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U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA  
Y 4. IN 8/16:B 65/995-2

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U.S. Policy Towards Bosnia, 104-1 H...

HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS


FIRST SESSION

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NOVEMBER 30, 1995

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
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# CONTENTS

## WITNESSES

	Page
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher, Secretary of State .....	4
The Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense .....	7
General John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Chiefs of Staff .....	12

## APPENDIX

Prepared statements:	
The Honorable Warren M. Christopher .....	43
The Honorable William J. Perry .....	49
The Honorable Toby Roth, Member of Congress .....	57
The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, Member of Congress .....	58
The Honorable Elton Gallegly, Member of Congress .....	59
The Honorable Cynthia McKinney, Member of Congress .....	61
Prepared materials:	
Material submitted by the Department of Defense .....	62
Questions for the record submitted to the Department of Defense .....	76
Questions for the record submitted to General Shalikashvili .....	105
Questions for the record submitted to Secretary Christopher .....	124



## U.S. POLICY TOWARDS BOSNIA

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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1995

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. Our hearing will come to order if our ladies and gentlemen will please take their seats. I want to thank our colleagues for being here despite all of the meetings going on this morning.

The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the substance and the details of the Bosnian peace agreement that was initialed last week in Dayton, Ohio. Since the time of our witnesses is limited and our colleagues have a number of serious questions, we will limit opening statements to those of the chairman and the ranking minority member. Any other opening statements will be made part of the record.

In a speech to the Nation this week, the President stated that American leadership, including the provision of more than 20,000 American ground troops, is vital to the implementation of the peace agreement. The President stated that our mission will be precisely defined, with clear, realistic goals that can be achieved in a definite period of time, which he indicated would be about 1 year.

Neither Congress nor the American people have yet heard precisely how this mission will be accomplished nor the exact number of troops that will be deployed. Figures have ranged from 20,000 to 37,500 to more than 40,000. The American people are entitled to know just how many Americans will be involved.

The peace agreement itself raises a number of questions that demand an answer. The agreement states that the warring factions are to withdraw from lines of confrontation, and if they do not withdraw voluntarily, our Americans will be called upon to risk their lives to move them. We question how this differs from fighting a war, which the President has assured us is not our objective.

Moreover, the peace agreement states that families pushed from their homes have the legal right to return to them but it is silent on just how that right is going to be implemented, and we hope we can get some answers with regard to that question this morning.

The agreement also describes an elaborate framework for investigating and determining human rights abuses. It is not yet clear on how such activities would be carried out. What will happen, for example, if Bosnian Serbs who have been implicated in human

rights charges refuse to cooperate? How will any findings and decisions be enforced?

The peace agreement also outlines specific arms control measures which the parties are to reach within 180 days through further negotiations, and if those negotiations fail, the agreement sets out a specific ratio of heavy weapons between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Accordingly, another question which we pose is what happens if the parties cannot agree on the arms control proposals? Will our troops be asked to forcibly remove those weapons? And if not, who will do that task?

That raises the question, then, of training and equipping the Bosnians. While not part of the mission, that proposal is certainly fraught with some peril. Is the Administration asking Congress and the American people to expect the Bosnian Serbs to quietly allow our troops to protect their enemies while their enemies are being armed and trained?

The President also has stated that our military force will remain in Bosnia for approximately 1 year, which appears at first glance to be an arbitrary timeframe. A number of military experts have expressed doubt that this mission can be completed within that time period. Canadian General Louis McKinzie, the former Commander of UNPROFOR, has stated that setting such a time limit, and I quote, "is impossible." He estimated that our forces would have to remain in Bosnia for at least several years.

So we ask, what are the criteria for determining if the mission has been successfully completed, and what will happen if those criteria have not been met at the end of 1 year? There appears to be an exit date but we have yet to hear the exit strategy. Is there a threshold, for example, for determining the success or failure of the mission, and if so, we would like that spelled out for us. Are any elements of this peace agreement so essential that if they are not carried out the military mission will be considered a failure, and if so, what are those criteria?

Beyond the agreement, however, is the fundamental question of U.S. leadership and our relations with NATO. The President has stated that U.S. ground troops are essential to demonstrate U.S. leadership, that only NATO can implement this peace agreement, and that NATO will not go into Bosnia without the United States.

However, in the spring of 1993, the Administration was unable to persuade our NATO allies to accept a U.S. proposal to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians and to provide limited air support. At that time, we were told that to preserve the cohesion of NATO, we had no choice but to maintain the embargo. We were also told that if we lifted the embargo, we would have to send American troops to Bosnia.

Now, our NATO allies are telling us that our nation must provide a substantial number of ground troops in Bosnia or the credibility of the alliance is going to be sorely weakened. On the one hand, we are told that the U.S. leadership is at stake. And on the other hand, we are apparently acting at the behest of our NATO partners, which raises another serious question. Just who is really leading whom?

We hope this panel will be able to provide adequate answers to these and other questions which our colleagues have. Before turn-



ing to our panel, I would ask our ranking minority member, Mr. Hamilton, if he has an opening statement.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for hosting these hearings. We appreciate that greatly. I welcome Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili to the hearing this morning.

The chairman, of course, has set out a number of questions and concerns that everybody in this room has. There is not a single person here that does not have a lot of concerns about the efforts that lie ahead of us.

But I do want to reflect for just a moment on what has been accomplished, and what has been accomplished is that for the first time since 1992, we will have a winter in Bosnia where a war is not going on. That is a very significant accomplishment.

I think the gentlemen seated in front of us at the witness table this morning deserve high praise for what they have accomplished thus far. The agreement that was struck in Dayton under the leadership of Secretary Christopher is a remarkable accomplishment. There is not anybody here who would have predicted that we could have achieved that kind of an agreement only a few weeks ago, certainly a few months ago.

So I do not think we should lose sight this morning of what has been accomplished, even though we have, as the chairman very ably stated, a lot of questions and a lot of concerns about the days that lie ahead of us.

We are going to hear a lot this morning about this agreement and some of its defects and I do not think anybody here would claim that it is a perfect agreement. A perfect agreement simply is not achievable in the real world. But I believe that it is the best peace agreement that can be achieved under the circumstances and I think the leaders of Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia believe that also and have embraced this agreement.

Gentlemen, thank you for what you have done. We appreciate the remarkable accomplishment of this peace agreement. We look forward to your testimony today as you seek to answer these very genuine concerns that members and the American people have about this venture. Most of all, we wish you and the troops and all that will have a part in executing now and implementing this agreement the very best.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

The record will be open for any opening statements by our members.

Our witnesses this morning are Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. We want to welcome our panelists, and again, we commend you for your intensive efforts in trying to bring peace to that part of the world.

When you appeared before our committee in October, the talks in Dayton had not yet begun and your testimony outlined a draft mission with few details. Now that an agreement has been initiated, it is our hope that you will be fully forthcoming to the detailed questions that our colleagues have.

We have been informed that your time is extremely limited. That being the case, I would hope that you would limit your opening

statements to short summaries. We will put the full statement in the record so that we may have as much time as possible for a dialog with our members. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary of State, would you kindly proceed? We would welcome a summary of your statement.

# **STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF STATE**

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you said, on Monday night, President Clinton addressed the Nation to explain why American troops should join our NATO allies to help peace take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I are here today to explain further our purposes and our plans, to answer your questions, and to seek your support.

We have a fundamental choice in this situation. As the President made clear, if the United States does not participate, there will be no NATO force, and if there is no NATO force, there will be no peace in Bosnia and the war will reignite.

We do not have to imagine the consequences if the war does reignite. We know what would happen. There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of a wider war, and immense danger to our leadership in NATO, in Europe, and in the world as a whole. Those are the alternatives that we absolutely must avoid.

The war in the former Yugoslavia has been a threat to our nation's interests and an affront to our nation's values. We have witnessed to horrors and cruelties that my generation, the generation that fought World War II, once thought had been consigned to a dark and distant past. We have also faced the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in this unstable part of Europe.

This summer, the conflict in Bosnia reached a crisis point. The President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step by step from the most horrifying events in Srebrenica and Zepa to this most hopeful point following last week's comprehensive settlement in Dayton.

We now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace, an opportunity created by American strength and American diplomacy. We will achieve that goal only if America continues to lead. The parties have taken risks for peace and we must continue to support them.

Our national interest in implementing the Dayton settlement is very clear. We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II. By helping peace take hold, we can make sure that the people of Bosnia see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug graves, no more years of isolation from the outside world.

We have a strong interest, as well, in making sure that this conflict does not spread. A widening war would threaten our allies and destabilize a regime where shifting frontiers and ethnic unrest have long been a cause of conflict among the great powers of the world.

Peace in this part of Europe matters to the United States because Europe matters to the United States. Twice this century, we

have sent millions of American soldiers across the Atlantic. Our leaders, Republicans and Democrats alike, have acted to protect our vital interests in Europe's stability. If we do not take this opportunity we now have for peace, we could be faced with the prospect of an action far costlier and far more dangerous than anything that is contemplated now.

Taking action now is an acid test of American leadership. After creating the opportunity for peace, we simply cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if this country does not follow through on the initiative we have taken, no nation will follow us, not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere. It is in our absolute national interest to maintain our leadership in the world by following through on the agreement that we reached in Dayton.

The Dayton agreement advances our national interest and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia. It was negotiated against a backdrop of four bloody years of war. It includes many hard-fought compromises, but on every important issue, it meets the principled and practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted at Dayton.

It is an agreement not just of goals but of means, and let me illustrate. It preserves Bosnia as a single state with Federal institutions that represent the Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities alike. It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and connects Gorazde to the Federation by a secure land corridor.

It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes and it creates a mechanism for settling claims to property.

The agreement makes it possible for democratic, internationally run elections to be held next year. I spent many hours in Dayton convincing the parties that the refugees in Bosnia should have a right to vote either where they currently live or in their original homes.

The agreement excludes war criminals from office and it explicitly obligates the parties to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate and punish violations.

Fundamentally, the agreement ends the war and requires the parties to move their armed forces behind agreed lines.

Sometimes in a negotiation like the one in Dayton, there is a temptation to take short cuts, to deal with the hardest issues in an ambiguous way. But in Dayton, we insisted on concrete and detailed commitments on the most critical issues that divided the parties. Because the agreement is fully comprehensive, it is more likely to endure. It is a comprehensive agreement with a framework agreement and 11 comprehensive annexes.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will speak in greater detail about our participation in IFOR, but before I conclude, let me address one or two of the questions that are most often asked.

I know many Americans have wondered why Europe cannot provide all of the ground troops for the NATO force. NATO was built on the sharing of risks and the sharing of effort. We are NATO's largest member. We are the core of NATO's strength and resolve.

The alliance simply cannot undertake what would be the largest mission in its history if we decline to do our share.

At the same time, I want to point out that we are doing only one-third in the sense that we are putting up 20,000 of 60,000 troops, with the other two-thirds coming from all of the other NATO members that have armed forces, from Russia and from many of our new partners in the Partnership for Peace in Central Europe.

Others have asked why, after 4 years of bloodshed, the parties are willing to enter into this agreement and they have asked whether they will carry it out. Fundamentally, we secured this agreement because peace is the key to what all the parties want, from reconstruction to justice to rejoining the international community.

Moreover, we constructed the agreement to ensure so far as can possibly be done that it will be carried out. We have made certain that the sanctions against Serbia, our main source of leverage with that country, will be reimposed. They have only been suspended and they will be reimposed if the agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will remain in place until they have withdrawn their forces behind agreed boundary lines.

As we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our military could implement and enforce. Each part of the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs of our armed forces and the advice of the very distinguished military members of our team who contributed so much at Dayton.

Let me assure you that the IFOR mission is well defined and carefully limited. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement, enforcing the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a zone of separation between them.

But they will not—I emphasize, not—be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction or to be a police force. One of the lessons that we learned painfully in the last few years is that our military should not and cannot be a permanent guarantor of peace. It can only create opportunities that others must then take advantage of and seize.

Because the IFOR mission is well defined, we have a clear end point, which Secretary Perry will describe in detail. In this connection, I want to stress that we are committed to achieving a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia so that peace will endure in that troubled region.

This should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions. It is not likely, however, that arms control measures alone will be sufficient for military stabilization. The armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which have been most severely affected by the arms embargo, will likely need to obtain some equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability.

For our part, the United States will ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary assistance. Neither the United States nor IFOR will directly participate in this effort through our military. The best approach and one that we will pursue is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

Civilian agencies from around the world will carry out a separate program to help the people of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will pay for most of this common civilian effort.

The well-known international organizations will play their important roles. The OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will supervise the elections. The UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees. The World Bank and the IMF will help Bosnia's economy recover from the devastation of several years. The European Union will play a leading role. There will also be a U.N. program to monitor and train the local police.

But none of these important civilian tasks will be carried out or could be carried out unless peace endures. There is no middle ground between peace and war in Bosnia. And in the choice between peace and war, as the President put it on Monday night, America must choose peace.

Many years from now, I have no doubt that people will look back in history on this month as a critical turning point for the United States and Europe. Let it be remembered as the moment when our country grasped the chance that we created for peace, not as the moment that we hesitated to act.

The President has made his choice. The United States must act as the great nation that we are. We must protect our interests. We must uphold our ideals. We must keep our commitments, and we must continue to lead.

In the coming days, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, our Administration will consult fully with you and the Congress. We feel confident about the case that we have. We feel confident that we should move forward. We are prepared to answer your questions and respond to your concerns.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Christopher appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The Secretary of Defense, Mr. Perry.

#### **STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit my written testimony for the record and just highlight that with my verbal testimony.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Without objection.

Secretary PERRY. I would like to use some charts to illustrate my points.

Chairman GILMAN. Please do.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, last week, after the signing of the Dayton agreement, I went to Bad Krevznach in Germany to meet with the leadership of the First Armored Division. This will be the backbone of the force, the U.S. force going into Bosnia. While I was there, I spoke with 700 of the military commanders, the division commander, the brigade commanders, the battalion commanders, the company commanders, the sergeant majors, the first sergeants, all of the military leadership that would be going into Bosnia.

When I spoke with them, I dealt with the questions which were foremost in their mind, and I would like to summarize these for you. Why is the U.S. committing forces to Bosnia? What will our mission be? Who else is sending troops? When will we go in? And when will we come out?

Today, I want to give the Congress and the American public the same answers that I gave our soldiers when I talked to them last week.

Why is the United States committing forces? I believe there is what I call an iron logic leading us from the first premise, that the United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe, to the last conclusion, which is that we should commit U.S. ground forces to participate in the peace force. I have summarized that here in five simple sentences.

The first point, that we do have these vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe, I think is essentially indisputable. For the past 50 years, we have pledged our lives and our treasures to protect Europe against aggression from the Warsaw Pact. That threat is now gone, but in the wake, through ethnic hatreds and national rivalries, they are creating a new round of instabilities, threatening the security and stability of Europe.

We are creating new structures to deal with these new problems—the Partnership for Peace, expanding NATO to encompass Central and Eastern European countries, what we call a pragmatic partnership with Russia. These are all positive developments that are well underway. The war in Bosnia threatens these developments, and therefore the war in Bosnia threatens our vital interests.

When I speak about the threat to these interests, I am going to distinguish between two different kinds of U.S. interests here. First of all, U.S. values. The killing and atrocities in Bosnia challenge U.S. values at the most fundamental level, and the opportunity to stop those killings and those atrocities is before us now.

But aside from that, there has always been a danger of this war spreading beyond Bosnia. Indeed, in the last few months, I would have given an even chance of a new war erupting between Croatia and Serbia. And for the last few years, there has always been a palpable danger of the war spreading to the south, to Macedonia, to Kosovo, involving Albania, possibly involving Greece or even Turkey.

That would threaten our vital interests in very important ways, and if this war spreads, and if then our vital interests required intervention, the intervention then would be at a much broader, much wider conflict and it would be intervening in a war instead of going in to enforce a peace.

We now have the first real opportunity to end this war. But to seize this opportunity, without any question at all in my mind, requires the commitment of U.S. troops as part of the NATO peace implementation force.

For 2½ years, we have said there would be no commitment of U.S. ground forces without a peace agreement, but it is also true that there will be no peace agreement without a commitment of U.S. ground forces. Make no mistake about it, the real alternative

to sending in this implementation force is allowing the war to continue.

That takes me to the last point, that the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue are greater than the risks of enforcing the peace. I will tell you, General Shalikashvili will tell you, there are risks involved. We will describe these risks. We will also talk about the efforts we are taking to reduce or to minimize the risks. But whatever we do, there will be risks involved and they have to be compared with the risks of allowing the war to continue, in particular with the danger of the war spreading.

I have also talked to our troops about what our mission will be. It is a peace enforcement mission and it is spelled out in the Dayton agreement. But first and foremost, we must protect our force, we must ensure the self-defense of our force and the freedom of movement of IFOR.

We will not repeat the mistakes of the U.N. force which is in Bosnia, which allowed itself to get pushed around, which allowed itself to have its freedom of movement curtailed. Our troops will be of sufficient size, sufficiently well-armed, and sufficiently well-trained and with sufficiently strong rules of engagement that they will be able to carry out this mission.

Also called for in the Dayton agreement is that we require the withdrawal of forces to respective territories. We have to establish and man a zone of separation, and I will show you more about that in a minute, enforce the cessation of hostilities.

And finally, through the whole aggregation of these activities, we will provide a secure environment which permits the conduct of other activities to take place in Bosnia which we will not be responsible for. I want to emphasize that there are a whole set of civil tasks—rebuilding the infrastructure, rebuilding the economy, overseeing elections, resettling refugees.

These are all critically important functions which will be taken on by other organizations and other institutions, not by NATO, not by the implementation force. But none of those can be successful unless we are there to provide the secure environment. So we are the necessary condition for these other activities to be successful.

I told you before, but let me reemphasize, that we will do everything that is possible—we are doing everything that is possible to minimize the risk to this force, the first and the most important of which is we did not send them in until we get the peace agreement. Then beyond that, the requirement of the large, strong force with strong rules of engagement are key.

This shows you the agreement within NATO of the responsibilities of the various forces that are going in. The U.S. division will have the northeast part of Bosnia, will be headquartered in Tuzla. I will tell you more about who will be joining us in that division and in the sector. The British will have the western section and the French will have the section in the vicinity of Sarajevo.

The three areas of greatest tension, greatest problems, are Gorazde, which is in the French section; Sarajevo, in the French section; and Brcko, which will be in the U.S. section. There are also some potential problems coming from Bihac, because in addition to the three contending forces in all of the rest of Bosnia, there are

rebel Muslim forces in Bihac making a fourth force complicating the issue.

I will describe to you in a few minutes who else will be in these forces, but in the U.S. area, we will have a Nordic brigade of approximately 4,000 troops in our division under the command of General Nash, the First Armored Division commander. That Nordic brigade will be a reinforcement of the Nordic battalion which has been located with the U.N. force, and therefore they will be bringing to us the knowledge of the terrain and the experience from having been there for the past years.

In addition to that, we will have a Turkish reinforced battalion which has been located in this area and they will be moving over to operate under General Nash, as well.

And finally, we expect to have a Russian brigade. The Russian brigade will be under the operational control of General Joulwan, but it will be under the tactical control of General Nash because it will be a part of the U.S. division.

I have had four meetings over the last 7 weeks with my counterpart in Russia, Minister Grachev, working out the arrangements for this. General Shalikashvili has talked with his counterpart, General Kolesnikov, until we could finally get the arrangements. We were responding to the guidance we got at the last NATO defense ministers' meeting in October, which said, first of all, it is important for the whole future security of Europe that Russia participate in this operation, but we cannot allow them to participate with a separate line of command. They have to be a part of this single command structure. In these four meetings I described to you, we are going through the agonizing process of working out how that could be done.

This chart shows you just one of the missions, which is enforcing the zone of separation. The boundary line between the two entities, the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serbs, the peace agreement requires that all troops and all arms be removed two kilometers on either side of that boundary line. One of the tasks of IFOR will be to establish and enforce that zone of separation.

That will, as you can see, require us to go into Bosnian Serb territory to do that. Although we will be based in Tuzla, our troops will be going into this area to enforce that. We also will be going through Bosnian Serb territory for our lines of communication.

Another task is to enforce the withdrawal of heavy weapons and troops to cantonments, which have to happen within 120 days after the peace agreement is signed. This zone of separation occurs within 30 days.

Yesterday, I was at the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels and we were concluding the final plans for the NATO involvement in this operation. All of the NATO nations, with the exception of Iceland, are contributing troops to this. The British, 12,000 to 14,000; the French, 7,000 to 9,000; the Germans, 4,000; Italians and Spaniards, about 2,000 each; and the other nine NATO nations, about 1,000 each. Proportional to the size of the country, these contributions are equivalent to or greater than the size of the U.S. forces.

In addition to that, more than a dozen nations, non-NATO nations, have indicated an interest in participating, and I have listed



some of them here. I have already described to you Russia's intention to participate. I have mentioned the Nordic brigade, which consists of two NATO nations, Norway and Denmark, plus non-NATO nations Finland and Sweden. And in addition, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all indicated an interest in participating in that brigade. This force will be fully subscribed by the interests of all of these nations in the participation.

We talked about the troops, about when they were going in. The answer to that is fairly simple. They start going in about mid-December, assuming that the peace agreement is signed on the 14th of December, which is the present plan. They will be going in a day or so after that.

General Shalikashvili can describe to you in more detail the deployment plan. I will simply say it will be a rapid deployment. We will go by rail to a staging area in Hungary, and the Hungarian parliament just yesterday voted overwhelmingly to approve our request to have that staging area in Hungary. I think the vote was something like 340 to 10 to approve that.

Then from that staging area, we will go in over road to Tuzla and we will go in by units and the units will go in on tracks, fully armed, ready for any contingencies as they go in. That is the plan for deployment, and within 2 months, more likely within 6 weeks, we will have the entire force deployed.

We have looked carefully at the missions which we are called to do in the peace agreement. We believe that those can be accomplished, including some months of stability after they are accomplished, within 1 year. Consequently, we have based our planning and our scheduling of this force on it being there for 1 year, which means that the process of building up I described to you which takes place over the first 2 months, it would be a reverse process taking place the last few months, building down the force for withdrawal at the end of about 1 year.

At that time, we expect the following situation to exist in Bosnia, and that is what I am calling the end state, the state in Bosnia when IFOR leaves. The military task will have been completed. The cessation of hostilities will be maintained for some number of months. The forces will have been separated. Territories will be transferred, and perhaps most importantly, this pattern of violence which has gone on for the last 4 years will have been broken.

At the same time, the civilian task which I have described to you, the reconstruction of the country which will be underway by different organizations, will have started. We have no expectation that that will be completed at the time we leave but we do expect it will have started—the economic reconstruction, internationally supervised elections, refugee return, and humanitarian assistance. All of these things will be underway at that time.

And finally, the conditions for reduced and stable regional military force balance will have been achieved. Secretary Christopher described to you the provisions in the Dayton agreement for an arms control process. Let me simply add to that that an important and a significant factor in the cause of this war was the dramatic imbalance of forces which existed 4 years ago between the Bosnian government forces and the Bosnian Serbs.

And, therefore, when we leave at the end of the year, we do not want to leave that same imbalance. We recognize the importance of that and the parties to the agreement recognize that, as well, and therefore they agreed to an arms control process to try to reduce that imbalance. That involves a 6-month cooling off period for the embargo while the process is working to build down the forces, as appropriate, to achieve this balance.

If, after 6 months, this balance is not achieved or it is not clear that it will be achieved, then, as Secretary Christopher said, the United States is willing to work with other countries to ensure that it can be achieved by providing the necessary arms to the Bosnian Federation. I do want to emphasize a point which he has made, though, that this will not be a task of NATO. It will not be a task of the U.S. military force. This is something that will be done through third parties but with the United States ensuring the success of it.

Mr. Chairman, there are many other points I could cover but this summarizes the major points in my written testimony. At this stage, I would like to turn the floor over to General Shalikashvili.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.  
General Shalikashvili.

#### STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you.

I would like to take just a few moments to brief you on NATO's plan for the implementation force and on the part that U.S. forces will play in the implementation of that particular plan. Before I begin, though, let me assure you that throughout the negotiations in Dayton, I and my staff have been in constant contact with our negotiators to ensure that the military tasks that would be assigned to the implementation force would be appropriate and would be executable, and I am satisfied that the military tasks are, in fact, clearly defined, are appropriate, and are executable.

That said, let me turn to the current situation in Bosnia and the major threats the IFOR will face, if I can have the next chart, please.

The situation on the ground has remained stable for quite some time now. Nevertheless, our soldiers have to be prepared to deal with the threats shown on that particular chart. This has been the emphasis of the very extensive training our forces have been receiving.

The next chart outlines the mission of the IFOR. The mission is very clear and very narrow. The chain of command is straightforward and the rules of engagement are proper. With the help of the next two charts, let me show you the specific military tasks outlined in the agreement.

Here are the specific tasks that Secretary Perry had already mentioned and are listed here in further detail. The next chart, please. Here is the remainder of those major tasks.

Just as it is important to understand the tasks that the IFOR must be prepared to perform, it is equally important to understand what tasks will not be the responsibility of the IFOR. Among these that the IFOR will not be responsible for is the conduct of humanitarian missions. IFOR will not be a police force. The IFOR will not conduct nation building, will not have a mission of disarming, collecting, or controlling weapons, and will not move refugees.

With that, let me show you on the next chart the chain of command. The NATO chain of command is, in fact, straightforward. It runs from General Joulwan, our supreme allied commander in Europe, to Admiral Smith, to British Lieutenant General Walker, who will command all ground forces, and on to Major General Nash, shown in the lower left-hand corner of this chart, who will command the American division.

Let me now turn to the rules of engagement. Under NATO's rules of engagement, our soldiers will have the right to use force to protect themselves against hostile acts or hostile intent and to get the job done that they have been assigned, and that includes the right to use deadly force, if necessary. The next chart, please.

In order to get the job done properly and safely, the plan calls for a total force of approximately 60,000 troops in Bosnia. As you have already heard, of this number, the U.S. contribution will be approximately 20,000 in Bosnia, with another 5,000 stationed in Croatia. Additional U.S. support forces, as mentioned by Secretary Perry, will provide needed support from rim countries, such as Italy and Hungary. This operation will require a selected reserve call-up of approximately 3,500 personnel in specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations, and military police. The next chart, please.

The operation itself will consist of five phases and we are now in a preparation phase, the first phase. Phase two, the entry phase, will begin immediately following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, now tentatively scheduled for the 14th, the passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution, and the issuance of the activation order by NATO. The next chart, please.

As the President stated in his Monday address to the nation, a small number of military personnel will have to be moved into the area early, ahead of the signing of the peace agreement to establish an essential communications command and support structure to enable rapid arrival of forces once the peace agreement goes into effect. The U.S. portion of these enabling forces will be 735 personnel in Bosnia with some 730 in Croatia, while other early deployments will go to Italy and Hungary to establish forward staging bases. The next chart.

Once the peace agreement goes into effect and NATO activates the deployment, French and British division headquarters will rapidly move in from the south through the two ports of Split and Ploce, while the U.S. division headquarters and appropriate security forces will enter from the north, from Hungary through Croatia. At the same time, the IFOR headquarters and the ACE rapid reaction corps, the ground component headquarters for this operation, will move to Sarajevo and Kiseljak, respectively.

As soon as these headquarters are established, IFOR will assume control of all UNPROFOR forces in the theater. The establishment

of headquarters that I just mentioned will be quickly followed by the arrival of lead brigades, and most forces should be in place, as Secretary Perry stated, by the middle of February. Once the forces are in place, the divisional areas will look as you saw on the chart that Secretary Perry showed and that is shown here once again.

Let me focus for a minute on the area where the American division will be located. The next chart, please.

There are, in fact, today two UNPROFOR units located in the American area, a Turkish battalion task force and the Nordic battalion in Tuzla that Secretary Perry mentioned. Both of those units have been extremely helpful in providing information and other assistance to our commanders as they gain knowledge of the area.

Our initial elements will go into Tuzla. Once all forces are deployed, our division headquarters will be in Tuzla, together with an aviation brigade, and distributed throughout the area will be two U.S. brigades, the Russian brigade that you heard about from Secretary Perry, a Nordic brigade, and the Turkish battalion task force. The next chart, please.

The plan also calls for the establishment of joint military commissions composed of IFOR commanders and the senior military commanders of each of the entities. Their purpose will be to resolve military implementation issues. Such joint military commissions will be established at each level of command. The next chart, please.

It is important that I restate something that Secretary Perry said and that is that the success of the total effort in Bosnia will depend not only on the IFOR, shown here in blue, but just as much on the civilian effort that Secretary Perry described, shown in green. The final chart, please.

After conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and after meeting on Monday in a very lengthy meeting with every defense chief of NATO, we concluded that the mission and tasks were clear, the chain of command was right without any dual-keys, and the rules of engagement appropriate to the task at hand. So we approved a plan and we sent it on to the North Atlantic Council for their approval, with the expectation that sometime by the end of this week or at the latest during this weekend, the North Atlantic Council would, in fact, approve this plan.

While the mission will be tough, and there is no doubt about it, and we have to be prepared for casualties, our soldiers have trained very hard and I am convinced they are ready and that the mission is doable.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I believe that Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and I are prepared to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Shalikashvili appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General.

I want to thank our panelists for their lengthy presentation and their extensive presentations for all of us.

Secretary Christopher, can you tell us precisely when the President made his commitment of sending up to 25,000 U.S. troops into Bosnia to help enforce a peace agreement?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, going back to 1993, President Clinton made it clear that the United States would not

put ground troops into Bosnia to fight a war. At the same time, beginning in 1993 and shortly after we came into office, the President also made it clear that if there was a true peace agreement that the parties were intent on implementing, the United States would join with other countries in NATO in implementing a peace agreement. Those two positions have continued to be the position of the President and the Administration since 1993.

Chairman GILMAN. At that time, when the President made his commitment, was there any consultation with the Congress with regard to the commitment?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, those matters have been the subject of testimony here consistently since 1993. I remember testifying before your committee in 1993 and stating exactly that position. Indeed, I reread that testimony before appearing here today. So those issues have been no stranger to Congress. Congress has been aware of that commitment since 1993.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Secretary, will each IFOR participant bear its own costs?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, that certainly is the intention of the United States. We have made very clear, for example, to Russia that its participation will be on its ticket, that Russia will pay its way if it participates.

Chairman GILMAN. And what about NATO costs, as well?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Those will be allocated in the customary way. Perhaps I would ask Secretary Perry to speak to that.

Chairman GILMAN. Can you give us an estimate of the total costs of this mission, Secretary Perry?

Secretary PERRY. The plan in NATO is that each nation will bear its own costs, with the exception of some relatively small set of infrastructure costs which will come out of the NATO budget.

Chairman GILMAN. And what will the overall costs of the mission be?

Secretary PERRY. The overall costs to the United States?

Chairman GILMAN. To the United States.

Secretary PERRY. Let me give you the assumptions and the costs that go with them. I will be describing to you costs which are incremental, that is, beyond what it would cost us to maintain our armed forces if we were not participating—

Chairman GILMAN. Just the overall costs, if you would.

Secretary PERRY. The overall cost will be, for the ground forces in Bosnia, \$1.2 billion. For the continuation of the air "deny flight" operation in Italy at the same level we have been doing it, that has been running \$300 million a year. And we estimate that the cost of the support facilities outside of Bosnia in the rim countries, in Hungary and Italy, for example, will be about \$0.5 billion.

Chairman GILMAN. So we are over \$2 billion, roughly, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. Two billion dollars. Two billion in round figures, yes, sir.

Chairman GILMAN. And are those incremental costs?

Secretary PERRY. Those are incremental costs—it does not include the salary of soldiers, for example, which we would be paying in any event.

Chairman GILMAN. You do not include soldiers' salaries?

Secretary PERRY. We do not include the salaries of soldiers. We would be paying the salaries for soldiers whether or not we are in Bosnia. These are costs which are not in the present budget, the present plans.

Chairman GILMAN. And that does not include any rehabilitation costs, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. No, no. NATO, IFOR, the Defense Department, are not responsible for those so those are not a part of our costs.

Chairman GILMAN. What are we estimating for rehabilitation costs? Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Pardon me, Mr. Chairman. I thought you were talking about rehabilitation in a military sense. The costs of reconstruction have been estimated by various international financial institutions as being in the \$6 billion range. The international financial institutions themselves will be picking up one-half of those costs. Of the remaining costs, the United States estimates that its share should be in the 20 percent range. That means \$600,000.

Secretary PERRY. Million.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I am sorry, \$600 million. Thank you, Secretary Perry. That would be over a 3-year period. So we estimate the costs at the current time to be \$200 million.

Mr. Gilman, I wonder if before—

Chairman GILMAN. Two hundred—

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Two hundred million dollars.

Chairman GILMAN. Two hundred million dollars for our total contribution for rehabilitation, is that correct?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. For reconstruction, \$200 million in the current year; a \$600 million commitment over a 3-year period, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. So then we are talking closely to another \$1 billion, is that right?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. We are talking about \$600 million.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Perry, I would like your comment on a story in today's Post which quotes U.S. officials expressing concern about the presence of up to a couple thousand non-Bosnian Muslim fighters, several hundred of whom are described as hardcore terrorists. In particular, what is your view about the allegation made by unnamed officials that there are certain elements of the Bosnian government who do not want to separate themselves from these particular elements? Are we going to have a problem with those elements?

Secretary PERRY. Our position is those elements should go out of Bosnia and that is encompassed in the peace agreement and that is encompassed in commitments which President Izetbegovic has made to Secretary Christopher, which he may want to speak more about.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, the agreement explicitly provides that all foreign forces will leave Bosnia within 30 days. That is a serious commitment, and as Secretary Perry has said, the Bosnian government as well as the other governments have underscored that commitment and indicated that it will be carried out.

Chairman GILMAN. If they do not leave, what do we do about that?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. That would be a violation of the peace agreement and there are many consequences of violating the agreement. In addition, Mr. Chairman, it is worthwhile saying here that IFOR is fully authorized to take whatever action is necessary to be able to carry out its mission. As I said, I have been assured by President Izetbegovic and other Bosnian leaders that foreign forces will leave.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Since I have had an opportunity to talk with these gentlemen before, I will have just one brief question. My question is directed to you, Secretary Christopher, and it is, does the United States have any secret or unwritten agreements, commitments, understandings, or assurances with any of the parties to the Dayton agreement that are not part of the published Dayton agreement and its published annexes?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. No, Mr. Hamilton, we do not. Our commitments are all here in this book. All commitments have been publicly stated. We have not hesitated to state our commitment to reconstruction and our commitment to ensure that there be an equilibrium of forces, which I outlined in my testimony here.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is all on the public record?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. On the public record.

Mr. HAMILTON. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Goodling.

Mr. GOODLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Having been a history professor during part of my former life, I hope you can understand my skepticism that I might have, realizing that this all began in the fourth century with the split of the Roman Empire, and we added to that the conversion of Bosnians to Islam during the Ottoman era, and then we see that with the Roman Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Christian Serbs, and the Bosnian Muslims, we have hardly created, 17 centuries later, the ideal melting pot. Yet, in 1 year, we are apparently going to put together a nation or a state or a nation-state, and I have not quite been able to figure out from the document which it is.

I wrote a letter to the President after his speech that basically said that I thought the use of the Pope in his speech was probably politically a good idea, but I was not sure that he did not miss what the Pope was trying to say; I think the Pope was trying to say what I have been trying to say for a year and that is that the Europeans could have gone in at the end of the 1800's. They had an ideal opportunity, but they decided to stay out. They could have gone in in 1908, but they decided to stay out.

They could have gone in in 1912 and 1913, both wars during that particular time, but they decided to stay out. They went in in 1914, which is what I think the Pope was trying to say, and that, of course, is when we expanded the war dramatically, as Bismarck predicted, over some fool thing in the Balkans.

So with that background, I have some real concerns. I would like to point out, however, that on October 18, I gave you a list of questions, because with 5 minutes, we do not have time to ask them

and get responses. They had to do with the how, the when, the where, the what, the which, and so on. We have asked every week since for the response to those questions. Every week, we are told it will come the next week, except one week we were told that the government is shut down so it will be next week.

We still have not gotten those responses, which seems to me is not the kind of way I would go about trying to build a relationship with the Members of the Congress. You have answered partially some of those questions today, but I am still hoping that I will receive the answers to those questions before our troops get on the ground and would hope it would be next week. That would be a celebration of my birthday, to get it a month and a half later than the request.

I would add just a couple other questions to that. What exactly do we hope to accomplish in the mission? As I said, you have explained this partially, but do we desire a secure, stable, and inclusive Bosnian state accommodating Serbs, Croats, and Muslims? What do you believe comprises a nation-state? And again, I am a little confused with what it is we are building here. Do you think this is achievable in Bosnia? How many American casualties do you envision? If you remember, I had asked on October 18 what your models would show in relationship to that. What are we going to do about the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic? Are we intent on arresting him or not?

So I would add those questions to the group that you have had for a month and a half and hopefully next week I will have those in writing. I would like some assurance that I would have those by next week. I do not think that is asking too much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Goodling, you are entitled to an answer to your questions and I assure you that you will have them by next week. We did answer a very extensive series of questions by the Speaker and that response was made public. We are now, I think, in a position to answer the questions because we have the Dayton agreement and we have the plan for IFOR.

What we hope to accomplish here, Mr. Goodling, is what the parties hope to accomplish, and that is peace. This is not about war; this is about peace. The nation that has been created here is a single nation with two entities, the Serbian entity, the so-called Republika Srpska, and the Federation, consisting of Bosnian and Croatian elements.

Those two entities make up the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a nation with very strong national powers, national foreign policy, powers of foreign trade, and a central bank that will be negotiated at some length in Dayton. So we have a single nation with two entities, not totally unlike the situation in either Switzerland or Belgium, where there are entities within the country based upon ethnicity and other factors.

As an historian, I think you would understand that nations are frequently created in this way. Indeed, in a sense, I suppose our nation is, as well.

We think this undertaking is achievable because the parties themselves want to achieve it. They came to Dayton and they stayed in Dayton in order to work out a peace agreement. This is



not war, and the President would not be recommending that we put troops in if it were a war.

We, as the Secretary and General will tell you, are doing everything we can to minimize the number of casualties. These troops are superbly trained. They are well equipped. They will go in heavy. We are very anxious to minimize the number of casualties. There is no model for this particular kind of an enterprise. Although every military operation is risky, we are going to make this one as safe as possible.

Finally, Mr. Karadzic and the other leaders of the Bosnian Serbs authorized President Milosevic of Serbia to sign the agreement on their behalf. I was not satisfied with that. I went to Milosevic; it was perhaps the last thing I did in Dayton, and asked that he get the initials of all of the Bosnian Serbs on the agreement. We agreed he would do that within 10 days. He accomplished that within 2 days. I think he is dealing very well with the problem of the Bosnian Serbs. They have now initialed the agreement. They will be present in Paris. Once again, we will be asking them to initial the military annex. We have taken that very seriously into account.

One thing more I would mention is that Mr. Karadzic can have no role in the future governance of that area. Under the constitution and under the provisions of this agreement, indicted war criminals are not permitted to have a role in the government.

Mr. GOODLING. Mr. Chairman, I would want the record to show that I am not an elected official from Georgia but an elected representative from the 19th District of Pennsylvania. I do not read what the Secretary may write to the Speaker.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was never a history professor but a little bit of a student. It seems to me that the length of this conflict is not quite as long as others that you have been working on, the one in the Middle East which may have been going on for two or four millennia, Mr. Secretary. Many of us, myself included, were not very optimistic about you getting Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat together and shaking hands. I think the world was astounded by your success there, and even with the tragedies, the continued efforts toward peace in the Middle East.

So the length of time of a conflict should not deter us from trying to move forward in a peace process, and I commend you and the Secretary of Defense and General Shalikashvili for your efforts in this area. From the beginning, there were skeptics and all of us in the Congress fearful that you could not achieve your goals. The Europeans were resistant to the use of air power. Many said that would not bring the parties to the table, that you would not be able to end the fighting. You convinced our European allies to go with your program. It has been successful.

There are clearly concerns that every Member of Congress has, but I, for one, want to commend the three of you and the President for taking a risk that most politicians will not take. This conflict did seem so intractable that the easiest thing would have been to avoid participating or trying to come to a solution.

The two areas of question that I would like to pursue at the moment are, one, the role of the indigenous forces. As you separate them, it seems to me that one of the things that I would like to see are the indigenous forces having some responsibility for keeping their areas secure. The Israelis, in their situation, their biggest threat today are terrorist attacks. Frankly, the success in reducing those has been directly increased—the reduction in terrorist attacks has been more effective as a result of the Palestinian participation.

So while our forces and their training are, I think, unmatched in the world, have we got agreements or will we have agreements with the indigenous forces to take on a role, as well?

Secretary PERRY. Let me make an answer to that and give General Shalikashvili a chance to add to it. We do expect the indigenous forces to be playing an important role. One example of that is in mine clearing. Another related example is giving us the charts of where they believe all of the mines are laid while this process of clearing is going on. They will have to maintain the cease-fire. They will have to establish some basic order in the state. So they will have a continuing function.

General Shalikashvili.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think it is clear that the execution of all military tasks which contribute to the stability of the area is first and foremost the responsibility of the indigenous forces. It is our responsibility to observe, and where necessary then to enforce it, but it is first and foremost their responsibility. And by implementing those and by, after time, removing their heavy weapons and their troop concentrations back to their garrisons and training areas, they, in fact, contribute in a most meaningful way to the stability and the security of those areas, so they have a very big part in it.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will you be utilizing them in trying to limit the danger of terrorist attacks? Every Member of Congress, I think all of you, and the President, have concern for American personnel. As you know, one car bomb can create a tremendous amount of carnage. Those forces, it seems to me, would be most effective, as well, at intelligence gathering and what have you, and is that being developed?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Absolutely. It remains their role. We will always be prepared to protect ourselves and take the necessary action to be able to get the job done, but it is first and foremost their responsibility, and through those joint military councils that I described to you, we will be coordinating such information. We will be coordinating the assistance that they have to provide and the function that they have to provide. So it is, from the very beginning, the intent to work together and ensure that they carry that burden, although we remain prepared to ensure that we take care of ourselves in case that fails.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I thank the gentleman. I will just take one more second of the committee's time. As I think as understandably cautious every Member of Congress is on committing ground forces into an area of danger, one of the things, listening to Mr. Goodling again, is that not participating in a solution has significant dangers, as well. As we have seen in the past, and I think the fear po-

litically for many people, although I do not think the decisions here are political, is to vote for putting forces in the field and then finding out that a number of your constituents have been killed in a terrorist attack or a conflict.

The other side of that, of course, is if we do not find a way to end this fighting, that we take some of the responsibility for seeing the mass graves and the concentration camps again and that fighting can spill over to other countries in the area. That, again, would lead to an impact on Americans. Many Americans thought that we could stay out of World War II for an awfully long time and we paid a terrible price for it. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili.

Let me say I am very impressed with the peace accord. I am also very impressed with the rationality of the case for intervention, particularly in a timing sense. But I am particularly skeptical on some non-military grounds. For example, it seems to me that fundamentally at issue other than military balance is the question of what might be described as a Balkan versus an American precept of human nature.

If these agreements can be viewed in a pragmatic, rational context, one can have a high level of optimism that the approach is going to work. On the other hand, if we view the human context as one where revenge for events of past days, weeks, years, and centuries are imbued in the environment of the peoples, the up-bringing of the children, it is difficult to be optimistic about the traumas that may face troop intermediaries.

In this context, I have four concerns. First, what happens if the consensus for peace breaks down or does not materialize among significant numbers of people?

Second, I am concerned about the rationalization for intervention as it relates to NATO. An alliance is designed to serve foreign policy objectives. A foreign policy objective is not to serve an alliance.

Third, I am concerned that where there is apparently an exit date, there has not been a well-articulated exit policy nor a contingency strategy. An exit perspective, if the issue is human nature, the nature versus nurture problem, we have a multi-generational, not multi-month, circumstance.

From a contingency perspective, I am rather confident our troops will be empowered to respond appropriately to attacks of platoons or companies by platoons or companies, but it is not as clear what happens if the attacks are anarchistic. Troops subject to sniping and land mine maiming may not know who to respond against. The abstract right and might to respond is very different from the concrete ability to cope with anarchy.

Fourth, I am concerned that troops trained to prevail in the cold war and deal with the conflicts that have emanated in the aftermath of World War II may not be as prepared to deal with the entangling issues more closely associated with World War I than World War II.

Despite these concerns, however, I believe Congress has the responsibility to recognize that the President has a constitutional

right to act and we have the obligation to support our troops. As much as I and other members remain constitutionally—with a small “c”—skeptical, we as a Congress should not undercut the mission. Indeed, at this point, it strikes me that except for second guessing, the arguments are largely over and what the Congress now has to cope with is the question of how we can help make this mission successful.

But I would simply ask at this point to return to one of my concerns and ask you to respond to this issue of exit policy. What is the achievable objective and how is it that you view your capacity to leave on a time basis, defining what that objective is, and how do you cope with anarchy if that emerges in this setting?

Secretary PERRY. Let me see if I can respond. I appreciate very much your comments, Mr. Leach. Let me see if I can address a few of your points of skepticism.

The hatred and the desire for revenge is our biggest enemy there and it is a deeply entrenched, very strong issue. I discussed this with all of the leaders at Dayton when I went out there at Secretary Christopher's invitation. They recognized that and they said, “What we need is a breathing space.” How long that breathing space is necessary, no one can estimate. A year breathing space is a pretty good breathing space.

On NATO, I just came last night from the defense ministers' meeting of NATO. I have never seen NATO as unified as it is on the importance of a mission and on the belief that the approach we are using is the proper approach to deal with it. Every defense minister had that conviction. I cannot think of another issue in the last 20 years in which they have all been so unanimous.

Secretary Christopher will be at the foreign ministers' meeting next week and I am sure he will find the same point.

On the issue of the difficulty of dealing with the snipers, the terrorists, the anarchy, we have for the last few months been training this First Armored Division on just those kinds of missions, including very detailed field exercises at our training range in Hohenfels, where we have set up a mini-Bosnia, a village, a Serbian army, a Bosnian army, paramilitary forces, village mayors who are causing problems, CNN. We have all the threats gathered there to the well-being of the soldiers.

[Laughter.]

Secretary PERRY. Then each battalion has gone through this training. Besides the usual combat training, they have gone through this training where the whole purpose of the training was to confront them with scenarios that they did not know how to handle. As soon as we saw a battalion handling a scenario properly, we would make it more difficult. We would change it.

General Joulwan, who is the supreme commander of this force, the motto for this training is, “The scrimmage should be harder than the game,” and that is the way we are training our soldiers.

Maybe General Shalikashvili would like to add to that.

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, I think you have said it.

Mr. LEACH. Let me just say that I am pleased that this is not entirely a first versus second estate issue, that there is a common recognition that the fourth estate is the real enemy.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me first commend our team and Secretary Holbrooke and the President for an extraordinary achievement. Let me also say that since so much in this town is predicated on polls, the polls are clearly running against the position you are taking. It is important for us to realize that the single greatest post-World War II achievement of our nation, the Marshall Plan, had 17 percent support in the polls when it was first announced by President Truman, and I think this augurs well for your mission.

I was intrigued by some of my colleagues bringing in history. I do believe there is nothing more important than an understanding of history as to how we got here, but there is nothing more dangerous than a misreading of history. The relevant timeframe for looking at the Bosnia crisis is the breakup of Yugoslavia, and if I am not mistaken, the Bush administration was in charge at that point.

I am one of those Democrats, and I was in the minority, who publicly and strongly supported the Bush administration in the Persian Gulf War, but I called on the Bush administration along with numbers of others, publicly and privately, to use the deterrent capability of NATO to prevent this bloodbath. We are now here using NATO after a quarter million people are dead and two million people are refugees. So we are here because we did not act earlier, and let no one forget that.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, it is important to look at the regional attitudes. You mentioned, General Shalikashvili, that one of the staging areas is Hungary. The Hungarian parliament is about as open and free and rambunctious as any in the world, and yesterday, by a vote of 312 to one—312 to one—they voted to authorize using the country as a staging area. This is typical of the attitudes in the region. The region desperately wants this plan implemented.

They are fully supportive of us, and I think it is important for us to recognize that your argument that without NATO there is no plan to bring peace, and without U.S. participation NATO cannot function, is an absolutely unassailable logic in this situation.

I do want to pay tribute to some Republican colleagues, particularly Senator Lugar and to a lesser extent Senator Dole, for taking a very responsible position to this crisis. This is not a Democratic crisis. This is not a Clinton administration crisis. This is a global crisis in which we must act as a nation.

I only have one question. The plan calls for the return of refugees or compensation to refugees. It is my judgment, and I would be grateful for your reaction, that the bulk of the refugees will never return, that the bloodbath which has unfolded in the last 4 years makes a return of refugees to most places very unlikely.

I would suggest that the wealthy Muslim nations be approached for a special fund to provide compensation for the Muslim refugees who have been forced out. Practically all of these people will find it impossible to return to their previous homes and I think it is appropriate for wealthy Muslim nations, particularly some for which we have done so much, like Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, to carry the financial burden of providing compensation for Muslim refugees. I would be grateful if you would comment.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. That is a very interesting suggestion, Mr. Lantos. As you know, one of the annexes in the Dayton agreement is a specifically designed annex for refugees. It provides for the creation of a commission on refugees and displaced persons which has the duty to try to determine the ownership of property, for example. There are also very heavy duties in this annex for the UNHCR.

I think that we will be wanting to seek the participation of the Islamic nations in the reconstruction fund, and I think you have added a very interesting idea, that we should also seek their participation in compensating the refugees if they have been displaced and cannot get their property back.

There is a great opportunity here to deal with a situation that is filled with anger and hostility. However, we should not be defeatist about it. We should not be pessimistic or cynical about it. I am glad to have your comments. This situation is certainly no more serious than that in South Africa or the Middle East or Northern Ireland, and there is promise in all those situations. There can be promise here if we grasp this promise for peace.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

At this time, I would like to recognize the British member of the European Parliament, Chairman of the European Parliamentary Delegation to the United States, Alan Donnelly, who is kind enough to visit our committee. Mr. Donnelly, welcome.

I would like to also ask my colleagues to keep an eye on the lights, if you would. We have 26 more members to inquire and we have about 60 minutes remaining, so with your cooperation, we will try to get through all of them.

Our next inquiry is from Mr. Roth.

Mr. ROTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, it is great to have you with us this morning. As you know from your previous visits, I have expressed my misgivings and concerns about this project and I do so again today. You know, when you stop to consider it, we cannot get the Democrats and the Republicans together on a budget here on Capitol Hill but we are going to send 25,000 troops or more halfway around the world to try to bring peace to the killing fields in Bosnia. The situation would be comic were it not so serious.

I just have three questions and I would like to direct them to Secretary Perry because I know you are a very frank and forthright person. The President has said that, unfortunately, we can expect casualties. From the studies you have conducted at the Pentagon on the different scenarios, could you give us some idea of what kind of casualties we can expect, because that is the greatest concern we have on this committee and in the Congress.

Second, yesterday, some 10,000 Bosnians were demonstrating, marching in Sarajevo saying that they do not want to be put under Muslim control. I listened attentively, Mr. Secretary, when you were briefing the committee this morning, and you said that the General here is going to be going in with some 25,000 troops and who knows how many other support troops as peacekeepers. But you also said by implication that the United States is going to be

arming the Bosnian Muslims. How can we do that? That seems like we are playing different roles. How can we be a neutral party?

And the third question is, Mr. Secretary, because many of us were around at the time of Vietnam, do you really, deep down in your heart, feel this is doable? I do not want to go through the McNamara experience again, where a Secretary of Defense comes and says, "I knew at the very beginning it was not doable."

Secretary PERRY. Let me take those questions one at a time, Mr. Roth. On the casualties, there are no models for casualties in this kind of an operation, and anybody that represents to you that the casualties will be such and such is misrepresenting, I think, is extending his information farther than the data will support.

Some people have suggested that we can look to the U.N. UNPROFOR as a model for this. UNPROFOR had about 20,000 people in Bosnia. We are putting about 20,000 people in Bosnia. They had about 60 casualties a year. I do not think that is a reasonable model because they were there in the middle of a war. We will be there enforcing a peace agreement. Also, our forces in general will be much better armed and better trained.

But I cannot answer your question on casualties. We do not have a good model for that.

In terms of the demonstrations in Sarajevo, all of the parties have found features in this peace agreement they do not like, and you see some arguments, some protests, including the public demonstrations in Sarajevo about the features of the agreement and determining the boundaries around Sarajevo.

In terms of the specific question about equipping the Bosnian forces, as I said in my testimony, I believe that the military balance is crucially important, that the way to get this is through a build-down, and that the process is in place, not only that is in the agreement. There will be a conference in Bonn in about mid-December to develop the actual arms control process.

But if, after this 6-month period—first of all, there is an embargo for the 6 months for heavy weapons. After the 6-month period, if we do not see a way clear to achieving a balance, we are prepared to work through third countries to correct the imbalance. It will not be an action of the IFOR. It will not be an action of U.S. military forces, but the United States is willing to support, to that extent.

I went with General Joulwan to Dayton. He went in and talked with the Bosnian Serb leaders who were there, including some of their military personnel. He told them, "We are not going in as your enemies. We are going in to enforce the peace. We are not seeking a fight. We will not provoke a fight with you. If you attack us, we will respond quickly and surely and with deadly force. But we are not cowboys. We are not seeking a fight. Our troops are well trained, they are well disciplined, and I believe they will handle that situation very well."

We want to send two different messages, really, to the Bosnian Serbs. The first is we are not going in as enemies, and I believe they are beginning to understand that now. But second, if they treat us as enemies, we will respond strongly and sharply.

Is this doable? I want to answer that question and I want to give General Shalikashvili a chance to answer it. You asked me, what do I feel in my heart, and it is an easy answer because it is the

same as my official position. Yes, I believe it is doable. If I did not believe it were doable, I would not be representing that to you. I would leave my job before I would come over and tell the Congress something I did not believe on an issue this important.

General Shalikashvili.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I can only say, Mr. Roth, that when I included that in my prepared statement and the charts, that I consider this mission to be doable, although it is going to be a tough mission and although we must be prepared for casualties, it is doable, I was as sincere as I could be.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Shalikashvili, the President has stated that we would not sign off on this agreement unless there are clearly defined goals and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that it could be accomplished in about 1 year. I have a great deal of respect for you, sir. Can you look me straight in the eye and tell me that, in fact, within 1 year, we can extricate ourselves and our troops from this mission?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe that it will take us less than a year to get the prescribed military tasks accomplished. I believe that very firmly.

I also believe that in a period of about a year, through our presence and through our actions there, we will be able to provide the secure environment that will allow for the civilian tasks that we have talked about here to get started and to take root.

And finally, I believe that 1 year is sufficient time to create this military balance that we have spoken about through the methods that both Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher spoke to. Therefore, I am convinced that we will be able to leave in about a year and we will see those conditions that I just outlined on the ground.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Secretary or to the General, whoever prefers to answer, we have talked a lot about 20,000 troops, and having listened to both of you today, it sounds like the sum in total, including those in Croatia and the selected reserve call-up comes to about 28,500 or so.

There is an article in this week's Defense News that talks about early estimates which, excluding support personnel, could reach totally for the whole mission 240,000 people. And, of course, that would be if we were to take the third that we are presently taking when we talk about ground troops, that would be a much larger figure.

Could you give to me and the committee not only the ground troops but the total commitment of troops for this mission, those in the Adriatic, those in air support, the total deployment of troops for this mission, of U.S. proportions?

Secretary PERRY. Of the U.S. troops, U.S. commitments, there will be 20,000 troops in Bosnia. There will be 5,000 in Croatia providing support for those forces in Bosnia. There will be about 7,000 in the rim countries, Italy and Hungary primarily, there providing the logistics backup and logistics base for these. That comes to



32,000. That encompasses the 3,500 reserves. The reserves are not added to that.

That does not include the Air Force which we have in Italy. That will continue the way it has been, and there are perhaps a few thousand people involved in that Air Force operation. It does not include our Naval operations in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. Even if we were not conducting this operation, we will keep a Naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. We do not expect this operation to add to that requirement, so we do not count them in the total.

Mr. MENENDEZ. You are not adding any to that?

Secretary PERRY. That does not include the people in the United States who, one way or the other—like General Shalikashvili and myself have time spent on this, but we do not count ourselves as part of the force.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I understand. Last, Mr. Secretary, we keep talking about this breaking into a wider war. For both the committee and the American public, both you and Secretary Perry have said in your statements about the possibilities of wider wars and you have mentioned the countries. Could you give the committee a sense of what exists within those countries that, in fact, could lead to a wider war, because I am not sure that, having seen the rates of our students on both geography and history, that everybody clearly understands. I would like you to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The threat of a wider war, of course, extends in all directions. There has always been a serious threat that this conflict could spread into Kosovo and Macedonia. For that reason, among others, we have 600 American troops in Macedonia serving as a deterrent.

But conflict would not stop there, because if it spread to Kosovo, which has primarily an Albanian population, it is hard to imagine it might not involve Albania. If conflict spread that far south, it would very likely involve two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. The possibility of conflict spreading to the south is very real and very serious.

We know what will happen if this agreement is turned down, if we do not participate in IFOR. The war will resume, the killing will resume, and the possibility of war spreading will be very great.

Now, let us look northward. One of the things that came out of Dayton which has not been talked about here today, is an agreement between Croatia and Serbia with respect to Eastern Slavonia, an area of Croatia on the Serbian border. If the Dayton agreement is not implemented, I think the likelihood of the agreement on Eastern Slavonia surviving would be somewhat limited. That conflict, which we thought was put to rest, might well flare up again.

In addition, there are large populations of conflict Serbs in Hungary and Hungarians in Serbia. So the implications of spreading there are considerable and very worrisome.

If a war were to extend that far, containing it then would be extremely difficult.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired. Again, I urge our colleagues to cooperate with the remainder of our mem-

bers who have not had an opportunity to question, to curtail your time and watch the lights.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Gentlemen, thank you very much for the dedication and energy you brought to your task of formulating a peace and implementation plan. Nevertheless, I have to conclude that this is a very wrong decision for the country.

Contrary to what you said, Secretary Christopher, I think we will be coming back in a couple of years and realizing just that. It is a fatally flawed plan. It will fail. I believe that within 2 years maximum—after we withdraw NATO and American troops, IFOR troops, the Croatians and Serbs will carve up Bosnia. There is no historical precedent for putting together in some sort of cobbled-together federation two disparate halves who have been fighting each other. It is just unlikely to work.

Now, if we involve American ground troops in a place like Bosnia or anywhere else, it must be in our vital national interest. I suggest to you it is not in our vital national interest to be involved, and I will make one exception to that that I will come to in a second.

NATO is a self-defense, mutual defense pact. If we are going to involve our troops out of area for the first time in a major way, it had better be in our vital national interest and in the interest of the NATO countries involved.

What I would like to suggest to you is that we have a situation that could spread to Macedonia—I agree with you; but Congressman Lantos and I may have been the first people going to the President from the Congress suggesting we send troops there. There should be three times as many. They should have armor. They should have tougher rules of engagement, but they ought to be there, because if it expands into a Southern Balkan war, we potentially bring Greece and Turkey in on opposite sides and that would be contrary to our vital national interest.

But there is really no direct or even significant indirect threat to NATO countries. Yes, it violates our sensibilities, our values, to have this regime of atrocities going forward in Bosnia, but we could be involved for that reason in Rwanda. In the past and now, we could have been involved in Cambodia, where we had much higher levels of atrocities and genocide taking place, but we were not. We have to distinguish when it is in our vital national interest to be there.

Now, one of the things I would focus—after giving you my views that this is an effort that is doomed to failure—are the comments about the exit strategy. The term most used by the Administration is "In approximately 1 year, we will withdraw U.S., NATO, and IFOR elements from Bosnia." Well, I think that, in fact, is a very bad decision and I think it is unachievable. I have great confidence in our troops and their ability and their leadership.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutsch, when he came before us in September of last year, speaking about Haiti, said, "We are concerned at the Department of Defense, both civilian and military leadership, with setting a specific time limit for the military mission in Haiti. An arbitrary time limit, Mr. Chairman, endangers the military in a variety of ways. We believe the Congress setting

a date for completion of military action at the outset to be an extremely bad precedent for the United States. This issue, in the judgment of the civilian and military leadership of the Department of Defense, goes far beyond Haiti."

So I would suggest that, one, it is not achievable. It is not achievable to have a peace in that period of time, to really have the peace enforcement people do their jobs, because it is not a military-to-military confrontation you are going to be facing, General. It is going to be something far different. I think you understand it is not a platoon against a platoon, a company against a company, and so on.

So I do think we need to be fair and candid and accurate about how we are going to get out of the place, and to propose 1 year is a mistake in a strategic sense because this operation has to be linked to strategic objectives, not to a time limit. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I share a lot of the concerns expressed on both sides of the aisle about exit strategies and 1-year deadlines and both being neutral peacekeepers and giving the Bosnian government the means and the weapons to defend itself in the future, but this is a very strange time to consider contemplating a course that would have the Congress of the United States undermine the remarkable diplomatic achievements made at Dayton.

These folks and the President have been talking for 2 years about 25,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia should there be a peace agreement. Both in the Democratic Congress and in the new Republican Congress, we have had ample opportunities to exercise our constitutional power of the purse to prohibit the expenditure of any funds at no occasion for the deployment of those peacekeepers. We have had two supplementals this year to do it.

We have a Defense Conference Committee report where any language on this was stripped out by the majority party conferees in the bill that was sent to the President, and nowhere was there an effort to say before Dayton that we do not want to see any peacekeepers deployed in Congress in the meaningful constitutional way we have to, which is through the power of the purse.

One small slice of the Administration's arguments about why it would be so wrong now not to support this decision is the role of the United States in the world, and I would suggest that our vital national security interests are defined by our role as the world's remaining superpower and, I think, our interest in exercising world leadership.

If we now undercut this particular decision through congressional action, tell me, what are the ripple effects down the road when we tell China, as we engage with them, and we tell China that they should resolve their differences with Taiwan through discussions and not resort to military means; when we tell North Korea to halt a nuclear program and what will happen to them should they cross a line in their relations with South Korea; when we move around the world trying to promote regional stability and to stop countries from proliferating weapons of mass destruction and the technology for those weapons, what are the effects on such

a decision, given the commitments made at Dayton, given the remarkable diplomatic achievement made there?

To me, there is a risk of terrible consequences in what we are to undertake. The witnesses say it is doable. They do not say it is a slam-dunk and there are negative consequences from it failing. But the risks of damage to the United States in terms of its role as world leader from now undermining this effort seem to be certain. So notwithstanding all the reservations, it seems to me at this particular point the best thing we can do for this country is to provide support for the decision and the deployment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

I just would like to note for the gentleman, there were two congressional resolutions adopted before any signing. One resolution that the Congress adopted said that the peacekeepers should not rely on U.S. participation. The second one denied funding until the President were to come to the Congress.

Mr. BERMAN. If the gentleman would just yield to me for a moment—

Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield.

Mr. BERMAN. There was a House-passed resolution which essentially said, "Do not do it before a vote." I am not suggesting we not have a vote. The Administration is committed to coming to Congress for its support on this issue.

The real question was, did you want to stop this from happening? You had so many opportunities. It was always about, do not do it before a vote or a sense of Congress. It was never right at the guts of the issue. And it is, once again, Congress not wanting to take its appropriate role in the particular process.

Mr. SMITH. Would my friend yield?

Mr. BERMAN. I would suggest that every construction of resolution was a—

Chairman GILMAN. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. SMITH. I thank the distinguished chairman for yielding.

You cannot have it both ways, I would say to my good friend from California. When Mr. Buyer and when Mr. Hefley offered their resolutions, H.R. 2606 and H.Res. 247, the Administration implored our side of the aisle not to go forward with this because it might upset things at Dayton. It might upset the negotiations. We argued that the Administration ought to have prior knowledge before and not after that there is widespread bipartisan opposition to the deployment of 20,000 or 25,000 troops.

One of the resolutions, H.R. 2606, would have said no funds unless specifically appropriated. Now, we know that the President is holding a lot of cards here. He would veto this bill. But, nevertheless, we passed it, and we were implored, and I am looking at the folks from the White House who came and lobbied and talked very aggressively, and they have their point of view and I respect it, but they asked us not to do this. We wanted everybody to be very clear that there was widespread opposition to this deployment. That is why we passed these before and not after.

Mr. BERMAN. Just to respond, that was a great time to do something which, by the way, only passed one house—this is a two-house legislature—in the middle of the talks in Dayton. What

about the 2 years where the President was saying, "I am committed to put 25,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia if there is a peace agreement." Where were we then? We were messing around and we were avoiding the issue.

Chairman GILMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the chairman and I will try to confine my 6 hours of commentary to the 5 minutes allotted, so I probably will not ask questions but there are some things I would like to unburden myself about.

Let me preface my remarks by saying you three gentlemen are superb public servants. You are men of honor, integrity, and accomplishment, and my critique and criticisms do not reflect on you personally. I think we are lucky to have you.

But, I want to say this. Cooperation is what you are seeking from us. What is the function of a Congressman in this situation? Are we to ratify a fait accompli by the President? Are we to rubber stamp decisions? Is that our role, or are we to exercise independent judgment?

Well, if we are take a clue from the other body, when they are confirming or rejecting Supreme Court nominees, they are pretty independent. The fact that the President picked Robert Bork does not mean a thing. "Destroy him politically because he is a towering intellectual conservative and we cannot have that." They are different situations, but I am talking about the function of a legislator when the President makes a choice.

Cooperation—we are unitary human beings. It is hard to put budget, foreign policy, domestic policy in different layers in my mind, but we just heard this morning that in the budget negotiations, which, frankly, are critical, the Democrats are making fools out of the Republicans. They have rejected the Republican budget.

They have said, "We do not want it. We do not like it. It is terrible." And we have said, "Where is your budget?" and they say, "We are not going to submit one." That has been going on for 2 days. That is worse than arguing about the shape of the table, as we used to do with the Vietnamese. So it is hard for you to come in and ask cooperation when you are evoking frustration in other very essential parts of governing.

Now, national interest, that is the most interesting topic of all. Charles Krauthammer says, "The role of a superpower is to redress the imbalance of power, not to act as policeman. That is the role for smaller countries." That is an interesting speculation, but I noted with some interest a comment by Dwight Eisenhower in 1963 that our military presence in Europe would "continue to discourage the development of the necessary military strength Western European countries should provide for themselves."

One might ask, why in heaven's name did we not lift the embargo some time ago, give that a shot? Maybe we could have prevented sending 25,000 of our troops to the slippery roads in the mountains and the land mines and snipers and what all.

The best argument we have for going is we cannot avert our eyes from the genocide, from the ethnic cleansing. These are human beings, and the civilized world ought not to tolerate it. I will buy that, except we have tolerated it in Sudan. We have tolerated it in

Rwanda. We are very selective in where we are going to assert our moral standards.

The last point in the short time allotted concerns Desert Storm, parallel issues, our national interest. Our national interest was very patent in Desert Storm. We had an identifiable enemy, a potential nuclear power, control of the Persian Gulf reserves of petroleum would impact the economies of every country in the world.

So when the Bush administration came up here to get support on January 12, 1991, yes, we got support. The Democrats, there were 265 of them. A hundred-and-seventy-nine voted no. Not one leader, not one Democratic leader past or present in the House or the Senate supported the President in something where our national interest was clear, crystal clear.

Now, we have a situation where our national interest is quite murky—quite murky. Bosnia is not going to attack us. I do not think that war is going to spread. It is a terrible situation, and I surely do not have the answers, but I will tell you, it rubs me the wrong way to have an administration come up here and want us to ratify and support an intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina when the overwhelming amount of Democrats—not all; there are a couple on this committee that voted right and I am looking at three now and that is Mr. Berman, Mr. Lantos, and Mr. Engel, but the leaders did not and the overwhelming amount of Democrats did not. They did not think they had to back the President then.

So, as I say, it comes a little hard saying we have no obligation but to ratify, to rubber stamp the President's decision made in a vacuum, not wanting to know where we stood on this issue.

There are no answers to that and I do not ask you to. I would like to know from General Shalikashvili, if I had the time, about the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Were they unanimous? Any dissent among the Joint Chiefs on this? I hate to ask you that, but I think it would be an interesting speculation. But anyway, I feel better.

[Laughter.]

Mr. HYDE. I have enjoyed the cathartic feeling, but believe me, it is a two-way street folks, and I have carried this roll call with me since 1991 because I resented the fact that you all would not back the President where our national interest was clearly involved and now you are falling all over yourselves in this situation where our national interest is pretty murky.

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Yes, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I do not want to get drawn into the budget fight, and certainly I will not, but I am going to feel a little better if I get something off my chest.

For months and years, the Congress has been coming to us, the Administration and saying, "Do something about Bosnia." Indeed, on the first of August of this year, Mr. Chairman, you said that we ought to stop wringing our hands, we ought to stop reaffirming the spirit of Munich, and we ought to do something.

Mr. Smith, in 1993, you said you thought we had it all backwards and we ought to be more assertive. Well, we have been more assertive. We have launched an initiative. We have stopped the

fighting. We have obtained a cease-fire. We have reached a peace agreement. And now we are coming to you asking for your support. That is what this is all about. Are you going to support the achievement of a peace agreement?

We must, I think, look at the broader picture. We know what will happen if we do not support this agreement. If Congress were to turn this agreement back and prevent us somehow from carrying it forward, war would break out. It would be a bloody situation. As I have said, there would be the risk of the conflict spreading. That is what the issue is here. I have sat here in this witness chair many times and just been blistered by this very committee for not taking firmer action in Bosnia. Now, the President has taken a very strong initiative and we are very close to peace.

I met yesterday with Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic of Bosnia. We have become quite good friends. He said to me, "We are within an inch of peace. We cannot miss this opportunity." He said, "This thing that is going on in Congress now is the most important thing that has happened to Bosnia in the last 4 years."

So I urge you to recognize what the stakes are. The stakes are very, very large. They are the stakes between peace and war. We have a chance for peace.

Mr. Hyde, I feel better.

[Laughter.]

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The gentleman's time has expired.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have been informed that our panelists now are telling us they have to leave by 12:20, so please be brief and watch your time.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I did not hear General Shalikashvili's answer to Chairman Hyde's question.

Chairman GILMAN. General, would you like to respond to the question?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes, I would very much like to respond, because the Joint Chiefs and I have spent an awful lot of time on this issue, Bosnia in general, recognizing that Desert Storm was about war and that this is about peace. We talked an awful lot about the fact that peace in Europe is a very vital interest of the United States.

We also spent an awful lot of time on examining the tasks that we would be asked to do, whether the conditions that we have been given would be right, and we have concluded, as I did when I reported to you here earlier, that the conditions for the military forces are, in fact, correct, that the tasks are properly prescribed, that the rules of engagement are correct, that the chain of command is right and we do not have any dual-keys or any other nonsense to interfere with the operation, that the troops are trained right, and that, yes, while the mission is going to be tough and we are prepared that casualties are very likely, we do share the view, all of us, that the mission is doable. So when I said that, I spoke for all the Joint Chiefs, not just for myself.

Chairman GILMAN. I am going to ask our panelists, since there are a number of members who have not inquired at this point, if

you would be willing to come back again next week if we can arrange a mutually convenient date. Would that be possible, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, we have always been cooperative with the committee and I am certainly not going to change that style.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you. We will try to arrange another date.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I do have to tell you that next week I have to be at the NATO meetings in Europe, but subject to working out schedules, obviously, we will cooperate with the committee.

Chairman GILMAN. We will try to work out a mutually agreeable schedule. Thank you very much.

Mr. Engel.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Christopher, I am so happy that you just made the remark about listening to our committee for 3 years admonishing you to do something, because that is precisely what I wanted to say. We have heard from colleagues on both sides of the aisle, but particularly the Republican side of the aisle, for 3 years saying that the United States has not been forceful; that we have let the European allies do the job in Bosnia and they have been doing it ineffectively. Now the Administration takes the bull by the horns and hammers out what I think is an incredible agreement in Dayton and we are second guessing, undermining and doing all the things that are not in our national interest.

I would say to my good friend, Mr. Hyde, for whom I have enormous respect, that this is no more of a fait accompli than President Bush gave us when he came to Congress during the Persian Gulf War. As you remember, I was one of the Democrats that crossed party lines and supported President Bush at that time because I believed that it was not in America's best interest to undermine the President of the United States at a time when he is putting forth important national security policy. I believed that then and I believe that now, and I would no more undermine President Clinton than I would undermine President Bush.

We have looked for nearly 4 years now and we have seen visions of a holocaust again rearing its ugly head in Europe, ethnic cleansing, emaciated people, rapes, and pillages. Again, I think America has a moral obligation. Europe is certainly in the vital interest of this nation. I do think that the NATO alliance certainly is important to us, and I do think that if we were to pull out now, the NATO alliance would be rendered impotent and go down the drain. So, I think that we do have a vital interest.

We have seen in other parts of the world, the Middle East, South Africa—as we speak, the President is now in Ireland—that without U.S. involvement, many of these things cannot be accomplished. When we talk about the Persian Gulf War, my God, we sent 500,000 U.S. troops there to fight in a war. We are talking now about 20,000 U.S. troops to keep a peace.

So I think that this is something, while we absolutely have a right to look at this and criticize and get the answers, I think that this is a very noble effort, and if the polls say otherwise, I think that sometimes we in Congress have to lead.



I have two questions. I have gone to many meetings these past 2 days on Bosnia and one question keeps coming up. I would like our Secretaries and the General to answer this: If, on the one hand, we are there as a neutral peacekeeping force, but on the other hand we are arming or building up the capability of the Bosnian Muslims, would that not put some of our troops in potential jeopardy? How can we be truly impartial if we are building up the capacity of one side? I think that is an important question that needs to be answered.

And second, as you know, there is no real peace for the people of Kosova. It was mentioned again, and you know I have been very active in the issue of the 90 percent ethnic Albanians. Serbian oppression is there, and I was disappointed that there was a failure to include Kosova in the Dayton talks. I think it has given the ethnic Albanian majority of that land the impression that their plight has somehow been ignored.

During our last hearing, Secretary Christopher, you very eloquently said that the so-called outer wall of sanctions against Serbia would remain in place until the situation in Kosova is resolved. This was reconfirmed at Dayton. I would like to know specifically what sanctions constitute the outer wall.

So those are my two questions, the one on Kosova and the one on the neutrality of America if we are arming one side.

Secretary PERRY. Thank you, Congressman Engel. We have said clearly, loudly, publicly, that we the United States, we NATO, will be evenhanded in our execution of this peace enforcement. We have also had an opportunity to say it personally to various Bosnian Serb leaders. I think it is clear now to them that we mean that. It will be even more clear by our actions when we start this, of course, because our troops, as I have said, are well trained, well disciplined. We will be evenhanded in the implementation.

We talked already about the need for having military balance. Our hopes are of being able to achieve that through the arms control process, and those are not naive hopes now that that has been embedded in the agreement, and that even if it is necessary to provide some arms toward the end of the year to correct the balance, they will not be provided by NATO nor by U.S. military forces. It will be done through third parties with the United States insisting that.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Engel, thank you for your comments. The "outer wall" involves membership in international financial institutions, access to lending from international financial institutions, and full diplomatic relations.

I think if this agreement goes forward, we have an opportunity to bring Serbia back into OSCE and to reestablish monitors in Kosova. I think the situation in Kosova will be improved. We have retained, however, quite explicitly the "outer wall" of sanctions.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Burton.

Mr. ENGEL. I am wondering if I can get the General to respond?

Chairman GILMAN. General. If you would, please be brief.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Because I was asked earlier about the Joint Chiefs and their views in certain matters, let me add that because of our concern for the safety of American troops, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended in very strong terms that no American military personnel be involved in any kind of arm and train effort and that the IFOR not have that as its mission. As you have heard already, neither Americans in the American military nor IFOR will be involved in this effort.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is a fait accompli. There is no question about it. The decision has been made and you are up here to sell the Congress on what has already been decided, and we have no choice but to go along. Once our troops are on the ground, we, as Americans who love these people in the military and believe we should support them, will support them because we will have no choice. But the fact of the matter is, this should have been handled in a different way, and I think most Americans would agree with that.

Now, my colleague from Connecticut, Mr. Gejdenson, said that the President accomplished a peace agreement in the Middle East, and he deserves a pat on the back for that. The fact of the matter is, no American troops were involved in that peace agreement. There had been an age-old conflict going on there, as well, between the Syrians, the Lebanese, the Jordanians, and the Egyptians. Yet they were able to accomplish some kind of an agreement by sitting down and reasoning together to bring about a peaceful solution, as was done with Jimmy Carter at Camp David. That is far different than what we are talking about here.

I had an intelligence briefing yesterday and I will not go into all the details because we cannot, but our troops are going to be in a 2½-mile corridor going all the way from around Sarajevo to Tuzla and beyond, and there are going to be potential enemies on both sides. There are going to be potential terrorists on both sides. There are going to be potential snipers on both sides. There are six million land mines, most of them plastic that you cannot find without digging in the ground. Our soldiers may be shot, they may be blown up, and they may step on a land mine. It just seems to me that this is not the best approach to dealing with this.

The Congress has expressed itself very clearly not once but twice. The American people overwhelmingly have not supported this. The American people did not support going into Haiti, yet the President took unilateral action. The American people did not want to bail out Mexico, yet the President took unilateral action. And they do not want us going into Bosnia, but the President is once again taking unilateral action.

I know that he is well intentioned, but the road to hell is paved with good intentions. We are going to see many young men and women lose their lives or be maimed in a situation we should not be involved in, and I feel very, very strongly about that.

There are 60,000 people in and around Sarajevo and other areas of Bosnia who have said very clearly they are not going to be put out of their homes, they are not going to be ruled by another ethnic

group, and they are going to fight. One woman said she would kill herself and her two kids before she would submit to that kind of leadership. Another man said in Sarajevo that what we saw in Somalia was likely to happen there in Bosnia, where American troops were maimed, killed, and dragged around.

The policy in Somalia did not work. General Mohamed Farah Aideed is still in power. We spent hundreds of millions of dollars, lost American lives, and nothing was accomplished other than President Bush's mission to feed the Somalians. But when we got into nation building, U.S. soldiers were killed and we had to withdraw.

What we will do in Bosnia is nation building: make no mistake about it. What we did in Somalia is exactly what the Clinton administration is going to try to do in Bosnia. We are trying to set up separate nation-states, and one has a three-member presidency. I do not see how, after hundreds and hundreds of years, we are going to accomplish this in 1 year.

I did not want to ask any questions, since this is a fait accompli. All I wanted to do is express my concern, and I think I expressed the concern of many Americans. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, may I respond?

Chairman GILMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Perry wants to respond.

Secretary PERRY. We have heard from Mr. Burton and other Congressmen concerns about the danger of this operation. I want to assure you, we understand these dangers very well and are taking every action we can take to minimize them.

I hear very little concerns about the dangers of allowing this war to continue. We do not live in a world in which there are no risks. We have to choose between the risks we are confronted with. The true alternative to not going in is allowing the war to continue. We can avert our gaze and not watch the killing and atrocities, but we cannot avoid the consequences if this war spreads south and north. This inextricably involves us. It involves us in a much bigger war and a much more dangerous situation.

Mr. BURTON. I have one question.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. BURTON. I have one question, Mr. Chairman. What are you going to do if a truckload of dynamite goes through a barricade and kills 235 Americans over there? How are you going to explain that to the American people?

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me also say that I really commend the team here. They have done an outstanding job of explaining the situation. I also commend the President for continuing his discussion and dialog.

I, too, have some concerns about the danger of the project, but I believe that there is a question of whether we are going to be world leaders or not, and being world leaders, you have a certain amount of responsibility that comes along with it. I think the question that my colleagues ought to consider is whether we, in fact, should remain a leader in the free world, the No. 1 power in the

world, or not. That is a decision that perhaps the new majority might want to make.

If so, we ought to decide that we will demilitarize, like some countries Costa Rica does not have a military. We should then simply decide that it will only be when we are physically attacked that we will respond and move out of being the world leader. No one told us to be a world leader. We assumed that responsibility and that posture.

So it does not make sense to me to hear ridiculous arguments about the fact that we are going to be in harm's way. I cannot understand how you can have a military and expect them to be out of harm's way. Even in military maneuvers, you should see the number of casualties. We have lost more casualties in military maneuvers in the last 2 years than we have lost in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti all put together; they just do not show up in the statistics.

So I think it is foolhardy to talk about and compare things that make no sense, that Bork was turned down by the Congress after he was submitted by the President. What does that have to do with this? So was Dr. Foster. He was an OB-GYN and did 40 abortions in 40 years and they said he could not be Surgeon General. So if you want to get into ridiculous things, we can go through all kinds of foolishness or of Clinton's plan that was put up for health and they tore it down and the new majority has decided that health care is not a problem so there is no health care plan to be put up because they do not want it to be torn down.

So I think that we are on the right track. I think it is a very tough decision, though. I think it is something that we all understand is difficult.

It also disturbs me when I hear people say that, "It cannot work. We cannot have peace. The plan will fail." I think that there is more than hope. We see a plan that has been defined. We are going to put all of our expertise in it. We are going to put all of our commitment into it. We are going to put all our resources into it. How can people conclude on this day that the plan is doomed to fail and that nothing is going to work?

I believe that the military does not like date-certain, either. I would just like to remind the Congress, date-certain came from Congress. I am sure that the military would love to do away with date-certain. But when it came to the Persian Gulf, when it came to other areas, the Congress said, we want you out in 6 months. We want you out in 1 year. So now, military activities are done with date-certain. I am sure that if we had the true discussion from the military, they do not like date-certain.

And finally, national interest, I think we have to understand what is our national interest. It was stated that in the Middle East, our national interest was there because of oil. In Bosnia, there is no oil so there is no national interest. I think that someday we need to have a definition and a discussion in this nation again about what constitutes national interest. Is it only economics? We said Kuwait would have women driving cars if they wanted to and voting, and Saudi Arabia was going to tell them they could walk next to the men. None of it has happened, but we sent 500,000 troops over there to defend those non-democratic countries.

So I think if we are going to have this piousness, we ought to have it all put out on the table, make a determination on where we are going to go. We spent trillions of dollars fighting the cold war. We knew that Tito was not going to stay forever. We knew that the iron curtain was going to fall because we had the best plan going. Communism cannot stand up to our system, and we knew it was just a matter of time. Why spend trillions of dollars to defeat the system when now we have to——

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. PAYNE. Incidentally, I do not have time, Mr. Chairman, for my question.

Chairman GILMAN. We are trying to accommodate all of our members. For those members who have not had an opportunity to inquire today, we will put them at the head of the list of our next hearing. We are making note of that right now.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, as you know and I know, President Clinton, through his actions, has left no options for the American people and the Congress at this stage in the process. Having prematurely made commitments to send U.S. troops to Bosnia, first to enforce the Vance-Owen plan and then to enforce the Vance-Stoltenberg plan, then to enforce the Contract Group plan, and then the evacuation of UNPROFOR and now the Dayton plan, the President has raised the expectations of our allies as well as those that are parties to the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, no matter what the U.S. Congress thinks about this at this particular time or the American people, this deployment is going to happen. He talks about a loss of prestige, but the potential risk to that prestige is of his own making.

We have expressed our concerns. Resolutions have been passed saying, "Come to us before," "No money spent until," and yet that has been ignored by the President. He has admonished us not to even pass these resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, I proposed the bill and a member from the other side of the aisle offered the amendment to lift the arms embargo. It passed overwhelmingly in a bipartisan way. That, to me, was and continues to be the prime way of making diplomacy work. Unfortunately, we are locked on to this idea of sending U.S. troops.

Let me just raise two brief questions, and I have dozens of questions and I think this inquiry should be day-long and days long, not just 2½ hours long.

President Milosevic has shown himself to be a deceiver, he has lied, he has broken with impunity one cease-fire after another during the course of this war, he is the prime mover in trying to create a greater Serbia. Tens of thousands of Croats, tens of thousands of Bosnians are dead, hundreds of thousands are refugees because of him, and yet he is the peacemaker whom we are trusting with the fate of our troops and with the fate of this plan.

Second—and I mean no disrespect to the distinguished gentlemen that are appearing before us today and I join Mr. Hyde in his accolades for them. I know they are trying to do the very best they can do but I wanted to get this on the record in an unambiguous way, and that is in light of Somalia especially, where political con-

siderations weighed in and were factors in not providing the necessary material for our troops, at any time during consideration of U.S.-Bosnia policy, and especially this peace initiative and the timing of it, were domestic political considerations, including the potential impact on the 1996 elections, ever discussed? Were they a factor in any way, shape or form?

And I would submit, and I speak for, I think, both sides of the aisle, when it comes to the lives of our servicemen, no one's career, no one's prestige is worth that. Were they ever discussed in your discussions?

And having asked those two questions, I yield to Mr. Gallegly, who has one final question, and then I think that is the end of this hearing.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I want to thank the gentleman, my good friend, Mr. Smith, for yielding. There is so much that needs to be said and I appreciate having at least a minute to ask just a couple questions.

First of all, gentlemen, all three of you, I have nothing but the highest personal regard for. I have great respect for the attempt to do what you did in Dayton. I have been a longtime supporter of the air and sea forces that we have had in that region of the world. I have been very much opposed to the use of ground forces for a long time. In listening to military leaders, they all, at least the ones I have met with, say that it is a lose-lose situation.

Gentlemen, I have here about 140 letters that have come in since the President's speech opposing the use of ground forces by my constituents. I have two letters from my constituents supporting it. What do I tell them when they say we cannot control the peace on our streets in Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, across this country with the murders and killings going on, yet we can go to foreign soil and put our young men in harm's way in a no-win situation?

The only real question I have, because we have limited time right now, is to General Shalikashvili. Secretary Perry mentioned a little earlier that we do not have a model for casualties. General, I have tremendous respect for you as the premiere military leader in this country. Certainly, before you are going to sign off and send young men and women into harm's way, you must have a pretty good idea what the worst case scenario would be as it relates to casualties.

I know you are here to try to put the best face on this, but General, I know you as a man of great honor. Can you tell the American people what you are prepared to deal with casualty-wise?

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

General Shalikashvili.

General SHALIKASHVILI. If I had any confidence in any kind of a number that has been either advanced by some groups or some military staffs, I would tell them to you. I think I would be grossly misleading if I did.

Probably the closest thing that I know of is, in fact, to do what Secretary Perry said we could do but then rejected, and that is to look at a conflict in the same area where we are going involving roughly the same number of troops and see what happened to them, recognizing, however, that they were in the midst of a con-

flict, they did not possess the right armament, they were not sized correctly to protect themselves, and you know very well that the rules of engagement were such that they were often sitting ducks and could not help themselves. You also know roughly what their casualties were per year.

The reason that you cannot project it is because the numbers are so low that one incident that any of you here could postulate would make those numbers invalid. The absence of such an incident would make them invalid the other way.

It is easier to talk about it in a major conflict because then you have statistical data over long periods of time and you are talking about large numbers. But these numbers are relatively small, and so statistically, they will only be misleading. But if you must have some number, I would suggest you look at what has happened to UNPROFOR and recognize that UNPROFOR was in war and we are going to go to enforce a peace.

Chairman GILMAN. Secretary Christopher, if you would respond to Mr. Smith's questions.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes. There are two questions that I need to respond to. First, I have never heard any discussion with respect to the 1996 political campaign or any other political issue in connection with Bosnia, but let me say this. I am not a political expert. It does not look to me, based upon the polls, that the President is taking a position that is politically popular. Indeed, from what I gather, it is a very politically risky position. But it is the right position.

You said before one time when you were questioning me, Mr. Smith, that you were frustrated to tears by the United States not having taken action. We have taken action. I hope now that we have taken action that you will support.

With respect to President Milosevic, he is the President of Serbia. We have to deal with the people who are in place because those are the people with whom you make peace. If he has been guilty of war crimes, I am sure the War Crimes Tribunal, which we have supported enormously, will weigh the evidence and decide whether or not to indict him.

Indeed, Judge Goldstone, who is the chief prosecutor of the War Crimes Tribunal, has said he will follow the evidence. If there is evidence, the Tribunal will indict. It has not issued any indictment. Whether or not there is to be one is not a U.S. decision. That is a decision for the War Crimes Tribunal. We have fully supported the Tribunal in a number of wars, including turning over evidence and we will continue to do so.

I think that we will deal with the situation as we have to deal with it. As Prime Minister Rabin once said, you do not usually make peace with your friends. You make peace with people who are former enemies.

Chairman GILMAN. The last comment is from Mr. Brown, who promised to be very, very brief.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I have a very, very short question with no comments around it much. In addition to reservations I have overall about IFOR, I am concerned about how we pay for it. Secretary Perry, the President has stated an intention to veto the defense appropriations bill over the last few weeks. For those of us

that truly are concerned about the budget deficit and truly concerned about a balanced budget, \$7 billion more money than you requested in the Pentagon simply does not make sense.

What does this whole new thing of Bosnia and the cost of upwards of \$1 billion mean in terms of budgetary issues and what does it mean in perhaps making less likely that the President should veto a bill that he absolutely, many of us in this committee think should veto?

Secretary PERRY. I do not want to make any forecasts of what the President will do relative to that defense appropriations bill. He has, I think, until midnight tonight to decide that, and I expect him to take action, which I do not want to forecast now.

In terms of this operation, it will require, as I have indicated, about \$2 billion which will have to somewhere come out of the 1996 budget. Whatever the budget is, whenever it is approved, it will be \$2 billion that will have to be reprogrammed to accommodate these expenses.

Chairman GILMAN. I want to thank our distinguished panelists for being with us. I thank our colleagues.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# APPENDIX

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STATEMENT BY  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
WARREN CHRISTOPHER  
BEFORE THE  
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Thursday  
November 30, 1995

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Monday night, President Clinton addressed the nation to explain why American troops should join our NATO Allies to help peace take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I are here to further explain our purpose and our plans, to answer your questions, and to seek your support.

We have a fundamental choice. As the President made clear, if the United States does not participate, there will be no NATO force. If there is no NATO force, there will be no peace in Bosnia, and the war will reignite.

We do not have to imagine the consequences. We know what would happen. There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of a wider war, and immense damage to our leadership in NATO, in Europe, and the world. That is the alternative we can and must avoid. We must continue to secure the peace.

The war in the former Yugoslavia has been a threat to our nation's interests and an affront to our nation's values. We have been witness to horrors and cruelties that my generation -- the generation that fought World War II -- once thought we consigned to a dark and distant past. We have faced the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in an unstable part of Europe. We have had to contemplate the possibility that our troops would be called upon to rescue our allies from Bosnia under fire.

This summer, the conflict in Bosnia reached a crisis point. The President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step by step from the most horrifying events of the war -- the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa -- to this hopeful point.

At the July London Conference, we persuaded our Allies to take decisive measures to protect Bosnia's remaining safe areas. We led a NATO bombing campaign to convince the Bosnian Serbs that nothing more could be gained by continuing the war. Our diplomacy produced a cease-fire and a set of constitutional principles for a single Bosnian state. And last week, we led the parties to a comprehensive settlement in Dayton. That settlement will be formally signed in Paris on December 14.

As a result of the President's initiative, the fighting has stopped. We now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace because of American strength and American diplomacy. There can be no doubt that we will achieve our goal only if America continues to lead. The parties have taken risks for peace and we must continue to support them.

Our interest in implementing the Dayton settlement is clear.

We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II -- atrocities that are all the more pernicious because they have been directed at specific groups of people because of their faith. By helping peace take hold, we can make sure that the people of Bosnia see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug graves, no more years of isolation from the outside world.

We have a strong interest in making sure this war does not spread. Bosnia lies on a faultline in a volatile region of Europe. To the south are Kosovo, Albania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the likeliest flashpoints of a wider war, as well as Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies. To the north and east lie Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, fragile new democracies deeply threatened by the prospect of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. To the north also lies the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, which could yet spark a regional war if the Dayton accords are not implemented.

Peace in this part of Europe matters to the United States because Europe matters to the United States. Twice this century, we have sent millions of American soldiers to war across the Atlantic. The first of this century's great wars began with violence in Sarajevo. The second began with aggression in Central Europe and with horrors that the world ignored until it was too late. Ever since, our leaders, Republican and Democrat alike, have acted to protect our vital interest in European stability. If we do not take this opportunity for peace, we could be faced with the prospect of action far costlier and more dangerous than anything being contemplated now.

The United States also has a vital interest in maintaining our leadership in the world. Acting in Bosnia now is an acid test of American leadership. After creating this opportunity for peace, we cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if we are seen as a country that does not follow through on the work it begins, no nation will follow us -- not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere.

Mr. Chairman, the agreement we initialed in Dayton advances our national interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia. The settlement was negotiated in 21 long days against the backdrop of four bloody years of war. It includes many hard-fought compromises. But on every important issue, it meets the principled and practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted. It is an agreement not just of goals, but of means.

- It preserves Bosnia as a single state with federal institutions that represent its Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities alike.

- It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and connects Gorazde to the Federation by a secure land corridor.
- It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes. And it creates a mechanism for settling claims to property.
- It makes it possible for democratic, internationally-run elections to be held next year. I spent hours in Dayton convincing the parties that refugees should have a choice between voting where they currently live or in their original homes.
- The agreement excludes war criminals from office. And it explicitly obligates all the parties to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.
- It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate and punish violations.
- Most immediately, it ends the war, and requires the parties to move their armed forces behind agreed lines.

Sometimes in a negotiation like this, there is a temptation to take short cuts, to deal with the hardest issues in an ambiguous way. But in Dayton, we insisted on and received concrete and detailed commitments on the most fundamental issues that divided the parties. Because the agreement is comprehensive, it is far more likely to endure.

In the long run, restoring the fabric of Bosnia's society will still require an immense effort. But at least that effort can now begin. After all, only with peace does Bosnia have a chance to exist as a single state. Only with peace does it have a chance to build a multi-ethnic democracy. Only with peace will we have a chance to bring war criminals to justice, and to ensure that no more war crimes are committed.

The Dayton accord does require the parties to take extremely difficult steps on the road to peace. I believe that each is prepared to carry out its commitments, but only if it is confident that the other parties will carry out theirs. That is why each party made it clear that they would reach settlement only if NATO agreed to lead a peace implementation force.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will speak in greater detail about our participation in IFOR. But let me address some of the questions I know are on your mind.

I know many Americans have wondered why Europe cannot provide all of the ground troops in this NATO force. We created NATO's integrated military structure to ensure NATO's effectiveness through the sharing of effort and risk. We are NATO's largest member, the source of its strength and resolve. The Alliance cannot undertake what will be the largest mission in its history if we decline to do our share. At the same time, we should remember that other nations, including nearly all our NATO allies, Russia, and many of our new partners in Central Europe, will contribute 2/3 of the troops in IFOR.

Others have asked whether, after four years of bloodshed, the parties are willing to carry through with this agreement. We constructed the agreement with that concern in mind. We secured the agreement because peace is the key to all the parties want: from reconstruction, to justice, to rejoining the international community. We have made certain that sanctions against Serbia, our main source of leverage with that country, will be reimposed if the agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will remain in place until their forces withdraw within the agreed boundary of the Serb Republic. Moreover, our troops will have the strength and authority to enforce key military provisions of the agreement.

In addition, let me emphasize that it was not enough for me that President Milosevic was specifically authorized to negotiate the accord on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. I insisted that the Bosnian Serbs initial it as well. In Dayton, President Milosevic promised to obtain their agreement within 10 days; as it turned out, he did so in just two days. This kind of response increases my confidence that this accord will be carried out.

Mr. Chairman, as we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our military could implement and enforce. Each part of the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs of our armed forces and the advice of the military members of our team. As a result, the military annex to the agreement contains the kind of detailed provisions our military considered essential to their task.

As someone who helped to negotiate the Dayton accord, I can assure you that IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement -- ensuring the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a zone of separation between them. But it will not be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction, or to act as a police force. One of the lessons we have learned in the last few years is that our military should not be a permanent guarantor of peace. It should only create opportunities that others must then seize.

Because IFOR's mission is well defined, we have a concrete exit strategy, which Secretary Perry will describe in detail. I want to stress that as one element of that strategy, we are committed to achieve a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia, so that peace will endure. This should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions.

Arms control measures alone, however, will not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. The armed forces of the Federation, which have been most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain some equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability. For our part, the United States will ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary assistance. Neither IFOR nor the U.S. military will directly participate in this effort. The best approach -- and the one we will pursue -- is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

Civilian agencies from around the world will carry out a separate program to help the people of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will pay for most of this vital civilian effort. International organizations will also play an important role. The OSCE will supervise elections. The UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees. The World Bank and IMF will help Bosnia's economy recover, with the EU also playing a leading role. The UN will help monitor and train local police.

But none of these important tasks will be carried out unless the peace agreement endures. There is no middle ground between peace and war in Bosnia. And in the choice between peace and war, as the President so plainly put it Monday night, "America must choose peace."

Many years from now, I have no doubt that people will look back on this month in history as a critical turning point for the United States and Europe. Let us be certain that it will be remembered as the moment when our country grasped the chance we ourselves created for peace, not as the moment when we hesitated to act.

The President has made his choice. The United States must act as the great nation that we are. We must act to protect our interests. We must act to uphold our ideals. We must keep our commitments. And we must lead.

In the coming days, Mr. Chairman, the Administration will continue to consult fully with you and with the Congress. We will continue to work hard to gain the bipartisan support of the Congress, just as we work to gain the support and understanding of the American people. We are confident that the case for moving forward is clear and strong. We are prepared to answer your questions and to hear your concerns today. Thank you.

**Statement of  
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry  
On the Deployment of U.S. Troops  
with the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force**

**House Committee on International Relations  
House Committee on National Security**

**November 30, 1995**

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Christopher has already described the Bosnia peace agreement that was initialed in Dayton. This agreement was achieved through tireless efforts of the Secretary and his lead negotiator, Dick Holbrooke. Dick's team included LTG Wes Clark from the Joint Staff and Jim Pardew from my staff. As a result of their efforts we have a real opportunity to achieve peace in Bosnia and protect and advance America's security interests in Europe.

Last Friday I spoke to 700 leaders from the First Armored Division -- every leader from the Division commander down to the company NCO's. I can tell you they understand the mission we are giving them, they are trained and ready and enthusiastic. The First Armored Division will be the core of the U.S. ground component in the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). They had five questions they wanted me to answer and I want to tell you and the American people what I told our soldiers.

The questions were, "Why should we commit U.S. forces to IFOR in Bosnia? Who else is sending troops? What is our mission? When will we deploy? And what is our exit strategy?"

After I answer these questions, GEN Shalikashvili will talk more about the specific mission tasks of our forces, their capabilities and the command structure. He has just come from reviewing the NATO plans with the NATO Military Committee.

**Why should we send ground forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina?**

I believe there is a set of propositions that create an "iron logic" as to why we should commit ground forces to Bosnia as part of the NATO implementation force:

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe.

The war in Bosnia threatens these interests.

We now have an opportunity -- the first real opportunity in four years -- to end this war.

To seize this opportunity, a NATO force is required to implement the peace.

The United States is the only nation that can lead that force to success.

Finally, although there will be risks associated with this operation, the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue and perhaps spread are even greater.

It is this "iron logic" that drives the decision that we should, at this time, commit ground troops to the NATO IFOR. Let me expand on each of those points very briefly.

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe. I regard this as an indisputable fact. For the past fifty years we pledged our lives and treasure to preserve the security of Europe against the threat of the Warsaw Pact. We understood that keeping Europe stable and secure ensured our own security. The threat from the Warsaw Pact has passed from the scene, but the collapse of the Soviet empire unleashed ethnic rivalries that continue to threaten stability in Europe and Central Asia. We are in the process of creating new structures to deal with these problems -- the Partnership for Peace, an expanded NATO, and a pragmatic partnership with Russia, but the war in Bosnia threatens those positive developments.

When I say the war threatens our interests, I am not referring to the actual war itself and the direct consequences of the war, as appalling as those are. Many of you will support this commitment in part on the grounds that we have a moral obligation to seize this opportunity to end the killing and the atrocities. I am deeply sympathetic to that view, but as the Secretary of Defense I try to base my recommendations on colder analysis.

I'm talking instead about the danger of this war expanding to a wider part of Europe. This is not an academic concern. Only two months ago, I would have given you even odds that the Croat offensive in Bosnia would provoke a renewed, all-out war between Serbia and Croatia. And all during the last three and a half years, the danger has been palpable that this war would spread south into Kosovo and Macedonia, involving Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey. Given that we have the opportunity, there is certainly a moral imperative to stop the bloodshed and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is that danger of a wider war that is the most significant threat to U.S. interests. The best way of avoiding the spread of the war is to stop it.

We now have such an opportunity. It is the first time in four years that we have been able to get all of the parties to step forward to sign an agreement. I talked with each of the presidents involved and their delegations in Dayton. I believe there were two factors that brought them reluctantly to this agreement. First of all, a war weariness -- four years of fighting, a quarter of a million people killed, two million refugees. They are just sick of the war. Previous diplomatic efforts had been thwarted by the belief of one or more of the parties that they had more to gain by continuing to fight.



The second factor was that the warring parties were impressed and awed at the military capability of the United States and NATO. They got a sample of that during the bombing raids. They witnessed our military power, but they also came to believe that, in the context of an agreement, that power would be used constructively, not to harm them, but to enforce the peace. That was the solid foundation which allowed them to step forward and make the necessary compromises to reach this peace agreement. Compromises, by the way, for which the three Presidents will be criticized in their own countries.

Therefore, in order to seize this opportunity for peace, we must make an American commitment to participate. None of the parties, certainly not the Bosnian Federation, and also surprisingly, neither the Croats or Serbians, would have been willing to sign the peace agreement without an American commitment to participation in the IFOR. And one of the parties has already publicly stated that they would withdraw from the agreement if that commitment to participate is not met.

So the real alternative to implementing this peace agreement, to passing on this chance for peace, is to allow the war to start up again. Failure to meet the American commitment could lead to another six months, another year, another two years of war -- resulting in humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia and risking the danger of the war spreading -- and thus endangering America's interests in European security.

This is not a blind plunge into a conflict. For four years and two administrations, we have, in the face of great pressure, refused to enter this war as a combatant on the ground. And we will not send U.S. troops into a war in Bosnia. We have said we will engage only to implement a peace agreement -- with the consent of the three parties. We now have that agreement and that consent. If the parties don't sign or if they otherwise renege on the consent, we won't go forward.

And we will be taking every possible action to minimize the risks necessarily entailed in the IFOR. NATO is going in with a large force -- 60,000 total on the ground in Bosnia. Sixty thousand is the number of troops that GEN Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has determined he needs to accomplish the mission. Additional support troops will be located in neighboring countries. The air strike component will also be located out of country -- the commanders will have access to as much NATO air power as they require. Some have argued that we could get by with a smaller force on the ground. A large force has advantages both from the point of view of deterrence and for planning our deployment. In any event, if we err, I prefer it to be on the side of sending in too many. If it turns out we don't need that many, we can pull some of them out. That is a lot better than not sending enough and scrambling to put more in later.

The American component of this force will include 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia. There are sound military reasons to organize our military presence around a full American division which has the advantage of self-sufficiency and organic support

elements. The American force will be able to protect itself under any circumstances. This large a force also is indicative of our size and our leadership position in NATO.

We are going in with a well-armed and well-trained force and with robust rules of engagement. The U.S. ground contingent is built around the 1st Armored Division. Nobody should doubt that the 1st Armored Division is capable of taking care of itself. The 1st AD's Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery, and Apache helicopters will be sufficient to take on any opposition in the region.

### Who else is going?

Two thirds of the IFOR will be non-U.S. While there will be 20,000 Americans in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as of today, more than 25 nations have stated an intent to join this force. Every NATO nation except Iceland plans to send troops. The British 12,000 to 14,000; the French 7,000 to 9,000; the Germans 4,000; Italians and Spanish about 2,000 each; and nine other nations about 1,000 each. In addition, there are more than a dozen non-NATO nations that have offered forces.

The 1st AD commander, MAJ GEN Bill Nash, will have under his command his own division plus some other U.S. units, but he will also command soldiers from seven to 10 other countries.

He will have a Nordic brigade of 4,500 troops, who are well-trained and well disciplined, and know the terrain. This brigade will consist of Norwegians, Finns, Danes, Swedes, and perhaps a Polish battalion. A very positive aspect is that many of their personnel have served a year or more on the ground in the Tuzla area where our troops will be centered. We can learn from them; in fact, our survey teams already are benefiting from the experience of the Nordic forces.

MAJ GEN Nash will also have a Turkish task force of one or two battalions. And he will have a Russian brigade. This poses some challenges to MAJ GEN Nash, but it's also a historic opportunity. I've spent most of my life as a "Cold Warrior," and as recently as a few years ago I could not have imagined the prospect of a Russian brigade serving under an American division commander.

I have met with GEN Grachev four times in the last seven weeks, trying to hammer out the agreement for Russian participation. We agreed on an arrangement putting the Russian brigade under GEN Joulwan's operational control, but giving him a Russian deputy who will transmit Joulwan's orders to that brigade. GEN Grachev agreed that MAJ GEN Nash will have tactical control of that brigade.

In addition to the military arrangement, GEN Grachev and I discussed the issue of political control. We reached agreement "in principle" on an arrangement that gives Russia the opportunity to consult, to be fully informed and to have input on matters involving Russian forces. This will be done through a formal consultative committee.

But the final decisions of political control will be left to the North Atlantic Council, preserving unity of command. NATO and Russia would take each other's views into account, but if any disagreement cannot be resolved through this committee, the decisions would stand. Russia, of course, would have the option to withdraw from the operation, but we do not expect that contingency to develop. In any event, inability to agree would not prevent NATO from proceeding.

I have invested so much time on this issue because of the impact that Russian participation will have on the future security in Europe. Last month, I met with all the NATO defense ministers in Williamsburg, Virginia. There was unanimous agreement that we wanted Russian participation -- providing it could be arranged without jeopardizing unity of command. In the Europe of the future, we do not want to isolate or exclude Russia. We want to find a way to include them inside the circle working with us, rather than outside the circle in a posture of confrontation.

The wide participation in the IFOR is a symbol of the new Europe. The effort will define how security in Europe is going to be handled for decades to come. In effect, we will be defining what post-Cold War Europe is all about and how its security will be assured. We will be creating new relationships with these military leaders of other countries, not just NATO countries, that will have a positive effect on the security of the United States for decades to come. But the entire effort depends on U.S. leadership. That is the lesson of Dayton, where U.S. leadership made the difference in diplomacy. That is the lesson of the NATO bombing campaign, where U.S. leadership stiffened the resolve of NATO. And that is the lesson that European leaders repeat to me at every meeting -- if the U.S. leads, the military job will be done right and we will succeed.

#### What is the mission for IFOR?

The mission of IFOR is to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement: Cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, return troops and weapons to cantonments. And, of course, IFOR will be responsible for its own self-defense and freedom of movement. The forces, their training, their equipment and their Rules of Engagement (ROE) are geared to these missions. I've just completed my second trip to the units getting ready for the operation. I have talked with every commander in the U.S. chain: from SACEUR, GEN Joulwan, who will be in overall command; to ADM Smith, who will be the theater commander; to LTG Walker, the ground forces commander; to MAJ GEN Nash; to the brigade, battalion and company commanders and the senior NCO's. They understand the mission; they have the training and equipment they need; they are ready to go if the order comes.

This mission will be even-handed. If they get any provocations, either by the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Federation forces, they will respond. They will have the authority to move anywhere in Bosnia. They will be based primarily in the Federation, but will be enforcing a zone of separation which goes several kilometers into Bosnian

Serb territory and will have to maintain lines of communication that pass through Bosnian Serb territory. Therefore in the peace agreement, we insisted on and got the authority to go anywhere in Bosnia to carry out our mission.

Our troops have all trained extensively for their mission. They will have robust Rules of Engagement and have been trained and disciplined in how to apply the ROEs. If our forces are attacked, or if hostile intent is demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will permit the immediate and effective use of deadly force. Our troops are well-disciplined, and well-trained. They know how to react across the full spectrum of situations they might encounter. They will use force as required and have been trained to control the level of violence, but make no mistake, they will have full authority to use deadly force if they believe they need to.

It is important to be prepared for the mission, and we are. But the commanders also understand what they are not going to do. The IFOR will be operating under NATO military and political control, not under UN control. We expect the UN to give a mandate to a whole set of military and civil operations in Bosnia. IFOR will be the military side of that mandate. The civilian programs will include rebuilding the infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, bringing refugees back for resettlement, and providing for free elections. Those tasks will not be IFOR's job, but none of them can be done without IFOR successfully accomplishing its mission. IFOR must provide the security environment that allows all those other things to be done.

Our troops are not going to equip and train military forces. However, in order to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans, it will be essential to achieve stable and balanced force levels within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the states of the former Yugoslavia. That military stabilization should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, rather than by the introduction of large quantities of new arms into the region. All of the parties agreed to an arms control process modeled after the CFE agreement which would result in stability through a build down of arms. As significant as the arms control measures in the Dayton agreement are, they may not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. In that case, the United States will work with other countries to ensure that Federation armed forces obtain the necessary equipment and training by the time the NATO-led implementation force withdraws from Bosnia-Herzegovina. But we hope and expect that arms control will succeed because of the interest of the parties and their neighbors in Europe. One week after the Paris signing there will be a conference in Bonn to structure the arms control process.

We have recognized that there will be risks in this operation. But because the governments have consented, the risks do not come from entering into a war as a combatant and fighting organized units. We do expect that there may be individuals or gangs who challenge the authority of IFOR or try to harass the forces. We also expect problems from harsh weather, poor infrastructure and mines -- there may be as many as six million mines in the country.

Our forces have trained against these risks. Three weeks ago I visited our training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. At Grafenwoehr all the units of the 1st AD went back through refresher training in their combat skills, such as tank gunnery practice. They then transitioned to Hohenfels where EUCOM has created a mini-Bosnia -- complete with villages, villagers, Serb and Federation armies, para-military units, blackmarketeers, smugglers, UN and NGO officials, bad roads, snipers, mines, mud and even CNN. The units are run through every conceivable scenario we could think up, and we had the help of British, French, Dutch and Canadian peacekeepers who have served in Bosnia and seen it all. If they succeeded in solving the problems, the trainers just made it harder. The objective, as stated by GEN Joulwan, was "to make the scrimmage harder than the game."

#### When will the troops deploy?

The timing of the operational deployments is dependent on the signing of the peace agreement, the UN Security Council resolution, and a North Atlantic Council decision to deploy the IFOR. I expect that GEN Joulwan will be given authority by the NAC today to deploy enabling forces, including some U.S. personnel, so that after the agreement is signed he can quickly stand up IFOR using European units already in Bosnia. This preparatory step is needed if the main body of U.S. and NATO troops are to be able to enter swiftly and safely, if the order to go is given. This step does not preempt Congress's consideration of our plans because the combat units of the 1st AD will not begin to flow until after the agreement is signed.

After the signing, the force would build up rapidly, moving from Germany to Bosnia by rail and road. By the end of the second month, we will have our entire force in and we'll maintain that and build down in the last few months. General Shalikashvili will lay out the schedule in more detail.

#### What is the exit strategy?

We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we have built our plan based on that timeline. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months, and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect that these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

By the end of the first year, we expect that we will have achieved perhaps several months of a stable security environment, will have broken the cycle of violence and will have the civil program efforts starting to take hold. That is why I believe that the London Conference to get reconstruction and economic efforts off to a quick start is very important.

In the final analysis, it is up to the parties to achieve peace. Our effort will give them that opportunity.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize my belief that this is both a commitment that is important to our national interests and an achievable mission. History has demonstrated the consequences of instability in Europe. Two generations of Americans paid the price. The conditions for peace in the Balkans now exist. But they require American commitment and leadership. If we do not fulfill that commitment we will rue the consequences for the long term security of Europe and for our own security.

**OPENING STATMENT  
BY CONGRESSMAN TOBY ROTH (R-WI)**

Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

I welcome the testimony of our distinguished panelists today, as I welcomed President Clinton remarks Monday night.

To date, unfortunately, I have not heard why young Americans must risk their lives in Bosnia.

I'd like to be able to counsel my constituents whose sons and daughters are going to Bosnia. I want to tell them that while young Americans may lose their lives, the risk is worth it.

I can't do that today. The President has not enabled me to do that. I can't in good conscience tell the families, friends and loved ones of our soldiers that Bosnia is worth dying for.

I have a strong sense of foreboding. I have always believed -- and still do -- that putting U.S. troops in Bosnia is going to be a very big mistake. I hope I'm wrong, but I think we are going to rue the day we sent our troops into Bosnia.

We cannot impose peace on Bosnia. It will occur when the three parties are committed to it. Real peace doesn't need 60,000 heavily armed troops.

Just yesterday 10,000 Bosnian Serbs marched in Sarajevo's suburbs, saying they must not be put under Muslim rule. Meanwhile, the Muslim government has said these same Serbs will be safe -- except, of course, if any of them participated in the bloodshed. This does not sound like a recipe for lasting peace.

When Secretary Christopher came before this committee two years ago he spelled out the Christopher criteria for sending U.S. troops abroad.

Those four criteria, or questions, were simple and straightforward: (1) do we have a clear and achievable mission; (2) is there a reasonable chance for success; (3) do the American people support the action; and, (4) do we have an exit strategy?

The Administration has so far not provided adequate answers to those questions.

Most troubling now is the lack of an exit strategy. It isn't hard to get entangled in a war. One of the lessons of Vietnam is that it is far harder to get out.

My greatest concern is that next Thanksgiving and next Christmas yellow ribbons will hang on Main Street in towns across America, as we wait for our sons and daughters to come home from Bosnia.

# # #

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**Gary L. Ackerman**  
**Congress of the United States**  
**5th District, New York**

**HIRC HEARING ON BOSNIA**

**CONGRESSMAN GARY L. ACKERMAN**

**NOVEMBER 30, 1995**

**COMMITTEE ON  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC  
RANKING DEMOCRAT  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA  
**COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND  
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SECURITIES AND GOVERNMENT  
SPONSORED ENTERPRISES  
**DEMOCRATIC STEERING COMMITTEE**

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to speak at this vitally important hearing. It's also good to see Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili here once again in front of the Committee. I look forward to the lively discussion that will shortly ensue.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has not been around for as long as the conflict in Bosnia has existed--it is a centuries old, deep-seated, ethnic and religious rivalry that exceeds anything we have ever known in this country. But I think, Mr. Chairman, there comes a time, even between bitter rivals, when the realization that you are in a no-win situation hits--and hits hard. Part of that realization is a reality that a bad peace is perhaps better than war. I think it's pretty obvious that we have reached that stage in the Bosnian conflict.

Now, through the supreme efforts of the men sitting before us, we have the opportunity to insure that peace--which has only been dreamt about before now--becomes a reality for all the parties involved. Do we really have the right to turn to these men, women and children, who have been crying out for help from the international community for four long and tortuous years, and say "NO, we will not help you?" It would be a very sad day in American history if we were to do that.

Do we have a specific, targeted, vital interest in sending troops to Bosnia? I wonder when helping to stop the killing and ease the suffering of other human beings stopped being in our interests? I thought the last time that America had to exert its leadership to stop ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity--in WWII--we pledged that we would never again stand idly by as thousands of people died needlessly and horribly. Never Again. We need to make good on that promise. Will the sides go back to fighting each other again once the NATO forces pull out? I don't know, and I don't think we will ever know unless we actually go through with this mission. But can we ever forgive ourselves for not doing anything, when we have the opportunity to do so much?



STATEMENT OF  
HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY

U.S. troops to Bosnia

I want to welcome our distinguished Secretaries as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs here today as part of the effort to consult with the Congress on this difficult issue of deploying U.S. ground forces in Bosnia.

I want to personally commend you - Secretary Christopher - and your entire staff at State, especially Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, for the time and dedication you committed to reaching the peace accord in Dayton.

Having said that, it should come as no surprise to you that I share the strong skepticism and opposition of many of my Colleagues on this Committee and in the Congress with respect to the commitment of U.S. ground forces to Bosnia.

While I do not share our Commander-in-Chief's position, I do appreciate the dilemma he faces as a full partner in the NATO alliance and the responsibilities which come with that partnership.

While I agree with the President's claim that we have an interest in the future of Bosnia, I see absolutely no vital national security interest, domestic or military, being served by sending American troops into this hostile and volatile place.

Make no mistake, our troops, which will be heavily armed and expertly trained, are not going into Bosnia to "keep the peace". They are going in to "enforce the peace". And the act of enforcement often comes at a price. This deployment is especially dangerous because many Serbs will see our troops as being there, not as impartial arbiters, but as protectors of the Muslims.

The deployment of U.S. ground forces to Bosnia also raises the broader issue of our future role in the NATO alliance.

Clearly there is a legitimate role for NATO to play in the Bosnia peace accord but why shouldn't we insist that regional conflicts and disputes in Central Europe be handled by those nation's most affected.

For me, the policing of the Bosnia peace is more of a responsibility for Germany, France, Britain and the other European nations than it is for the U.S.

Consequently, while we should continue to support the NATO mission, as we have all along, as part of our responsibility as a NATO partner, we should not necessarily be the lead player - and, sending 20,000 heavily armed troops makes us the lead player. And that is a role I have a very serious problem with.

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS



**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**

Washington, DC 20515-1011

Bosnia Statement

Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney (11th-GA)

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

I look forward to hearing the testimony today of Secretary Christopher and others on the critical importance of our essential role in supporting the Bosnia peace agreement. Mr. Chairman, so many times in history, America has been on the wrong side of peace and the wrong side of the issue. However, as we continue to embark on the vast and resounding changes that are a result of the post-Cold War era, we have an indisputable responsibility to ensure that the peace dividend is the order of the day.

We cannot call on other nations to support peacekeeping efforts if we are not willing to do the same. How can we not champion a peace accord brokered on US soil, if we want to retain any credibility with our friends or the respect of our foes? We must not embolden the war mongers. I listened with rapt attention to the words of the Bosnian Prime Minister yesterday as he outlined the delicate road the peace process has taken and the intense desire by the majority of the Bosnian people for peace and a return to a life of dignity.

Despite the cries by many of my colleagues that the American public is not in favor of US participation in the peace process, recent polls show that many support President Clinton if US participation is essential and vital to restoring peace in the region. The American public views the Bosnia mission as if it were an ounce of prevention ... because it is. It is heartening that for a change America is thinking ahead and using our forces and fancy weapons to build a foundation for peace and not a foundation for the next war!

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## *Current Situation in Bosnia*



- **Current situation**
  - Ceasefire holding; minor violations continue
  - No changes to confrontation line since 11 Oct
- **Major threats to IFOR**
  - Indirect fire against unprotected forces
  - Landmines, civil disorder, snipers, non-combat losses
  - Extremist elements
  - Hostage taking for political goals
  - Undisciplined local factions



## **IFOR Mission**

***In an even-handed manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement***

- Unity of Command under SACEUR**
- CINCSOUTH operational commander for NATO and non-NATO forces**
- NATO Rules of Engagement**



- Supervise selective marking of cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation
- Monitor, and if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within agreed period
  - Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zone of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority
  - Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority
  - Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days


## ***Military Tasks of the Dayton Agreement (cont)***



- Establish and maintain 4km zone of separation (2km on either side of cease-fire / inter-entity boundary line)
- Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities
- Create Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties



# Command and Control





— All IFOR units (NATO and non-NATO) under  
NATO ROE


- These ROE permit the right to use force up to  
and including deadly force:
- In self defense to protect against a hostile  
act or hostile intent
  - To accomplish the mission

## Personnel Requirements


**Total US IFOR in  
Former Yugoslavia is  
approx 25,000**

**Additional US forces  
provide support from  
rim countries**

- **In Bosnia**
- **IFOR total approx 60,000**
- **US approx 20,000**




# Phasing






# IFOR Enabling Forces





# *IFOR Initial Entry Operations*



- Provide force security
- Deploy key HQs elements - theater to division
- IFOR assumes control of theater

# *US Initial Entry*




PHOTO COURTESY OF THE

# Joint Military Commissions




**Who...**

- IFOR Commander -- Chair
- Senior military commander of each entity
- Comparable participants at subordinate levels


**Why...**

- Resolve military Implementation issues





# Parallel Structures in B-H



COORDINATION  
THREE STAR  
REPRESENTATIVE

## HIGH REPRESENTATIVE IN THEATER

UNHCR  
REP

ARMS  
CONTROL  
REP

CIV  
POLICE  
REP

WAR  
CRIMES  
REP

HUMAN RIGHTS  
MONITOR  
CHIEF

BY  
ECONOMIC RE-  
CONSTRUCTION  
GROUP

OTHERS/NGOS

CLEAR  
RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN IFOR AND  
CIVILIAN GROUPS.

## Questions for the record submitted to the Department of Defense

### GENERAL QUESTIONS

1) What, precisely, are the vital U.S. interests in deploying U.S. forces in Bosnia?

**Answer:** The United States has vital interests in the security and stability of Europe because of our significant trade relationship, historic ties, and lasting partnership in pursuing our shared values of democracy and market economies throughout the globe. Twice this century we have fought to maintain European security because of its importance to our own national security.

The conflict that was taking place in Bosnia over the past several years was the most dangerous threat to Europe since World War II. Without U.S. leadership and participation, the current opportunity for a lasting peace would not exist. Without peace, the war could spread and involve our allies. In any case, NATO would be weaker, Europe less stable, and we would face an increased risk of a broader war in Europe.

It has been American leadership over the past six months has brought the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina this real opportunity for a lasting peace, including the U.S. military resolve to use airpower to stop Serb aggression, U.S. shuttle diplomacy leading to a successful cease-fire and basic principles, and finally the Dayton negotiations which led to the agreement signed in Paris on 14 December.

2) How important is the balance of power in the former Yugoslavia to the U.S.? In the Balkans as a region?

**Answer:** Stable and balanced force levels within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the states of the former Yugoslavia will be essential to preventing another outbreak of fighting, in the absence of an international force prepared to again intervene. If the fighting resumes, there will be an increased risk that the fighting will spread elsewhere in the Balkans and Europe. Establishing stable and balanced force levels at lower levels in Bosnia and the Balkan region is one of the principal objectives of Annex 1(b) of the Dayton agreement and the negotiations taking place in Vienna among the Parties in order to implement its provisions, as well as the U.S. led international effort to train and equip Bosnian Federation forces.

### GENERAL QUESTIONS

3) Is an unjust peace better than no peace at all?

**Answer:** There must be justice if there is to be a durable peace. In a variety of its provisions, the Dayton Agreement aims to create a just basis for the peace settlement. We believe that the Dayton agreement provides a real opportunity for both a just and a lasting peace. All parties are required to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia which seeks to bring war criminals to justice. All refugees are assured the right to return home or to receive compensation. Free and fair elections are to be held throughout Bosnia this summer. The new Bosnian constitution provides high standards of protection for human rights. The OSCE will oversee the elections and will participate in promoting respect for human rights.

For all of these measures to succeed, of course, the parties must live up to the commitments they made at Dayton. The agreement offers peace, economic recovery, and the building of democracy as powerful incentives for the parties to make the most of this opportunity.

4) How do I explain to the mother or father of a U.S. soldier killed in Bosnia that they died because "NATO solidarity" was at stake?

**Answer:** The IFOR's mission is to help secure the peace in Bosnia, end the tragic slaughter of innocent people and prevent the conflict from spreading to other parts of Europe. Any U.S. or other IFOR soldier who is killed during Operation Joint Endeavor will have died in support of that noble cause. Any death of a soldier during a military operation is tragic, and U.S. military and civilian leaders are doing everything they can to minimize the chance it will occur. But such losses may prevent much more numerous and costly losses to the United States in coming years. While NATO solidarity is an important reason for the United States to take part in this operation, it is certainly not the only reason, or even the most important one.

### GENERAL QUESTIONS

5) Over the past four years, this problem has been described by many as a "European problem." Do you agree or not? Why is it now essential for the U.S. to become so deeply involved?

**Answer:** It was the Bush Administration that in 1991 preferred to regard this as a "European problem", in light of the end of the Cold War, and Europe's declared intention to advance its own unity and itself address the problems consequent on Yugoslavia's break-up. The Clinton Administration entered office in 1993 convinced that the United States needed to take a more active role in ending the war in Bosnia and preventing its spread throughout the Balkans. By 1995, it became clear that Europe's best efforts could not achieve an acceptable solution in Bosnia and were unable to stop mass killings of civilians or the other atrocities of this conflict. We recognized that failure to exercise U.S. leadership would have unacceptable consequences for Europe and for the United States. That is why we took such an active role that led to the successful conclusion of the Dayton negotiations and deployment of the NATO-led Implementation Force.

6) What are the diverging national interests of the likely participants in this operation? Can you point to separate national agendas on the part of the different nations?

**Answer:** We believe that the participants in IFOR share the common interest of wanting to end the war in Bosnia and prevent its tragedy from spreading to other parts of Europe. This common interest is far more compelling than any single national interest, and we believe it will prevail. US leadership, which helped bring about the Dayton Peace Agreement, is also capable of maintaining accord sufficient for the success of the current peace effort between such divergent national interests as may exist among countries contributing to IFOR.. Our common interests in the success of our current joint effort are of paramount importance. Although there are some differences in national perspective, one of the striking aspects of the IFOR deployment is that over 33 countries, many from outside NATO, have been able to work together so successfully. Russia's participation, which is unprecedented, has been very successful, thus far.

### GENERAL QUESTIONS

7) In your view, what would be a "successful" outcome in Bosnia?

**Answer:** We believe that approximately 12 months will be adequate to accomplish IFOR's principal military tasks such as separating the forces and establishing the zone of separation along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and allow the peace to become self-sustaining. The international effort to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement--especially economic reconstruction-- will require a longer term, but 12 months should be sufficient to set up the civilian structures that will oversee this effort. In the initial 12-month period, IFOR can lay the foundation for a lasting peace by establishing a pattern of compliance by the Parties with the military provisions of the agreement, thereby decreasing tensions and building confidence.

8) What is the current humanitarian situation in Bosnia? What is the long-term viability of a peace settlement if the displaced persons in Bosnia are unable to return to their homes?

**Answer:** With the first stages of the agreement now completed and freedom of movement being established, the humanitarian situation is improving, but it still has a long way to go. Food and other assistance is getting to all who need it, and now the country can turn the enormous problem of reconstructing housing, the economy, and the entire infrastructure. Annex Seven of the peace accord provides, where return is not possible, for compensation for lost property, and provides a mechanism for the determination of such compensation. The achievement of conditions for the return of as many as possible, including especially a cessation of the threat of violence, is an important goal of the military provisions of the accord.

### **General Questions (2)**

1) What will the role of IFOR be if, for example, Muslim civilians cross the demarcation line, complaining of having been "ethnically cleansed" out of the Serbian zone? What will we do about atrocities? And while we are doing whatever it is we may do, how will we protect ourselves?

**Answer:** The mission of IFOR is to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement, in particular the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within an agreed period and the establishment of agreed zones of separation between forces. IFOR will carry out its critical tasks in an even-handed manner. If provocation's occur, from either side, IFOR will respond. IFOR is under orders to respond when it observes atrocities taking place, if the IFOR commander judges that assistance can be provided without detracting from his principal mission or unduly risking his forces. In addition to its assigned military tasks, IFOR has authority under the Dayton Agreement to assist in other aspects such as providing secure conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections and responding appropriately to deliberate violence.

2) In light of comments by Bosnian Serbs about their dissatisfaction with some aspects of the peace plan, do we anticipate that the Serbs will violate the agreement? If so, why are we putting our troops in their territory, where they will be at risk?

**Answer:** We believe that all of the entities will generally comply with the agreement. So far, this has largely been the case, although there have been periodic examples of partial or even non-compliance. It was anticipated that some elements on both sides would be dissatisfied with aspects of the peace accord, and that some might even try to violate the accord. However, the parties to the Dayton Agreement have repeatedly committed themselves both to the accord and to mechanisms which would respond to violations, including IFOR. Of necessity, in order to respond, IFOR required, and was given under the accord, freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding potential risk, any military force carrying out a military mission must accept the risk consequent on its mission. While we will minimize that risk as far as possible, some risk is required to accomplish the mission.

**GENERAL QUESTIONS (2)**

3) Is it our aim to allow the Bosnians to defend themselves against Serbia proper?

**Answer:** No. The equip and train program is designed to establish a military balance in B-H. By strengthening the Bosnian Federation via its neighbors a deterrent will be established. This will also contribute to regional security.

4) Do you believe that either the current Croatian or the current Serbian leaderships want, at the end of the day, to either absorb the present territory of Bosnia or divide it between them?

**Answer:** In the Dayton Agreements, the leaders of Croatia and Serbia have pledged to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We expect them to honor their commitment.

5) Why is the present plan better than the Vance-Owens Plan, which the Administration rejected when it came into office?

**Answer:** The State Department will be answering this question and forward to L.A.

6) How have the Bosnian Serbs been penalized for having rejected the Contact Group's "take it or leave it" offer of last year and causing a further year of slaughter?

**Answer:** The Bosnian Serbs have lost their former Serb allies in Croatia, who have been driven out of Krajina, previously a strategic buffer in Croatia for the Bosnian Serbs.

**GENERAL QUESTIONS (2)**

7) If we would want to resume a bombing campaign against the Serbs -- if they violate the cease-fire -- won't the IFOR troops, the peace monitors, and others simply become hostages, as was the case for UNPROFOR?

**Answer:** UNPROFOR's policy of avoiding any forceful response under virtually any provocation allowed forces hostile to their presence to subject UNPROFOR to various indignities, including hostage taking. IFOR is committed to a forceful and effective response to any threat to it, without specifying in advance where or how that response would be applied. This is why IFOR will include almost 60,000 well-armed troops with significant heavy equipment and combat aircraft at its disposal, as well as robust rules of engagement that will allow it to avoid getting into the kinds of situations that adversely affected UNPROFOR.



**GENERAL QUESTIONS (2)**

8) You said yesterday that each IFOR participant will bear its own costs. Does this apply to NATO as well? Or will we be picking up the tab for heavy lift, for example.-- as was the case when we brought in the Rapid Reaction Force?

**Answer:** There are three organizational sources of funding to support IFOR costs -- the United Nations, NATO and national participants.

- Residual United Nations obligations are being paid by the UN.
- Nations participating in IFOR -- both NATO and non-NATO -- pay all their own costs, including transport into theater.
- NATO -- as an alliance -- agreed to pick up selected common costs which -- as an alliance -- NATO members agreed were imputable neither to the UN or to a specific nation. Examples of agreed NATO common costs include expenditures for such requirements as personnel and administrative costs for common headquarters and activities; equipment (combat/non-combat vehicles, ADP and communications requirements); engineering; common logistics; contracting; and collective training.

NATO common costs are paid out of either the NATO Military Budget (largely for Operations and Maintenance-type costs), or from the NATO Security Investment Program (mostly for construction and procurement costs). Some US national costs, especially for services or assets which benefit more than one nation, may be reimbursable through NATO.

### **ISSUES REGARDING RUSSIA**

1) Secretary Perry, what is the result of your most recent discussions with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on possible Russian participation in a NATO led peace enforcement force?

**Answer:** Minister Grachev and I held a series of meetings throughout the fall that made continued progress, starting with an agreement for Russia to send COL-GEN Shevtsov to SHAPE to work out military arrangements for Russian participation in IFOR. Later, General Grachev and I agreed on the principles for Russian participation in the IFOR, based on work between Generals Joulwan and Shevtsov, that put the Russian brigade under the operational control of General Joulwan and tactical control of the US Division Commander Nash. In November, we reached "agreement in principle" at the NATO Defense Ministerial for "political control" of Russia's IFOR contingent through a NATO-Russia Consultative Mechanism. Political control would still reside with the North Atlantic Council but would include regular and ad-hoc consultations with Russia in a 16+1 format on issues that bear on Russian forces.

Work remains to conclude technical agreements on the terms of Russian participation, but the deployment is going extremely well on the ground. Hopefully the excellent teamwork will continue and the operation will provide an excellent precedent for future cooperation in the NATO-Russia relationship.

2) Secretary Perry, how would Russia financially support participation in a peace enforcement force by a substantial number of its troops?

**Answer:** Russia, as with other IFOR contributors, has joined IFOR with the understanding that it will bear the costs of its forces' deployment. Recognizing the importance of this operation, the Russians have deployed a brigade and are supporting that unit. I commend them for putting their resources and their forces into helping peace in Bosnia -- and in fostering new cooperation between Russia and the West.

### ISSUES REGARDING RUSSIA

3) Secretary Perry, what would be the command and control relationship between NATO forces and Russian forces in a peace enforcement force?

**Answer:** The Russians have agreed to participate in Operation JOINT Endeavor under the Operational Control of General Joulwan, the commander with overall authority for the operation, with COL-General Shevtsov acting as his deputy for Russian forces. Orders to Russian forces therefor flow from Joulwan through Shevtsov to the Russian brigade commander. In addition, MG Nash has tactical control over Russian forces operating in his sector. Of course, Russia maintains overall national command of its forces, just as we and all other IFOR contributors do.

**EXIT STRATEGY**

1) You have recommended to the President that he limit the deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia to one year. Why one year? How do we get out in one year? Or more simply: What do you expect to be different in one year as opposed to six months or two years or whatever? When the administration appeared last year to testify on committing U.S. troops to Haiti you strenuously opposed setting a date certain for their withdrawal because it would destabilize the mission. Why don't you have the same concern with the one year timetable you have established for IFOR in Bosnia? What is different and why don't your fundamental concerns apply in Bosnia?

**Answer:** One year was the estimate that came from military planners at NATO and from our senior military leaders on how long it would take to accomplish the key military tasks provided for in Annex I(a) of the Dayton Agreement. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months, and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit key civilian implementation efforts such as the holding of elections and the first returns of displaced persons, to go forward. We did not establish a date certain for withdrawal in either Haiti or Bosnia. In the latter case, we have established a limited time period for the mission's duration in order to maintain pressure on all the parties to move forward quickly to implement the agreement. In any case, the situation in Bosnia is very different situation from Haiti. In Bosnia, we are separating large numbers of regular forces with considerable equipment and we are working through two different government structures that have committed themselves to a peace treaty.

### EXIT STRATEGY

2) The lines you've drawn on the map of Bosnia remind me of nothing so much as the Green Line separating Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces in Cyprus. The Green Line was drawn 1974, and today, more than 20 years later, we still have U.N. peacekeepers patrolling the line. Why will the line you've drawn in Bosnia be any different? If the IFOR withdraws in one year, won't some other peacekeeping force have to take its place to patrol the line?

**Answer:** By signing the Dayton Agreement, the parties have committed to a process which has the objective of not leading to a permanent division between entities. But this process has to take place in stages, and the first priority has to be to separate the warring factions and stop the fighting. Only then can a secure environment be established that will allow elections to take place and other civilian structures, such as the Federation Government, to take hold. It is these steps at civilian implementation that are ensuring that the boundary lines within Bosnia do not become permanent. Also, during the year that IFOR is in place, the United States will also lead an international effort to equip and train Bosnian forces to allow them to defend themselves and make it unnecessary for any outside force to come in and defend them. A key difference is the provision for an overall government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Further, foreign forces have started their withdrawal from Bosnia, and we intend to insure that this withdrawal is complete as specified in the Dayton Accord. The peace accord for Bosnia includes provision for economic assistance toward reconstruction (for which there was no provision on Cyprus), which is intended as an incentive for peaceful evolution.

3) What are the military criteria for determining that U.S. forces would leave IFOR?  
 What exactly will we have accomplished at that time?..  
 Walk through the timeline for how we would get our forces in and out

**Answer:** IFOR, including the US contingent, plans to leave Bosnia after about one year. By the end of the first year, we expect that we will have completed all of our military tasks and broken the cycle of violence. We will have established a stable security environment which will allow the civil program efforts to take hold. Regarding our timeline for troop deployment: Within two months of the 14 December Paris signing, IFOR is to be at full strength, and will remain at full-strength until late next summer or early fall, when it will begin to re-deploy. We expect that redeployment to be completed within a year.

### **EXIT STRATEGY**

4) How does the peace accord address the issue of how long IFOR will stay in place? How long will other nations remain in place? What reaction have you had from our allies on our one year commitment?

**Answer:** Annex A of the Dayton Accord provides that IFOR will be deployed for "approximately one year". National contingents in place are part of IFOR and therefore covered under Annex A. The one year target was discussed and agreed between Secretary Perry and other NATO defense ministers at Williamsburg, prior to the initialing of the Dayton Accords.

5) Is it acceptable to us that the Russians, if they should participate, remain after we leave?

**Answer:** The Russian contingent is part of IFOR and therefore covered under Annex A of the peace accord. We expect the Russians to leave with the other national contingents.

6) General Shalikashvili. is it your belief that one of the main considerations, if not the key determinant, in deciding on a one year time-frame is that time the Bosnians will be able, as a result of training and equipment, to defend themselves?

**Answer:** The framework agreement defines the military aspects of the peace agreement. IFOR should withdraw when the military aspects of the peace agreement are accomplished in Phase I and II as outlined in Article IV of Annex I to the peace agreement. There is, however, an inescapable linkage between the IFOR exit strategy and the parallel civil effort. The true indicators of success of the operation may in fact be the progress made in the civilian aspects of the peace agreement. There must be strong civilian agency support in the overall effort. Of course, the other key to exit strategy is simultaneous effort to ensure the Federation's self-defense capability is established. This assures a stable military situation, or rough balance of power, between the two entities.

### **MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (1)**

1) What political and security objectives and military tasks are set forth in the draft peace accord?

--What size force is necessary to fulfill those objectives and tasks?

--It is my understanding that up to an additional 20,000 U.S. forces (naval carrier groups, air combat support, etc.) will be utilized to support the actual U.S. ground forces deployed in Bosnia. Is that correct? So what is the total; U.S. commitment to the operation? 40,000? 50,000?

**Answer:** The U.S. sought to achieve a peaceful settlement that preserves Bosnia as a state. In that regard, The U.S. diplomatically achieved a settlement which addresses the entire situation, including an equitable territorial arrangement and constitutional principles, with the consent of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia. To assist in stabilizing the region, and to support the parties' commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the U.S. endeavors to help establish a comprehensive international program for regional economic reconstruction, security, and stability. To this end, the parties welcome the international community sending a NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to assist in the implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement. In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right: to monitor and help ensure compliance by all parties with the military annex of the DPA; to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the DPA; to establish liaison arrangements with the local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission; and to assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to IFOR, including if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO (now UNTAES) Forces. The parties also understand IFOR has the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, including the following: to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions; to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.

### **MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (1)**

2) What is the size of the U.S. contingent adequate to fulfill its responsibilities in the sector around Tuzla? What other national forces will be required or would be suitable to execute that mission?

**Answer:** The current plans call for a final force of approximately 27,000 troops to be deployed in the U.S. sector. Of these, approximately 20,000 are U.S. forces. These are coming principally from the U.S. 1st Armored Division which will be augmented by other EUCOM and CONUS based forces. In addition to the U.S. contingent, forces for the Tuzla sector will be provided from the following countries:

Denmark	Iceland
Norway	Sweden
Turkey	Russia
Poland	Finland
Estonia	Latvia
Lithuania	

3) How rapidly can an adequate force be deployed to man the demarcation lines in Bosnia?

**Answer:** Following signing of the agreement and authorization by North Atlantic Council, the IFOR began deployment immediately by rail, road and air to Bosnia. As of D + 30, 19 Jan 96, sufficient forces were on the ground to man the Cessation of Hostilities Zone of Separation. More than 90 % of the force was in place by D + 45, 3 Feb 96, the date that the Inter-entity Boundary Line went into effect. The full force of 60,000 personnel is expected to complete deployment prior to D + 60, (mid-February). IFOR will maintain that force until the drawdown begins in the latter part of the one year period.



## MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (1)

4) Why a one-year deployment? Walk us through how you came to that time period.

**Answer:** The mission of the IFOR is to monitor and enforce compliance in an evenhanded manner with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. While the Parties have primary responsibility for implementing the agreement, the Parties have made clear that a strong international military presence is needed to give them mutual confidence that commitments will be met and to provide them with a breathing space to begin to rebuild their country. In the past, absence of such an implementing force has contributed to repeated failures of other agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, IFOR's purpose is to improve the chances of this agreement leading to lasting peace. Specifically, IFOR's primary tasks are to: establish the military infrastructure, logistics, communications, and command and control required to support a large robust force. Thus, IFOR will rapidly deploy once the agreement is signed, quickly establishing a strong, visible presence to deter violations; assume command and control of the theater from UNPROFOR and withdraw UN forces that are not becoming part of IFOR; ensure IFOR's self-defense and freedom of movement throughout B-H; monitor and enforce compliance with specific military provisions of the Dayton agreement including ensuring:

1. From the outset continued compliance with the cease-fire.
2. Within 30 days withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation approximately 2 km on either side of the agreed cease-fire line.
3. Within 45 days, redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other.
4. For an additional 45 days, no introduction of forces into transferred areas.
5. The selective marking of the agreed cease-fire line, the Inter-Entity boundary line, and their zones of separation.
6. The establishment of liaison with local military and civilian authorities.
7. The creation of Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.

In addition, IFOR will be prepared to provide assistance -- within its capabilities and on request -- to others responsible for implementing other provisions of the agreement. Most essential is IFOR's role in creating secure conditions for the conduct by others of their implementation tasks, including elections. IFOR will coordinate with and be prepared to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for

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refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. IFOR will assist in monitoring the clearing of minefields and obstacles. IFOR will assist in observing and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons.

Equally important is understanding what IFOR will not do. IFOR is not responsible for election security, conducting humanitarian missions, or clearing mines. Its mission is not disarmament: it will not attempt.

5) What tests of other military capability ought to be applied to other national contingents that may be included in the Bosnia force?

**Answer:** Each Non-NATO nation which contributes to IFOR must have their troops certified by NATO. Non-NATO IFOR participating nations must ensure their forces can be certified as able to competently perform missions and tasks assigned to them. The following Mission Essential Task List (METL) is a guide for required tasks and for certification of combined arms formations:

- a. Conduct all operational communications in English.
- b. Conduct combined arms operations at battalion level.
- c. Prepare and conduct pre-deployment and deployment operations.
- d. Conduct peace support operations to include:
  - (1) Conduct offensive operations.
  - (2) Conduct defensive operations.
  - (3) Conduct withdrawal operations under enemy pressure.
  - (4) Perform sustainment operations.
  - (5) Perform reconnaissance and security operations.
  - (6) Conduct tactical movement.
- e. Work with and exploit capabilities of National Coalition Cells (NCC).
- f. Establish/receive individual soldier level on IFOR Rules of Engagement.

Moreover, an important part of the certification process is that contributors be able to support their contingent financially.

**MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (1)**

6) Will the U.S. provide quick reaction force protection to other national contingents? Or only to U.S. troops? Or to NATO troops?

**Answer:** Force protection is clearly a top military priority for IFOR operations. The U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit/Amphibious Ready Group (MEU/ARG) serves as the IFOR theater reserve. As such, it provides quick reaction force protection for the entire operation.

There may be instances when other U.S. forces may be better situated to react to a quick reaction contingency. Those force assigned to the U.S. sector or Hungary could be provided. CINCUSAREUR has issued clear guidance that NCA approval is required for personnel assigned in the U.S. sector to conduct missions outside of its sector; the only exception is in support of an IFOR military emergency.

In short, we will provide quick reaction forces in cases of legitimate military emergency, yet retain national control over assigned U.S. forces in all other cases.


### **MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (2)**

1) What are the current command and control arrangement for this mission? What assurances can you give us that there will be no "dual key" arrangements?

-Please explain the military chain of command.

-Please explain the political authority under which the military commanders will operate.

**Answer:** The unity of command under SACEUR was established as to eliminate the "dual key" requirement for action under which UNPROFOR acted. The commander's political authority comes from the NAC in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1033 of 15 December 1995. The Chain of Command is as follows:



## **MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (2)**

2) What inherent difficulties of command and control are raised by the multi-national nature of this operation?

**Answer:** The multi-national military chain of command in place should eliminate any problems encountered. Although there are differences between the national contingents, all have accepted NATO command and control. So far, the system has worked quite well, and Non-NATO countries have shown a strong interest in working with NATO.

3) What are the rules of engagement for U.S. forces?

-- What rules of engagement are proper for a "peace enforcement" mission? What is the likelihood that robust rules of engagement can be maintained throughout a diverse coalition?

-- Should U.S. forces be shelled -- let's say by irregular forces -- will the ROE permit the U.S. to respond as necessary -- through air combat missions or other means?

**Answer:** Robust NATO rules of engagement are in place for this operation. The fundamental principle underlying all of these rules of engagement is the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. The NATO ROE for IFOR reaffirm this right. In addition, these ROE fully support IFOR's capability to enforce the peace as required under the Dayton Peace Agreement.

-- Because this is a peace enforcement mission, the rules of engagement must permit the judicious use of force to conduct the mission. Soldiers and leaders have been given extensive training to ensure they understand them and are capable of applying them in all situations. These ROE have been agreed to in the NAC by all NATO nations and have been accepted by all non-NATO participants.

-- IFOR commanders have full authority to respond to any attack on their forces, regardless of the source.

**MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (3)**

1) Secretary Perry, last month some of our Committee staff met with General Haukland, the Norwegian Commander of UNPROFOR troops in Tuzla and Captain Warburg of the U.S. Army attached to UNPROFOR in Tuzla. We learned that neither of these officers had been contacted by either EUCOM or NATO planners involved in the preparations for the Implementation Force. Isn't it rather a serious oversight to neglect the ideas and perceptions of these two officers on the ground in Tuzla in planning for a deployment of U.S. troops in that very area?

**Answer:** Throughout the fall, U.S. military planners from USEUCOM as well as its component commands conducted extensive liaison with officers in the Nordic countries with experience in UNPROFOR. In particular a series of five coordination meetings were conducted by the EUCOM staff and the prospective Nordic brigade staff in October and November. These efforts were focused on integrating the Nordic Brigade and its headquarters into the US Multinational Division which was to be centered on Tuzla. The Nordic brigade staff included a number of officers with recent experience in the Tuzla sector and these personnel provided detailed and valuable information regarding conditions in and around Tuzla. Since the deployment of the U.S. IFOR contingent, BG Nash, its commander, has continued with the commanders of the Nordic brigade to seek their input and utilize their expertise.

**MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (3)**

2) Secretary Perry, you have outlined a narrowly defined mission and role for any U.S. troops in Bosnia. Our staff, who just returned from a visit to Tuzla, where U.S. troops are likely to be based, were told by refugee workers as well as the UN commander in Tuzla, that if our troops only perform that narrowly defined mission, and do not engage in such activities as helping restore infrastructure, etc., that they will encounter resentment and frustrations on the part of the local population. Over time, this resentment could well pose additional problems for our troops. How do you respond?

**Answer:** The Dayton Agreement clearly delineates between military tasks--such as separation of forces and patrolling the cease fire--and civilian tasks--such as rebuilding the infrastructure. IFOR has responsibility for the former and a variety of international organizations, such as UN, the Red Cross, and the World Bank have responsibility for the latter. I believe that effective implementation of both the civilian and military aspects of the agreement is key to its success and to forestalling any potential resentment. I believe that most Bosnian civilians will welcome IFOR as an opportunity for real peace that will allow them to go back to living normal lives free from fear.

**MISSION, FORCE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (3)**

3) : General Shalakashvili, one of the problems agreed to by the parties, is the right of return by displaced persons to their homes.

-- Will U.S. troops have any role in ensuring that this right of return is respected for those who wish to exercise it? If so, how would our troops perform this role?

**Answer:** Most essential is IFOR's role in creating secure conditions for the conduct by others of their implementation tasks. The parties have called upon the UNHCR to develop a repatriation plan to allow for an early, peaceful, orderly, and phased return of refugees and displaced persons. IFOR will coordinate with and be prepared to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. IFOR will, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person.



### **MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (3)**

4) General Shalikashvili, some would argue that the strength of the U.S. lies in our air power, while our ability to project and sustain power within Central Bosnia through ground forces leaves troops vulnerable to land-mines, attacks, and provocation's and is a relative weakness. The argument goes on to suggest that our presence on the ground would actually neutralize or diminish our ability to use our airpower effectively, because, as we have seen from UNPROFOR's experience, ground troops can be retaliated against in the event air power is used. -- How do you respond?

**Answer:** A major tenet of U.S. military doctrine is that the armed services will operate as a team. As such, our Armed Forces are organized to provide joint force commanders the full range of military capabilities necessary ensure successful mission accomplishment. This team concept is equally important in multinational efforts. Airpower brings definite strengths that to a joint operation, but there are also limitations.

IFOR's major tasks as specified in the NATO operations plan are to monitor and enforce compliance with the military tasks of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These include enforcing the cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of forces to their respective territories; redeployment of forces and heavy forces; establishment of Zones of Separation (ZOS), restrictions on new minefields and obstacles and supervise marking of boundaries and ZOS between the parties. Each of the above tasks is designed to establish a security environment which will set the conditions for a lasting peace in Bosnia and each requires a significant ground presence.

IFOR's concept of operations was designed to accomplish these tasks while at the same time taking prudent measures to protect the force. First and foremost, force protection is built on a foundation of robust ROE -- which NATO has authorized for IFOR. It is reinforced and by adopting tactics which provide forces the full range of combat capabilities, limits the exposure of small groups of soldiers and ensures front-line forces are backed by increasingly powerful reserves. Finally, there must be a willingness to apply force when required. In direct contrast to UNPROFOR, IFOR forces and operations were designed to ensure all of the above.

NATO air forces are an essential part of IFOR's concept to accomplish the mission while providing for force protection. The mission of NATO airpower in DECISIVE EDGE is two fold: to enforce the UN mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-

Herzegovina, and to provide support the IFOR ground forces. IFOR's defensive capability to protect itself from retaliation is much more robust that UNPROFOR's. Air power serves to reinforce that capability, but it is not the only or even the most important tool in carrying out peace enforcement operations in Bosnia.

**MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES (3)**

5) Secretary Perry, General Smith, the UN commander in Bosnia remarked that NATO crossed the "Mogadishu Line" when it bombed the Serbs last August -- meaning that NATO has taken sides in the Bosnian Conflict. What guarantees or understandings do you have that the Serbian side will look upon a NATO implementation force as neutral peacekeepers rather than a hostile party?

**Answer:** Both the U.S. government and other countries contributing troops to IFOR have made it clear that IFOR will enforce the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement in an even-handed manner. We intend to enforce all of the provisions of the agreement equally among all sides. So far we have seen only limited evidence of Serb hostility to IFOR. This has, as expected, from rogue elements and not from the Bosnian Serbs or the population at large.

6) Secretary Perry, would U.S. forces be deployed in and around the Brcko Corridor in order to assist the Serbs in maintaining a link between the territory they control in eastern and western Bosnia?

**Answer:** IFOR forces are deployed throughout Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement. A principal task of the agreement is a requirement to enforce in a fair and impartial manner the Zones of Separation. Additionally, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, IFOR is to observe and prevent interference with the freedom of movement of civilians and refugees and will respond to appropriately to acts of deliberate violence from anyone that are intended to restrict freedom of movement.

The Brcko Corridor falls within the area of Bosnia where the US Multinational Division will be deployed. In the course of carrying out the principal tasks they are assigned by the Peace Agreement, U.S. and other forces deployed in its sector will maintain secure conditions in this and all other areas of the Sector.

### **THREAT ENVIRONMENT**

1) General Shalikashvili, last Sunday members of our staff visited the refugee housing project near Tuzla that had been shelled by Serbian Orca rocket-assisted mortar the previous week. This devastating attack killed 10 persons--mostly children playing in the courtyard where the device impacted-- and injured 50 others. The shell, a sophisticated cluster bomb, was fired from at least 20 kilometers away and had obviously been aimed at the resettlement project-- a very small target for that distance. Clearly, the Serbs have the capacity of successfully launching similar weapons against Americans based in Tuzla with the possibility of inflicting large numbers of casualties with one well aimed shell. How do you propose to protect our troops from such an attack?

**Answer:** While there can never be complete guarantee of safety in operations of this nature, U.S. commanders have pursued all available courses of action to mitigate the risk to U.S. forces from artillery, mortar and rocket attacks. These include implementing protective measures such as digging-in or sandbagging troop positions and ensuring where possible that U.S. forces operate from armored vehicles. U.S. forces have also deployed with several target acquisition radar batteries and heavy artillery pieces and rocket launchers to deter and if required respond to attacks against our forces. In addition, the U.S. Army is deploying the newly fielded Short Stop counter artillery system as a further protective measure for U.S. forces.

**THREAT ENVIRONMENT**

2) Will the U.S. and NATO troops be seen as impartial, or will they be viewed as combatants? What is the likely reaction of the warring parties to the presence of U.S. forces?

**Answer:** We have gone to great lengths to ensure that the IFOR operates in an even handed manner. So far, all sides have welcomed US and other IFOR forces and have been cooperative.

3) Secretary Perry, you have stated that we should fully prepare for the possibility that U.S. forces could be targeted for attack. What about the taking of U.S. personnel as hostages?

**Answer:** We will be taking every action to minimize the risks. We do not expect organized opposition to the NATO implementation force. The parties to the peace agreement not only agreed to the cessation of hostilities, but they invited the NATO force in and offered to assist. The size, equipment and rules of engagement of IFOR have reduced its vulnerability to hostage taking. There is also a provision of the agreement that provides for the removal of all foreign forces to help minimize these risks.

4) How willing is the administration to respond to provocation's with the appropriate level of force?

**Answer:** It is absolutely willing to do so. We expect there may be rogue individuals or groups who might want to harass IFOR troops. If this occurs, IFOR's rules of engagement permit the immediate and effective use of force to prevent any additional provocation's or resistance. In addition, of course, all personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defense.

### THREAT ENVIRONMENT

5) Secretary Perry, what is your estimate of U.S. casualties over the one year period of the deployment in Bosnia?

**Answer:** I have not directed the preparation of any precise estimate of casualties. However, while we are doing everything we can to minimize the number of casualties I have stated to the Congress that I fully expect there to be some casualties over the course of this difficult, dangerous and complex mission. It is my job to ensure that our troops are superbly trained and well-equipped in order to minimize the risks of casualties.

### READINESS ISSUES

1) What are the short and long term effects on U.S. readiness of an extended deployment to Bosnia?

**Answer:** U.S. participation in the IFOR would not seriously reduce the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win a regional conflict elsewhere. Combat forces needed in the opening phase of a regional conflict would still be available to deploy on short notice. There would, of course, be some degradation in the preparedness of units deployed in Bosnia to engage in combat missions elsewhere. Units engaged in contingency operations sometimes lose the opportunity to conduct a full range of training. The need to withdraw combat forces from peace operations and redeploy them rapidly is likely to be required only in the event of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. In such a case, most of the forces from the peace operation would be redeployed to fight and win during the later phase of the second major regional conflict. Readiness degradation to critical force can be prevented by implementing a planned limited call-up of the reserve forces.

**READINESS ISSUES**

3) How will the deployment affect the national strategy of two major regional contingencies?

**Answer:** The need to withdraw combat forces from peace operations and redeploy them rapidly is likely to be required only in the event of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. In such a case, it is envisioned that most of the forces from the peace operation would be redeployed to fight and win the later phase of the second major regional conflict. Readiness degradation to critical support forces can be prevented by implementing a planned limited call-up of the reserve forces.

4) Will the deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia require the call up of reserve units? What type of units? How Many?

**Answer:** Yes, the President selected reserve call-up will involve approximately 3,800 reservist. The first rotation will be for 270 days. It will include all four services. The functions will include civil affairs, medical, military police and transportation. Some of these functions comes from the reserves. Therefore, anytime we go to ant significant deployment, we go as a total force. We go with active duty and with reserve components.

## Questions for the record submitted to General Shalikashvili

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### EXIT STRATEGY

Mr. Smith: General Shalikashvili, is it your belief that one of the main considerations, if not the key determination; in deciding on a one year timeframe is that at that time the Bosnians will be able, as a result of training and equipment, to defend themselves?

General Shalikashvili: Essentially, we believe that approximately 12 months will be adequate to accomplish IFOR's tasks and allow the peace to become self-sustaining. The international effort to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement -- especially economic reconstruction -- will require a, longer term, but 12 months should be sufficient to set up the civilian structures that will oversee this effort. In the initial 12-month period, IFOR can lay the foundation for a lasting peace by establishing a pattern of compliance by the Parties with the military provisions of the agreement, thereby decreasing tensions and building confidence. This period of stability is vital so the Parties can build the framework for a stable military balance, to the extent possible through arms control negotiations. The principal US policy goal in Bosnia related directly to the concept of providing training and equipment is in achieving such a stable military balance in the region. While not directly tied to the one year timeframe of IFOR's deployment, it will be the objective of any Equip and Train program, in concert with arms control measures, that within one year the Federation military possesses the equipment and have the training to defend themselves."

## MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: What political and security objectives and military tasks are set forth in the draft peace accord?.

-- What size force is necessary to fulfill those objectives and tasks?

-- It is my understanding that up to an additional 20,000 U.S. forces (naval carrier groups, air combat support, etc.) will be utilized to support the actual U.S. ground forces deployed in Bosnia. Is that correct? So what is the total U.S. commitment to the operation? 40,000? 50,000?

General Shalikhavili: The US sought to achieve a peaceful settlement that preserves Bosnia as a state. In that regard, the US diplomatically achieved a settlement which addresses the entire situation, including an equitable territorial arrangement and constitutional principles, with the consent of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia. To assist in stabilizing the region, and to support the parties' commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the US endeavors to help establish a comprehensive international program for regional economic reconstruction, security, and stability. To this end, the parties welcome the international community sending a NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) to assist in the implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of the agreement. In accordance with the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the parties understand and agree that the IFOR shall have the right: to monitor and help ensure compliance by all parties with the military annex of the DPA; to authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line and its Zone of Separation and the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and its Zone of Separation as established by the DPA; to establish



liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary for the accomplishment of its mission; and to assist in the withdrawal of UN Peace Forces not transferred to IFOR, including if necessary, the emergency withdrawal of UNCRO (now UNTAES) Forces. The parties also understand IFOR has the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, including the following: to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; to assist the movement of organizations in the accomplishment of humanitarian missions; to assist the UNHCR and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions; to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and to monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles.

-- NATO planners determined that implementation of the tasks agreed to in the Dayton Agreement will require a force of approximately 60,000 ground troops in Bosnia. These troops have been deployed into three sectors and are organized under multinational framework divisions. These divisions are commanded by U.S., UK and French officers with a significant portion of the troop strength of each coming from those nations. As the largest member of NATO and the core of NATO's strength and resolve, the U.S. has committed one-third of the total forces the vast majority of which are deployed to the U.S. sector.

-- The total number of U.S. military personnel supporting Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is approximately 37,500. Of these, approximately 25,000 forces are deployed in Bosnia and Croatia under NATO operational control. Also operating under NATO operational control are approximately 400 naval personnel in direct support of maritime intercept operations in the Adriatic and approximately 2,200 airmen supporting the IFOR air operation, DECISIVE EDGE. These forces are being supported by approximately 7,000 U.S. personnel deployed to the "Rim" countries (Hungary and Italy) and another 2,900 are providing support from bases elsewhere in the EUCOM AOR.

In addition to the forces noted above, there are approximately 13,000 sailors and marines deployed on the in Theater Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group and these may be available to support operations upon NATO request.

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MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: What is the size of the U.S. contingent adequate to fulfill its responsibilities in the sector around Tuzla? What other national forces will be required or would be suitable to execute that mission?

General Shalikashvili: Current plans call for a final force of approximately 27,000 troops to be deployed in the US sector. Of these, approximately 20,000 are U.S. forces. These are coming principally from the U.S. 1st Armored Division which will be augmented by other EUCOM and CONUS based forces.

In addition to the U.S. contingent, forces for the Tuzla sector will be provided from the following countries:

Nordic Brigade: Approximately 3,900 personnel.

Denmark	807	Norway	785	Sweden	800
Poland	660	Finland	450	Romania	300
Estonia	32	Latvia	32	Lithuania	32

Russian Brigade: Approximately 1,500 Personnel

Turkish Brigade: Approximately 1,500 Personnel

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MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: How rapidly can an adequate force be deployed to man the demarcation lines in Bosnia?

General Shalikashvili: Following signing of the agreement and authorization by North Atlantic Council, the IFOR began deployment immediately by rail, road and air to Bosnia. As of D+30, 19 Jan 96, sufficient forces were on the ground to man the Cessation of Hostilities Zone of Separation. More than 90% of the force was in place by D+45, 3 Feb 96, the date that the Inter-entity Boundary Line went into effect. The full force of 60,000 personnel is expected to complete deployment prior to D+60 (mid-February). IFOR will maintain that force until the drawdown begins in the latter part of the one year period.

## MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: Why a one-year deployment? Walk us through how you came to that time period.

General Shalikashvili: The mission of the IFOR is to monitor and enforce compliance in an evenhanded manner with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. While the Parties have primary responsibility for implementing the agreement, the Parties have made clear that a strong international military presence is needed to give them mutual confidence that commitments will be met and to provide them with a breathing space to begin to rebuild their country. In the past, absence of such an implementing force has contributed to repeated failures of other agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, IFOR's purpose is to improve the chances of this agreement leading to lasting peace. Specifically, IFOR's primary tasks are to: establish the military infrastructure, logistics, communications, and command and control required to support a large robust force. Thus, IFOR will rapidly deploy once the agreement is signed, quickly establishing a strong, visible presence to deter violations; assume command and control of the theater from UNPROFOR and withdraw UN forces that are not becoming part of IFOR; ensure IFOR's self-defense and freedom of movement throughout B-H; monitor and enforce compliance with specific military provisions of the Dayton agreement including ensuring:

1. From the outset continued compliance with the cease-fire.
2. Within 30 days withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation approximately 2 km on either side of the agreed cease-fire line.

3. Within 45 days, redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other.
4. For an additional 45 days, no introduction of forces into transferred areas.
5. The selective marking of the agreed cease-fire line, the Inter-Entity boundary line, and their zones of separation.
6. The establishment of liaison with local military and civilian authorities.
7. The creation of Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.

In addition, IFOR will be prepared to provide assistance -- within its capabilities and on request -- to others responsible for implementing other provisions of the agreement. Most essential is IFOR's role in creating secure conditions for the conduct by others of their implementation tasks, including elections. IFOR will coordinate with and be prepared to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. IFOR will assist in monitoring the clearing of minefields and obstacles. IFOR will assist in observing and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons.

Equally important is understanding what IFOR will not do. IFOR is not responsible for election security, conducting humanitarian missions, or clearing mines. Its mission is not disarmament; it will not attempt

to collect and control weapons. IFOR is not responsible for movement of civilians. IFOR is not a police force or a nation-building force.

Now that the specific provisions of the agreement are established, we believe that approximately 12 months will be adequate to accomplish IFOR's tasks and allow the peace to become self-sustaining. The international effort to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement -- especially economic reconstruction -- will require a, longer term, but 12 months should be sufficient to set up the civilian structures that will oversee this effort. In the initial 12-month period, IFOR can lay the foundation for a lasting peace by establishing a pattern of compliance by the Parties with the military provisions of the agreement, thereby decreasing tensions and building confidence. This period of stability is vital so the Parties can build the framework for a stable military balance, to the extent possible through arms control negotiations.

The assessment of the senior military commanders is that it will take less than a year to accomplish the prescribed military tasks. We believe that the presence and actions of a robust NATO military force can secure conditions throughout Bosnia. Such an environment will break the cycle of violence and permit civil authorities to begin to implement those measures which will lead to a secure and lasting peace.

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MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: What are the rules of engagement for U.S. forces?

-- What rules of engagement are proper for a "peace enforcement" mission? What is the likelihood that robust rules of engagement can be maintained throughout a diverse coalition?

-- Should U.S. forces be shelled -- let's say by irregular forces will the ROE permit the U.S. to respond as necessary -- through air combat missions or other means?

General Shalikashvili: Robust NATO rules of engagement are in place for this operation. The fundamental principle underlying all of these rules of engagement is the inherent right and obligation of self-defense. The NATO ROE for IFOR reaffirm this right. In addition, these ROE fully support IFOR's capability to enforce the peace as required under the Dayton Peace Agreement.

-- Because this is a peace enforcement mission, the rules of engagement must permit the judicious use of force to conduct the mission. Soldiers and leaders have been given extensive training to ensure they understand them and are capable of applying them in all situations. These ROE have been agreed to in the NAC by all NATO nations and have been accepted by all non-NATO participants.

-- IFOR commanders have full authority to respond to any attack on their forces, regardless of the source.



## MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: What unique constraints are imposed by weather and terrain on the capability of U.S. forces to accomplish their mission?

-- Concerns have been expressed that the onset of winter may hinder U.S. deployment efforts. Is this a valid concern? If so, might our efforts to withdraw from Bosnia a year later be hampered by the same factor?

-- What about the impact of inclement weather conditions prevalent throughout central Bosnia in Winter on our ability to carry-out close air support of our troops?

General Shalikashvili: The terrain and weather found in Bosnia do not differ significantly from that found elsewhere in Europe, in general, and in particular, central and southern Germany. NATO forces, the most capable military forces in the world, have been training to operate in this kind of terrain for more than 45 years. The greatest impediment to IFOR operations in Bosnia is the limited infrastructure, road, rail, etc. These limitations were recognized early in planning and commanders have incorporated measures to overcome them.

-- Winter weather in particular was identified as a probable hindrance to deployment operations. However, while, adverse weather delayed deployment, it did not prevent mission essential elements of the force from being in place in Bosnia when required by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Redeployment operations may well encounter similar challenges at the conclusion of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, however, we will be operating with a much improved infrastructure.

-- Inclement weather may detract from the effectiveness of close air support if required. However, experience over the last three years of war suggests that the warring factions will also have limited capability to conduct operations during the winter weather. On balance,

the effects of winter weather will favor IFOR over the factions due to IFOR's superior mobility relative to its potential adversaries.

Mr. Smith: Secretary Perry, last month some of our Committee staff met with General Haulkland, the Norwegian Commander of UNPROFOR troops in Tuzla and Captain Warburg of the U.S. Army attached to UNPROFOR in Tuzla. We learned that neither of these officers had been contacted by either EUCOM or NATO planners involved in the preparations for the Implementation Force. Isn't it rather a serious oversight to neglect the ideas and perceptions of these two officers on the ground in Tuzla in planning for a deployment of U.S. troops in that very area?

General Shalikashvili: While the officers in question were not consulted, throughout the fall US planners from USEUCOM as well as its component commands conducted extensive liaison with the Nordic countries. In particular a series of five coordination meetings were conducted by the EUCOM staff and the prospective Nordic brigade staff in October and November. These efforts were focused on integrating the Nordic Brigade and its headquarters into the US Multinational Division which was to be centered on Tuzla. The Nordic brigade staff included a number of officers with recent experience in the Tuzla sector and these personnel provided detailed and valuable information regarding conditions in and around Tuzla.

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MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: General Shalikashvili, one of the problems agreed to by the parties, is the right of return by displaced persons to their homes.

-- Will U.S. troops have any role in ensuring that this right of return is respected for those who wish to exercise it? If so, how would our troops perform this role?

General Shalikashvili: Most essential is IFOR's role in creating secure conditions for the conduct by others of their implementation tasks. The parties have called upon the UNHCR to develop a repatriation plan to allow for an early, peaceful, orderly, and phased return of refugees and displaced persons. IFOR will coordinate with and be prepared to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. IFOR will, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request, observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person.

## MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: General Shalikashvili, some would argue that the strength of the U.S. lies in our air power, while our ability to project and sustain power within Central Bosnia through ground forces leaves troops vulnerable to land-mines, attacks, and provocation's and is a relative weakness. The argument goes on to suggest that our presence on the ground would actually neutralize or diminish our ability to use our airpower effectively, because, as we have seen from UNPROFOR's experience, ground troops can be retaliated against in the event air power is used. . . . How do you respond?

General Shalikashvili: A major tenet of U.S. military doctrine is that the armed services will operate as a team. As such, our Armed Forces are organized to provide joint force commanders the full range of military capabilities necessary ensure successful mission accomplishment. This team concept is equally important in multinational efforts. Airpower brings definite strengths that to a joint operation, but there are also limitations.

IFOR's major tasks as specified in the NATO operations plan are to monitor and enforce compliance with the military tasks of the Dayton Peace Agreement. These include enforcing the cessation of hostilities; withdrawal of forces to their respective territories; redeployment of forces and heavy forces; establishment of Zones of Separation (ZOS), restrictions on new minefields and obstacles and supervise marking of boundaries and ZOS between the parties. Each of the above tasks is designed to establish a security environment which will set the conditions for a lasting peace in Bosnia and each requires a significant ground presence.

IFOR's concept of operations was designed to accomplish these tasks while at the same time taking prudent measures to protect the

force. First and foremost, force protection is built on a foundation of robust ROE--which NATO has authorized for IFOR. It is reinforced and by adopting tactics which provide forces the full range of combat capabilities, limits the exposure of small groups of soldiers and ensures front-line forces are backed by increasingly powerful reserves. Finally, there must be a willingness to apply force when required. In direct contrast to UNPROFOR, IFOR forces and operations were designed to ensure all of the above.

NATO air forces are an essential part of IFOR's concept to accomplish the mission while providing for force protection. The mission of NATO airpower in DECISIVE EDGE is two fold: to enforce the UN mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to provide support the IFOR ground forces. IFOR's defensive capability to protect itself from retaliation is much more robust than UNPROFOR's. Air power serves to reinforce that capability, but it is not the only or even the most important tool in carrying out peace enforcement operations in Bosnia.

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MISSION, FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT ISSUES

Mr. Smith: Secretary Perry, would U.S. forces be deployed in and around the Brcko Corridor in order to assist the Serbs in maintaining a link between the territory they control in eastern and western Bosnia?

General Shalikashvili: IFOR forces are deployed throughout Bosnia to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement. A principal task of the agreement is a requirement to enforce in a fair and impartial manner the Zones of Separation. Additionally, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available resources, IFOR is to observe and prevent interference with the freedom of movement of civilians and refugees and will respond to appropriately to acts of deliberate violence.

The Brcko Corridor falls within the US Multinational Division Sector. US forces are not tasked to assist the Serbs in maintaining the linkage between their forces. However, in the course of carrying out the tasks associated with the Peace Agreement, they will maintain secure conditions in this and all other areas of the U.S. Multinational Division Sector.

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THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Mr. Smith: General Shalikashvili, last Sunday members of our staff visited the refugee housing project near Tuzla that had been shelled by a Serbian ORCAN rocket-assisted mortar the previous week. This devastating attack killed 10 persons -- mostly children playing in the courtyard where the device impacted -- and injured 50 others. The shell a sophisticated cluster bomb, was fired from at least 20 kilometers away and had obviously been aimed at the resettlement project -- a very small target for that distance. Clearly the Serbs have the capability of successfully launching similar weapons against Americans based in Tuzla with the possibility of inflicting large numbers of casualties with one well aimed shell. How do you propose to protect our troops from such an attack?

General Shalikashvili: While there can never be complete guarantee of safety in operations of this nature, US commanders have pursued all available courses of action to mitigate the risk to US forces from artillery, mortar and rocket attacks. These include implementing protective measures such as digging-in or sandbagging troop positions and ensuring where possible that US forces operate from armored vehicles. US forces have also deployed with several target acquisition radar batteries and heavy artillery pieces and rocket launchers to deter and if required respond to attacks against our forces. In addition, the U.S. Army is deploying the newly fielded SHORT STOP counter-artillery system as a further protective measure for U.S. forces.

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READINESS ISSUES

Mr. Smith: How ready will U.S. Army Europe be to conduct its primary warfighting missions?

General Shalikashvili: U.S. participation in the IFOR will not seriously impair the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win a major regional conflict elsewhere. Combat elements and the vast majority of support units and assets involved in this operation come from active component units other than those designated as part of the contingency force -- that is, units called upon to respond rapidly to major international crises. Those units assigned to IFOR critical to effective early wartime response, such as selected intelligence assets and some special operations units, will be carefully monitored. Therefore, most of the forces needed in the critical opening phase of a regional conflict would be available to deploy on short notice from their home stations. The need to withdraw the bulk of U.S. forces from the IFOR peace operation and redeploy them rapidly is likely to be required only in the event of the occurrence of not one but two major theater wars. In such a case, we envision that most of the forces from the IFOR would be redeployed to fight and win the latter phase of the second major conflict. This could result in delayed force closure and conflict termination, but will not jeopardize our ability to defeat an aggressor.

We expect some degradation in the readiness of combat units deployed to IFOR in relation to their assigned wartime tasks. Units engaged in peacetime contingency operations generally lose the opportunity to conduct the full range of training for wartime missions.



This is a normal cost of doing business, and once the units have redeployed, they regain their warfighting readiness after a period of retraining. Since most of the forces in Bosnia would only be needed in to support a second major conflict, we anticipate that sufficient time would be available to provide units with retraining, restocking, and other "readiness upgrades" prior to their being redeployed and committed to operations in a second major regional conflict. Readiness degradation to critical support forces will also be ameliorated by implementing a limited call-up of reserve forces as currently planned.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT

Question:

1. You have stressed to us the importance to U.S. credibility of delivering on President Clinton's commitment to send up to 25,000 U.S. troops into Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement. Precisely when did he make this commitment, and to whom did he make it?
2. Was there any consultation with Congress about this commitment before it was made?

Answer:

Since shortly after taking office, the President has said that U.S. troops would participate in a force to implement a peace settlement in Bosnia. I have repeated the President's commitment on a number of occasions in testimony before this committee. In a November 13, 1995 letter to the Speaker, the President wrote that on October 20, 1993, in a letter to Senator Mitchell, he said he intended to provide U.S. troops to help implement a Bosnian settlement and the desirability of Congressional support for such a deployment. This commitment has since been publicly reiterated a number of times.

Throughout the peace process, the Administration has made clear that U.S. troops would not be deployed to Bosnia unless there was a real peace to keep. With the Dayton agreement, all sides have committed to peace. In addition, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have assured President Clinton, in writing, that they will do everything possible to ensure that there are no threats to the security of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).

The President has also ruled out any deployment of U.S. troops without clear NATO command and control and robust rules of engagement. These conditions have been met in the Dayton agreement and in the NATO operations plan approved by the President.

Throughout the peace process, President Clinton and all levels of his administration have consulted closely with Congress both on our peace initiative and our participation in implementation.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Q: If there was prior consultation with Congress about the commitment, could you give us the dates on which those consultations took place and the names of the Members who were consulted? Could you also describe what sort of reaction you received from the Members you consulted?

A: As Secretary Christopher said in open testimony before the Committee on November 30, 1995, President Clinton made it clear, going back to 1993, that the United States would not put ground troops into Bosnia to fight a war. The Secretary added that also beginning in 1993, the President made it clear that if there was a true peace agreement in Bosnia that the parties were intent on implementing, the United States would join with other countries in NATO in implementing a peace agreement.

This issue has been the subject of both open testimony and written communication with the Congress since 1993. In October of that year, the President stated this position in a letter to then Senate Majority Leader Mitchell. As the Secretary repeated in his November 30 testimony, he put the same position on the record in open testimony in 1993 before the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Presidential Commitment

Question:

4. In making this commitment, was the President specific about the type of mission the U.S. forces would be prepared to carry out? I am particularly interested in knowing whether he committed us only to a traditional peacekeeping role -- essentially the role of being a neutral observer of the parties' compliance with a peace agreement -- or whether he committed us to fight a war if necessary to impose peace on Bosnia.

Answer:

As the President noted in his December 11 and December 21 letters to Congress, IFOR's mission is to monitor and help ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement. IFOR will enforce the establishment of agreed zones of separation between forces of the parties. Within the strict limits of its key military tasks, IFOR will endeavor to create secure conditions for the conduct by other agencies and organizations of tasks associated with the peace agreement. Our goal is to provide the parties with an opportunity to achieve peace in Bosnia. Our obligation through the NATO-led force is to create a safe and secure environment that will allow the peace to be self-sustaining. Ultimately, however, it is up to the parties to implement the agreement.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Question:

1. In your judgment, are the parties now committed to lasting peace, or do they merely want a temporary respite from the fighting until they are ready to go at each other again? (If yes, What about the statements from Karadzic and other Bosnian Serbs that some parts of the plan need to be renegotiated, otherwise they will not cooperate?

Answer:

Four long years of war, with all the attendant destruction and hardship, brought the parties to the conclusion that there could be no military solution to the conflict. In addition, Muslim/Croat gains this summer and fall created a military stalemate on the ground which underlined this fact. The international community has also demonstrated its willingness to respond forcefully to outrages such as the Sarajevo marketplace shelling. The parties agreed to a cease-fire and talks which led to a peace agreement.

Let me emphasize that this was not an agreement that was imposed on the parties. They reached it freely and have freely committed themselves to implementing it. Clearly, such a brutal war created suspicions and anxieties that will take some time to erase; indeed some may never completely disappear. It was for this reason that the parties asked NATO to provide an independent force to implement the military aspects of the agreement. Nonetheless, the parties have shown every sign of realizing that it is in their own self-interest to end the war.

No part of the agreement is open for renegotiation. I would note that, despite Karadzic's other public statements, he endorsed the agreement in its entirety only two days after it was initialled in Dayton.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Question:

2. From the point of view of trying to keep the peace in Bosnia, which party do you expect to cause the most problems? Which party will be most dependent upon and supportive of international peacekeeping in Bosnia?

Answer:

The Dayton agreement was not imposed on the parties. They negotiated it and freely signed it. All the parties have committed themselves to peace. Therefore, we expect that all the parties will cooperate with IFOR and other international organizations in implementing the agreement. In fact, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia have all sent letters to President Clinton pledging to safeguard the security of IFOR.

Throughout the course of the conflict the Bosnian government has shown itself to be the party most cooperative with international peacekeeping efforts.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Question:

3. What happens if we find out down the road that one of the parties is not committed to peace but the others are? Would we pull out at this point, or would we seek to coerce the misbehaving party back into compliance with the agreement?

Answer:

We do not expect such a situation to occur. All the parties have signed the Dayton agreement. The agreement was not forced on them by any outside party. This commitment to peace is the key factor in successful implementation of the Dayton Accord.

In the case of non-compliance, there are a number of mechanisms to ensure compliance by the parties. The first, and most effective, is their own self-interest. The military stalemate on the ground and the demonstrated willingness of the international community to respond forcefully to outrages such as the Sarajevo marketplace shelling make it unlikely that the parties will attempt to disrupt the peace.

In addition, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) will have authority to respond forcefully to any violations of the military provisions of the agreement. There are also mechanisms that would keep economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs if they do not comply with the terms of the agreement.

All of these measures offer a reasonable expectation that the parties will fulfill their commitments in the Dayton Agreement. If, however, there is a complete breakdown in compliance, the North Atlantic Council will have the authority to end IFOR's mission and withdraw. The U.S. will not be asked to stay in a war zone, they are there to implement the peace, not fight a war.

## Chairman Gilman

## Questions on the Intentions of the Parties

Question:

4. Is the Muslim-Croat Federation likely to survive a peace settlement? In particular, is Croatia committed to survival of the Federation, or are the Croats just waiting to join with the Serbs in partitioning Bosnia?

Answer:

The March 1994 agreement between Bosnia's Croats and Muslims to join in a federation was one of the first key steps leading to the peace settlement. That Federation agreement, reaffirmed and further elaborated on November 10 in Dayton, is essential to the successful implementation of the peace settlement. Ensuring the success of the Federation will take further determined efforts by the United States, other countries, and the two Bosnian parties on the ground. Along with other interested governments, the United States will continue to press for rapid implementation of the Federation.

With regard to the intentions of Croatia and the FRY, the United States expects these governments to abide by the provisions of the peace settlement which they initialed on November 21 in Dayton and signed on December 14 in Paris. The governments of Croatia and the FRY have recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state.

We are determined to see the Dayton agreements fully implemented and to see the Bosnian Federation succeed.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO  
ARM AND TRAIN THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT

Question:

1. Outline the process by which the U.N. arms embargo will be lifted under the recently passed U.N. Security Council resolution.

Answer:

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1021 (1995), adopted by the Security Council on November 22, 1995, states:

"...that the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1993) shall be terminated as follows, beginning from the day the Secretary-General submits to the Council a report stating that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have formally signed the Peace Agreement:

(a) during the first ninety days following the submission of such a report, all the provisions of the embargo shall remain in place;

(b) during the second ninety days following the submission of such a report, all provisions of the arms embargo shall be terminated, except that the delivery of heavy weapons (as defined in the Peace Agreement), ammunition therefor, mines, military aircraft and helicopters shall continue to be prohibited until the arms control agreement referred to in Annex 1B has taken effect; and

(c) after the 180th day following the submission of such a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of Annex 1B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) as agreed by the parties, all provisions of the arms embargo terminate unless the Council decides otherwise."

"Heavy weapons" are defined in the Peace Agreement, Annex 1-A, Article IV, Paragraph 5(a) as: "all tanks and armored vehicles, all artillery 75mm and above, all mortars 81 mm and above, and all anti-aircraft weapons 20 mm and above."

Annex 1-B, the Agreement on Regional Stabilization, is attached.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

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QUESTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO ARM AND TRAIN THE  
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT

Question:

2. My understanding is that the lifting of the arms embargo applies to both Bosnia and Serbia? If so, what will prevent the Russians and others from arming the Serbs while we arm the Bosnians?

Answer:

The arms embargo has been much more damaging to the Bosnian government and the Federation than to the Bosnian Serbs who had access to weapons from Serbia and the Former Yugoslav military throughout much of the conflict. The strong arms control measures in the Dayton Agreements should lead to a balance of forces at much lower levels. However, we still anticipate the need to provide some training and equipment to the Federation to ensure a military balance and prevent the opportunity for renewed aggression.

The United States is working closely with Russia and our NATO allies to achieve a comprehensive peace in Bosnia based on a broad array of programs including arms control, demobilization, and other confidence-building measures. In the context of such a regime to establish military balance/stability at lower levels, we do not expect the Russians to initiate a Bosnian arms race.

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Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO ARM AND TRAIN THE  
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT

Question:

3. To whom do you plan to provide training and other assistance -- to the Muslim-Croat Federation, or to the Muslims alone? If your plan is to assist the Federation, what will you do if the Federation begins to splinter along ethnic lines?

Answer:

The United States will take a leadership role in coordinating an international effort to ensure that the Bosnian Federation receives the assistance necessary to achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. Part of our train and equip effort is directed toward strengthening political-military relationships within the Federation, thereby promoting an integrated military force. This includes our intention to channel the program through the Federation, initially working through the Federation Presidency and extending as far as possible down through a joint military command structure. The parties understand that the survival of the Federation is a key element in building a sustainable peace. There is no basis at this point for speculation on what type of military assistance might be provided if the Federation were to split on ethnic lines.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO ARM AND TRAIN THE  
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT

Question:

4. How can we simultaneously arm one of the parties to the conflict and remain neutral peacekeepers? Won't the Serbs necessarily consider us parties to the conflict?

Answer:

The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) has no role in providing equipment or training to the Federation. NATO and the United States have made it clear to all parties, including the Bosnian Serbs, that IFOR will act evenhandedly against any violations of the military aspects of the Dayton Accords. IFOR's mission is to help ensure the peace, not to support one side in the war.

All parties to the Dayton Accords understand and accept that the United States will play a role in ensuring the Bosnian Federation is able to defend itself. Strong arms control measures are contained in the peace agreement and a conference in Bonn on December 18 established the framework for a build-down of forces. Of course, arms control is only one part of the military stabilization equation. The Bosnian Federation was militarily outclassed during the just-concluded conflict. Some limited military equipment and training will be required to bring the Federation forces into balance and reduce the likelihood of renewed aggression when IFOR departs.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL TO ARM AND TRAIN THE  
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Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

- 1a. What are the cost estimates for this operation?
- b. -- Are these the anticipated incremental costs?
- d. -- Are the U.S. cost estimates based on the current operational plan for the introduction of U.S. troops in Bosnia?

Answer:

Based on current operational plans, the anticipated incremental cost for U.S. troops participating in IFOR operations, based on the best information available on the introduction of U.S. troops participating into Bosnia, is approximately \$2 billion for a one year period.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

1C. Please explain how NATO costs are allocated and what percentage is the U.S. liable for?

Answer:

NATO nations pay their own costs to support their operations in NATO. NATO assessments are only for common costs that support NATO as a whole. This principle remains valid for the operations in Bosnia.

For 1996 in support of IFOR Bosnian operations, NATO has budgeted \$554 million. This amount is divided between two budgets, the Military Budget, \$197.8 million, which covers common military costs such as deployed headquarters expenses, and the Security Investment Program Budget, \$356.2 million, which covers common infrastructure costs such as NATO communications.

The sixteen NATO nations have also agreed to fund \$124 million in common engineering logistics for the first 90 days to facilitate the transition from UN to NATO control.

The U.S. share is approximately 25 percent of the common NATO costs which will be about \$138 million.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

- 2a. How does the Administration plan to pay for this operation?
- b. -- If a request for a supplemental appropriations is made, when would you expect to submit such a request?

Answer:

The approximately \$2 billion for our U.S. national and NATO common share costs for participation in IFOR will be borne by the Department of Defense budget. The Departments of Defense and State are working along with the Office of Management and Budget to determine the most appropriate vehicle for funding the Bosnian mission. Therefore, the Administration has not decided whether to seek a supplemental appropriation to meet the military funding requirements.

Question:

3. In light of the estimated large price tag for this operation (\$1 to \$2 billion or even higher) will the Administration be forced to reduce our participation in, and contributions to, other peacekeeping operations around the world?

Answer:

IFOR is not a UN peacekeeping operation. Our ability to finance UN peacekeeping operations depends on appropriations for the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account. By fully funding the Administration's request, we would be able to pay our share of assessments for all current UN peacekeeping operations.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

4A. Will the U.S. be assessed costs for troops participating from other countries?

Answer:

No. Other than agreed common costs, the sixteen NATO nations agreed in Council that all countries participating in IFOR will absorb any and all costs associated with their participation in the operations, i.e. costs lie where they fall. This does not preclude countries from concluding their own bilateral arrangements, however, to finance the participation of non-NATO nations.

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

4B. Apart from normal NATO cost-sharing, do you anticipate that the U.S. would pay the costs of other troop-contributing countries?

Answer:

The Administration has made no plans or commitments to any nation to pay for their costs to participate in IFOR. That said, we have urged other countries such as those belonging to the Organization of Islamic Countries to financially assist countries such as Pakistan that are unable to afford all the costs associated with IFOR participation.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

FUNDING ISSUES

Question:

4C. In particular, what assurance can you give the committee regarding that the U.S. would incur no financial obligation if Russia were to send peacekeeping forces to Bosnia?

Answer:

As stated previously, the administration has made no plans or commitments to any nation to pay for their costs to participate in IFOR. This also applies to Russia; Secretary Perry told Defense Minister Grachev that the United States will not pay for Russian forces. The Russian forces, now being deployed to the MND(N) -- Multinational Division (North) -- alongside American forces, are being financed by Russia.

Question for the Record  
 Submitted to  
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
 by Chairman Gilman  
 Committee on International Relations  
 November 30, 1995

#### FUNDING ISSUES

##### Question:

5. Secretary Christopher, we understand at the upcoming London Conference the U.S. will make a substantial financial commitment for the relief and reconstruction of Bosnia.

5A--What is the size of that commitment and what are the implications of such a commitment for FY 96 program levels?

##### Answer:

The London Implementation Conference was held December 8-9. Its primary focus was the creation of a mechanism for coordinating international support for civilian assistance in Bosnia. London was not a pledging conference. Accordingly, the United States made no pledges or financial commitments in London.

At the December 20-21 Brussels conference, organized and co-sponsored by the World Bank and the EU Commission, the focus will be on identifying immediate and first quarter civilian assistance needs. The World Bank has indicated that first quarter economic reconstruction needs for Bosnia are approximately \$518 million.

For Brussels, the USG will have ready a "Quick Impact" package consisting of FY 95-funded activities amounting to approximately \$85 million. (President Clinton announced the Quick Impact package in Paris December 14.) Most of these activities (about \$72 million) will be in humanitarian assistance.

The Administration intends shortly to make available approximately \$32 million of FY96 and carry-over FY95 SEED funds. Current plans call for use of these funds in extending municipal rehabilitation, initiating a reconstruction finance program, providing assistance to the Ministry of Finance, providing support for upcoming elections and building the Federation institutions which will be necessary for success of the recovery and reform programs. The Administration is currently consulting Congress on plans for SEED program expenditures.

Question:

5B.--What programs will suffer reductions in order to fund this effort?

Answer:

The Quick Impact package is funded entirely from FY 95 funds. The FY96 \$30 million and FY95 \$2 million activities, scheduled to begin in January 1996 (after clearing the required notifications with Congress), are part of the SEED budget. No SEED programs elsewhere in Central Europe will be curtailed in order to fund either of these activities.

The President will seek an additional \$600 million from Congress to fund the U.S. economic reconstruction effort in Bosnia over three years. This money represents twenty percent of the World Bank's external financial needs assessment for Bosnia that will be required from bilateral donors. The Administration seeks this money from outside the Function 150 account. It is the Administration's strongly held position that SEED program countries, especially the front line states which paid disproportionately for respecting the UN sanctions, should not now be penalized with reductions in our SEED assistance in order to fund reconstruction in Bosnia.

Question:

5C--In your reconstruction efforts are you planning to support projects involving Americans only in territory controlled by the Bosnian government or will we also be putting Americans at risk in Serbian held territory?

Answer:

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina negotiated at Dayton provides for two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, within a single state. Pending legislation would limit USG economic assistance to the territory of the Federation, although the language places no such restriction on humanitarian assistance. There are no plans to carry out USG economic assistance activities in Republika Srpska at this time.

Future consideration of providing USG economic assistance for Republika Srpska will depend on Bosnian Serb compliance with all aspects of the Dayton peace settlement.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations

Question:

1. You have recommended to the President that he limit the deployment of U.S. forces in Bosnia to one year. Why one year? How do we get out in one year? Or more simply: What do expect in one year as opposed to six months or two years or whatever? When the Administration appeared last year to testify on committing U.S. troops to Haiti you strenuously opposed setting a date certain for their withdrawal because it would destabilize the mission. Why don't you have the same concern with the one year timetable you have established for IFOR in Bosnia? What is different and why don't your fundamental concerns apply in Bosnia?

Answer:

The timeframe of approximately one year is based on our best military judgment as to the time necessary to complete IFOR's military tasks and to provide an opportunity for the parties to reap the benefits of peace. Most of IFOR's initial military tasks such as the withdrawal of forces from the zone of separation have already been completed. IFOR is now providing a safe and secure environment for the implementation of the civilian side of the Dayton Agreement such as the conduct of elections, the release of prisoners and the return of refugees to go forward. After one year, the people of Bosnia should have the tools they need to create a stable and successful society.

Regarding Haiti, after assessing the situation on the ground, the Administration was able to determine a date for the withdrawal of US Forces. In Bosnia, all the parties to the Dayton Agreement have agreed to a series of concrete steps and timelines to build peace in the region. Based on this agreement and robust rules of engagement, it our best military judgment that IFOR will be able to meet its mission requirements within one year. So far, the parties to the Dayton Agreement have met most of their Treaty requirements. We expect them to continue to do so.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Q: The lines you've drawn on the map of Bosnia remind me of nothing so much as the Green Line separating Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces in Cyprus. The Green Line was drawn in 1974, and today, more than 20 years later, we still have U.N. peacekeepers patrolling the line. Why will the line you've drawn in Bosnia be any different? If the IFOR withdraws in one year, won't some other peacekeeping force have to take its place to patrol the line?

A: Unlike the situation in Cyprus, the agreement in Bosnia envisions joint national institutions to provide connecting tissue between the Bosniac-Croat and Serb entities. We believe -- as do the parties to the agreement -- that IFOR's presence for one year will provide the confidence necessary to implement the Dayton accords.

Question:

2A and B. What are the military criteria for determining that U.S. forces would leave IFOR? What exactly will we have accomplished at that time?

Answer:

The military mission is precisely defined in the Dayton Agreement and, in my view, can be achieved within one year. The military criteria are clear and realistic: supervise the marking of boundaries and the zone of separation between the parties; enforce the withdrawal of forces to their respective territories; establish and man the zone of separation; monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons to designated areas; ensure self-defense and freedom of movement for IFOR; and establish Joint Military Commissions. Most of these missions have already or on well on their way to being completed.

Within its capabilities and military mission, IFOR will also facilitate the work of civilian implementation by creating a secure environment for the work of humanitarian and other organizations that will permit peace and reconstruction to take root. With the IFOR's commander's authorization, IFOR will also respond to gross violations of human rights it might encounter. Again, based on the experience of U.S. forces in Bosnia so far, we believe that IFOR will meet its objectives in Bosnia in the one year time period. We anticipate that the exit phase will involve the orderly transfer of residual commitments to appropriate civilian and international organizations.

Question:

2C. Walk through the timeline for how we would get our forces in and out?

Answer:

The U.S. deployed its forces in Bosnia beginning on mid December 1995. On December 20, UNPROFOR officially transferred authority for Bosnia operations to IFOR. Between January 13 and February 3, the parties to the Dayton Agreement are to complete a number of tasks stipulated in the Agreement, including withdrawal of all foreign forces from Bosnia, agreement on a set of confidence building measures, withdrawal of all forces and hazardous objects (mines) behind a zone of separation, release and transfer of all prisoners and withdrawal of all forces from areas to be transferred. Most of these requirements have been fulfilled or are well on their way to be completed.

On June 11, the Dayton Parties (Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia) are to have concluded agreement on arms reductions and other measures, which would establish a stable military balance at lower levels of forces. Between June 14 and September 14 elections are to take place in Bosnia. At this stage, all parties have demonstrated a good faith willingness to comply with the Dayton Agreement and to work toward peace in the region. We expect the Dayton parties to continue to do so and anticipate that US forces will depart from Bosnia within one year.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Benjamin Gilman  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

EXIT STRATEGY

Question:

3. How does the peace accord address the issue of how long IFOR will stay in place? How long will other nations remain in place? What reaction have you had from our allies on our one-year commitment?

Answer:

IFOR's mission is limited, narrow, and focused. It will monitor the cease-fire, ensure the separation of previously warring parties along agreed lines, and create a secure atmosphere for civilian reconstruction efforts. The President has stated that this mission will be completed in approximately one year. The Dayton peace agreement (see Annex 1-A, Article I, Section 1) notes that the international community will deploy a military implementation force for "approximately one year," but contains no binding language on the duration of IFOR's mission. The agreement does, however, "front-load" many of the key military obligations to be undertaken by the parties. A one-year timeframe is envisioned as sufficient to complete the assigned military tasks and subsequent withdraw.

On December 15, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1031 authorizing IFOR's deployment. The text of this measure parallels that of Annex 1-A to the Dayton agreement, stating in paragraph 21 that the Security Council will review IFOR's mandate by the time of the Force's one-year anniversary "with a view to terminating the authorization" based upon the recommendation of the IFOR contributing states and the High Representative in charge of implementation of civilian aspects of the peace accord. Resolution 1031 was adopted unanimously, indicating the very widespread support among our IFOR partners and others for IFOR's one-year deployment period.

Civilian reconstruction and development tasks will obviously last many years. After IFOR's departure, we expect that the many non-Bosnians engaged in economic reconstruction, police training, and other aspects of civilian implementation will remain in country for some time.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Benjamin Gilman  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

EXIT STRATEGY

Question:

4. Is it acceptable to us that the Russians, if they should participate, remain after we leave?

Answer:

IFOR has deployed to Bosnia at the request of the parties to the peace settlement. Authority for IFOR to conduct its mission to implement the military aspects of the Dayton agreement is granted in the peace accord itself, UN Security Council Resolution 1031 of December 15, and a decision of NATO's North Atlantic Council of December 16.

Discussions with the Russian government have produced an arrangement for Russian participation in IFOR that preserves NATO's unity of command in Bosnia. Under an agreement worked out December 8 in Brussels between Secretary Perry and Defense Minister Grachev, the Russian forces in Bosnia will be under the tactical control of the U.S. division commander, Major General Nash, and the operational control of General Joulwan and his deputy for Russian participation in IFOR, Colonel-General Shevtsov. The December 8 agreement also established a NATO-Russia consultative mechanism to deal with political guidance issues affecting the Russian contingent with IFOR.

The Russian troops deployed with IFOR will withdraw in approximately one year, at the same time as U.S. troops and the other national contingents that make up IFOR. We do not foresee the need for a continued post-IFOR international military presence in Bosnia. Indeed, once IFOR departs, the Dayton agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1031 contain no provision for the continued presence of foreign military forces within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON UNPROFOR TRANSITION ISSUES

Question:

1. What does the Administration expect to happen to the mandates of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and the UNCRO mission in Croatia?

Answer:

On November 30, the UNSC extended UNPROFOR's mandate to January 15. On December 20, the transfer of authority (TOA) from UNPROFOR to the IFOR will occur, at which point UNPROFOR's mandate terminated. Most UNPROFOR troops were re-hatted as IFOR troops. To ensure an orderly departure of the remaining UNPROFOR forces, after the TOA the IFOR commander has assumed command and control of those UNPROFOR forces not being re-hatted to join IFOR.

As for UNCRO, its mandate was extended for a period terminating on January 15 to allow for an orderly transfer to the follow-on operation in Eastern Slavonia.

Question:

2. Will there be any residual units or functions for these peacekeeping missions? Will they have a role to play in the NATO-led operation?

Answer:

As for UNPROFOR, personnel in its office of Civilian Affairs may be retained and transferred to the staff of the High Representative to perform a liaison role with local municipalities. Also, members of the UNCIVPOL operation in Bosnia might be "re-hatted" to join the proposed new CIVPOL operation in Bosnia -- the International Police Task Force, or IPTF. In the case of UNCRO, the Russian and Belgian troops currently in Eastern Slavonia are expected to remain in-country, as part of the new operation in Eastern Slavonia. The exact details of this follow-on operation in Eastern Croatia are yet to be decided, however.

The U.N. will have no role in the operational aspects of IFOR.

Question for the Record  
 Submitted to  
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
 by Chairman Gilman  
 Committee on International Relations  
 November 30, 1995

QUESTIONS ON UNPROFOR TRANSITION ISSUES

Question:

3. Can you make available to our Committee all documents and understandings between these residual UN peacekeeping operations and the NATO-led force, including intelligence-sharing arrangements, any Status-of-Forces Agreements, and any understanding or commitments involving the use of U.S. troops to protect any residual UN forces or observers?

Answer:

There is only one such agreement between the U.N. and NATO. It is administrative in nature and covers transitional administrative arrangements for ensuring a smooth handover from UNPROFOR to IFOR. Following the required determination of releasability of this NATO document, we will provide it to you.

Question:

4. Will U.N. officials, in any capacity, remain to assist in implementing the Peace Agreement? What role will they have and how will they coordinate their activities with the IFOR?

Answer:

Yes. Significant elements of U.N. agencies -- such as the UNHCR and WFP -- will continue their humanitarian activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the peace implementation period. We are working on an orderly transition into the new implementation structure now, and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's intention to establish a civilian mission should facilitate that process.

Specifically, the SYG intends to appoint a U.N. official at the Assistant Secretary General level to coordinate U.N. activities in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to exercise authority over the UNCIVPOL operation (the IPTF). This official -- the United Nations Coordinator -- would be resident in Sarajevo. He or she would be the principal channel through which High Representative would provide guidance to the IPTF.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

1. Has Milosevic carried out his pledge to allow international access to the eastern enclaves and Banja Luka? Has access been satisfactory? In what other ways should Milosevich cooperate in order to demonstrate good will regarding the investigations? What kinds of investigations have taken place? What have they revealed?

Answer:

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reports that there has been a significant difference in access to the eastern enclaves and to Banja Luka since Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck's intervention in Belgrade and since the signing of the Framework Agreement. ICRC has seen about fifty places of detention and most of the detainees in these regions and believes that it will be allowed to visit all of them. We are still awaiting, however, the release of the persons in detention or under work obligation in Banja Luka -- estimated by Bosnian Serb leader Koljevic at at least 1400. As to other ways in which Milosevic might cooperate, the ICRC expects his help in compiling a list of persons not imprisoned, but working in forced labor. In addition to the ICRC investigations, the War Crimes Tribunal is proceeding with its own investigation of war crimes in the eastern enclaves and the Banja Luka area.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

2. What progress has been made during Assistant Secretary John Shattuck's missions to the Balkans to facilitate humanitarian aid, prisoner exchanges, and international access to Bosnian and Croatian regions of recent conflict?

Answer:

Assistant Secretary Shattuck has travelled to Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia four times since July specifically to investigate and expose the massive violations of human rights in Srebrenica and in the Banja Luka area during the most recent round of fighting in northern Bosnia. During these visits, Mr. Shattuck personally interviewed scores of refugees who reported incidents of mass killings, forcible expulsions from their home areas and assaults, including rapes.

In his press briefings in Zagreb on August 2, October 25 and October 29, Assistant Secretary Shattuck drew broad international attention to the abuses reported to him by refugees.

His latest trip resulted in commitments from the Serbian government and Bosnian Serb authorities to allow unfettered access to the sites of alleged war crimes for International Tribunal investigators, U.N. personnel, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), representatives of interested governments and the press.

The ICRC has already noted a substantial increase in its access to detainees following Mr. Shattuck's missions. The ICRC also reports that approximately 1,500 prisoners have been released from the beginning of 1995 through November 23, over 500 of them under ICRC auspices. The majority of the rest were probably exchanged.

In addition, for the first time, the Serbian government has agreed to meet with the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to discuss Serbian cooperation with the Tribunal. This has not yet occurred, however, despite requests for a meeting by Justice Goldstone.

Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Human Rights Violations and the War Crimes Tribunal

Question 3.

Do you believe Milosevic was aware of, or even behind, the Bosnian Serb campaign to overrun the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa, eliminate Muslim defenses in the area, and conduct mass executions? What kinds of evidence might point to Milosevic's involvement?

Answer:

In view of Belgrade's extensive intelligence-gathering capabilities, it is difficult to believe that he was unaware of General Mladic's intentions to take the eastern enclaves. Questions over Milosevic's potential responsibility for the reprehensible behavior of Mladic and his troops will be addressed by the International Tribunal, whose work we have consistently supported and with whom we have shared all appropriate information. Having said that, I must note that throughout the tragic events of last summer, Milosevic purported to be frustrated and confounded by the limits on his ability to influence the Bosnian Serbs.

This is not to suggest the "FRY" completely ended its support for the Bosnian Serbs. To the contrary, we detected numerous instances when the Yugoslav Army continued to provide logistic support to the Bosnian Serb Army. We challenged Milosevic on each instance. While levels diminished, the flow of supplies was never totally contained.

We remain interested in the activities of the Yugoslav army and of other authorities in Belgrade during the conflict in Bosnia and Croatia. We are hopeful that with the end of these conflicts, more information will become available.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

4. What information do you have on the role, if any, of the Serbian government, Yugoslav armed forces, or Serbian secret police, in the atrocities that occurred in Srebrenica and around Banja Luka?

Answer:

At this point we have no specific information about involvement by the Serbian Government, Yugoslav armed forces or Serbian Secret police in the Srebrenica or Banja Luca area atrocities. However, this does not rule out the possibility of, for example, logistical support that is difficult to detect. Any information we do acquire will be passed to the War Crimes Tribunal.

Question:

5. Some observers have cited an inherent contradiction between the work of the Tribunal in seeking justice against criminals, and diplomatic efforts to reach a settlement among the warring parties, which include many of the suspected criminals. In this sense, are the establishment and proceedings of the tribunal premature, and should they have awaited a resolution to the conflict? Might war crime prosecutions hamper peacemaking and reconciliation?

Answer:

We see no conflict between the goals of pursuing peace in Bosnia and prosecuting war criminals. The President affirmed this when he concluded his remarks on October 15 commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Nuremberg Tribunals by saying: "There must be peace for justice to prevail, but there must be justice when peace prevails." No peace is possible in the long term in Bosnia, or anywhere, if justice is not a central component. We must assign individual responsibility for the crimes and remove the perpetrators from the scene.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia furthermore serves the cause of peace by isolating those whose criminal behavior would foment conflict and by exacting a cost for aggression. It is clear that the activity of the Tribunal has not hampered peacemaking, as witnessed by the signature of peace accords that contain pledges to cooperate with the Tribunal.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Q: Given Milosevic's importance to the current peace strategy, what impact would an indictment against him by the War Crimes Tribunal have on the peace process? Would U.S. interests be enhanced or damaged if Milosevic were to be indicted? Would political considerations influence the investigations against Milosevic?

A: We remain committed to seeing that those responsible for war crimes are brought to justice. The International Tribunal, which we pressed to establish and are providing with personnel, information, and other services, has already issued more than fifty indictments and has initiated criminal proceedings in two cases. The Dayton accords commit the parties to cooperate fully with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Throughout the negotiations, we have stressed the importance and independence of the war crimes process. We do not believe, however, that it is useful or proper to discuss hypothetical matters related to the Tribunal's work.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

7. Does the fact that most of the indictments have been against ethnic Serbs damage the Tribunal's reputation of even-handedness? What impact might the November 13, 1995, indictments against six Bosnian Croats have on the Muslim-Croat Federation?

Answer:

The Tribunal is empowered to pursue prosecutions independently, free from political pressure. We have no reason to doubt the impartiality of the Tribunal's actions. We are confident that the Tribunal will continue to proceed vigorously and impartially against all parties responsible for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

The Tribunal is sometimes hampered by a lack of promised cooperation. For example, the failure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to respond adequately and in a timely fashion to a request for assistance by the Office of the Prosecutor obliged the Prosecutor on December 8 to request release of a detained Bosnian Muslim suspected of committing war crimes against Serb victims. The Tribunal also criticized the Bosnian-Croat Administration in Mostar for releasing Ivica Rajic, accused of killing Serb civilians in central Bosnia.

The indictment of six Bosnian Croats on November 13 can, in our view, only help long-term stability by removing perpetrators and demonstrating to all that war criminals from any ethnic group cannot act with impunity.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

8. The Tribunal relies on the domestic legal systems and enforcement machinery of each state. Therefore all requests for arrest, search, surrender or transfer are addressed to individual states which may not cooperate. How has the Tribunal addressed this problem? How can the Tribunal compel cooperation from states which have been perpetuating the crimes?

Answer:

Pursuant to the UNSC resolution which established the Tribunal, which relies on that cooperation. We take this obligation very seriously. This obligation has been reiterated and reinforced in the Dayton Accords. Several mechanisms, based on international commitments, are in place to retaliate against a state that refuses cooperation. A UN Security Council resolution allows the reimposition of sanctions lifted after the Dayton Agreement in the event of non-compliance with the Tribunal if the High Representative or IFOR Command recommends.

Moreover, the so-called "outer wall" sanctions (membership in international organizations, international recognition, international financial assistance) will remain in place against Serbia and Montenegro until that country has demonstrated commitment to international norms, including cooperation with the Tribunal and its orders.

The United States will also condition its economic assistance to the countries of the former Yugoslavia in part to their willingness to cooperate with the Tribunal and will urge other countries to do the same.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Q: Are U.N. sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro linked to that state's cooperation with the war crimes tribunal? Will the Belgrade government be required to hand over indicted persons from Serbia before sanctions are suspended or lifted?

A: Although United Nations Security Council Resolution 1022 suspended sanctions against Belgrade indefinitely, the so-called "outer wall" sanctions (membership in international organizations, international recognition, international financial assistance) remain in place. Belgrade's cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal is one important factor in determining whether to lift these "outer wall" sanctions.

Question:

10. Given that the Tribunal cannot try suspected criminals in absentia, what can the Tribunal accomplish after indictments are issued? Is the Tribunal able to issue sentences against those found guilty of war crimes? If yes, will penalty involve imprisonment? Criminal fines? What is the mechanism for enforcement of the Tribunal's decisions?

Answer:

There can be no trials in absentia; but, on the other hand, there is no statute of limitations for war crimes. Thus, indictments will hang over suspected war criminals permanently. Even if alleged criminals are never brought to trial, the Tribunal's proceedings will vindicate victims by providing an official record of the wrongs they suffered. The rules governing the Tribunal's proceedings allow for public airing of evidence, including victims' testimony. One such proceeding, which involved ten witnesses from Bosnia, has already occurred and more will be forthcoming.

For those trials that do occur, the Tribunal has the authority to impose sentences up to life imprisonment. The Tribunal also has the authority to order restitution to victims. Prison sentences will be served in the prisons of states that have agreed to make such facilities available to the Tribunal. States are obliged to assist the Tribunal in enforcing its orders, including restitution orders.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

11. Do existing U.N. or future NATO troops have the authority to arrest those indicted by the Tribunal?

Answer:

IFOR does have authority to detain and surrender indicted persons to the Tribunal. They will not pursue indicted war criminals, but they can detain them if they come into contact with them while carrying out IFOR official duties.

Question:

12. How would you characterize international support for the Yugoslav Tribunal, especially among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council? Do views differ among countries on the tasks, authority, or importance of the Yugoslav Tribunal? Which countries have agreed to imprison those convicted by the Yugoslav Tribunal?

Answer:

All of the P-5 countries support the Tribunal; none has ever voiced any opposition to it. There are no apparent differences of opinion on the tasks and authority of the Tribunal.

With respect to funding and personnel, the U.S. has provided the most support. Our seconded personnel outnumber those of any other country, our assessment is paid in full, and we have made substantial voluntary contributions. The UK has provided some voluntary contributions and seconded five people to the Tribunal staff. China has made no voluntary contributions, but does have a judge serving on the Tribunal. Russia has been unable to pay its \$1.2 million regular assessment.

Besides hosting the Tribunals and providing other support, the Netherlands has assisted the Tribunal in arranging security and detention facilities for defendants while in the Netherlands.

To date, Bosnia, Iran, Finland, Germany, Norway, and Pakistan have agreed to imprison convicted war criminals. Sweden, Spain, and Denmark have also agreed, but have attached certain conditionalities.

Question:

13. Which countries have adopted legislation formally accepting the jurisdiction of the Tribunal? What is the status of draft U.S. legislation which would establish the legal basis for surrender of persons to the Tribunal?

Answer:

Under UN Security Council resolution 827, all member states are to cooperate fully with the Tribunal and its organs. The resolution also says that all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the Tribunal resolution and statute.

As of December 15, 1995, 12 countries had passed implementing legislation: Australia, Bosnia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain and Sweden. Korea, Singapore, and Venezuela have declared they do not need to enact legislation in order to implement the Tribunal's statute.

In July 1995, the Administration submitted legislation to the Congress which would authorize the Attorney General to extradite indicted war criminals directly to an international tribunal. The legislation has broad bipartisan support and was included as an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) in the DoD Authorization bill. That bill has not, however, been enacted into law.

Question:

14. In your view, is the Tribunal receiving sufficient funding for its activities? How much funding has been received so far? Assessed and voluntary? What contributions has the U.S. made so far? How much through assessed budget? And how much paid to the voluntary funds for Rwanda and Yugoslavia? What Tribunal activities have been postponed or curtailed because of recent U.S. funding problems?

Answer:

The Tribunal has available funds adequate for its current needs. Its future financial situation will depend in large part on the demands to be placed on it -- especially trials -- and the ability of its primary supporters (especially the USG) to pay their assessed contributions.

To date, the Yugoslav Tribunal has received \$18,832,686. This includes \$6,269,795 in voluntary cash contributions and \$12,562,891 from regular UN budget assessments. The U.S. has paid in full its assessment of \$5.48 million. Under the unique budget arrangement developed for the Tribunals, half of funding is paid from the UN's peacekeeping accounts; the UN has set aside roughly \$20 million in unencumbered UNPROFOR balances for the use of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Unpaid budget assessments for 1994-95 total \$7,596,931, with the countries with the highest arrearages being the Russian Federation and the United Arab Emirates.

U.S. contributions have been in the form of cash, personnel, and goods. (A full description of USG-seconded personnel can be found in the answer to question 15.)

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

Regular UN budget assessment for 1994-95	\$5,498,000
Voluntary contributions in cash	700,000
Voluntary contributions in kind	2,300,000
(Litigation support, information management system)	
Yugoslavia War Crimes Commission	
Voluntary contributions in cash	\$ 500,000
Voluntary contributions in kind	300,000

International Tribunal for Rwanda:

Regular UN budget assessment for 1994-95	\$1,683,000
Voluntary contributions	3,000,000
(Litigation support, information management system, and contract personnel)	

Tribunal activities have been hampered more by UN-imposed spending and hiring freezes than by U.S. funding problems. Travel, hiring, and procurement freezes, which were applied UN-wide earlier this year, had a detrimental effect on the pace of both Tribunals' progress. The U.S. helped the Tribunal persuade the UN to lift partially these freezes; the Rwanda Tribunal has received an exception which allows it to hire, and the Yugoslav Tribunal staff have been able to resume some investigative travel.

Answer to Question 14, cont'd.:

The Yugoslav Tribunal has certain immediate needs which could be met largely by voluntary contributions. These include victim and witness protection, the defense counsel fund, and exhumation of mass graves.

The Yugoslav Tribunal is preparing its 1996-97 budget; we understand that the preliminary two-year estimate is in excess of \$85 million for operations related to the former Yugoslavia. The Rwanda Tribunal budget may be similarly large due to the high costs of establishing a trial facility in Arusha, Tanzania. Under the unique funding formula the UN adopted for the Tribunals' 1994-95 budgets, 50 percent of tribunal costs was covered by unencumbered UN peacekeeping balances, and the remaining 50 percent of costs was assessed according to the normal UN scale of assessments (for the U.S., the rate is 25 percent for each Tribunal). No decision has been made on funding for the 1996-97 biennium. The U.S. ability to pay its assessment in full in 1996 and 1997 for both Tribunals is dependent on Congressional approval of funds for U.S. contributions to international organizations.

Question:

15. How many U.S. government personnel are detailed to the Tribunals? What other kinds of support does the Tribunal receive? What other support does it require? Are personnel, space, and support services sufficient to do the job? What provisions are there for increasing the number of judges, prosecutors and investigators if caseloads require? What resources are available to seek advice of experts at every stage of the proceedings?

Answer:

During 1995, 23 U.S. Government personnel were seconded to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

Department of Defense	2 prosecutors, 5 investigators
Department of Justice/FBI	6 prosecutors, 3 investigators
Department of State	6 professional staff
USAID	1 contractor

The total of U.S. contributions to the Yugoslav Tribunal is over \$12 million, including \$3 million in voluntary contributions, a full payment of the U.S. assessed contribution of \$5.5 million, and other contributions in cash and in kind.

The U.S. Government secondee presence in the Kigali offices of the International Tribunal for Rwanda is beginning to build.

Department of Defense	3 investigators (2 presently)
Department of Justice	2 prosecutors (beginning 1/96)
Department of State/Justice	2 admin specialists,
	2 interpreters, 7 investigators

The Tribunal headquarters in The Hague share a building with an insurance company. The insurance company will be moving from the quarters; once this occurs, there will be ample space. The need for proper court room, office, and residential facilities is most acute for the Arusha facilities, where the Rwanda Tribunal will be seated.

For both Tribunals, personnel and support services available are contingent upon employees seconded by various nations being extended or replaced. The Tribunal continues to be able to hire and spend as necessary despite restrictions imposed by UN officials in response to the organization's financial crisis.



Answer to Question 15, cont'd:

There are no provisions for increasing the number of judges, prosecutors or deputy prosecutors, as these figures are set in the Tribunal statutes. The addition of trial attorneys or investigators to handle increased workloads depends on whether funds are received to cover the Tribunal budgets in full and whether states second additional attorneys and investigators.

The Tribunal is seeking funds for expert help in its budget proposals. Thus far, the Yugoslav Tribunal budget has allowed for a small amount of funds to be allocated to cover the costs of expert testimony. It has been helpful that, thus far, many experts have agreed to provide their services for expenses only. A coalition of interested NGOs, known as the Coalition for International Justice, has formed, in part, to facilitate the contribution of expert services for the Tribunals.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1994

16. Q. What is your view on the complaint by Judge Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor of the tribunal, about the "quality and timeliness" of U.S. intelligence information being provided to The Hague which might be used against criminal suspects? After the news media released a story on this, the White House admitted that some intelligence information was withheld "for national security purposes," but later the State Department pledged "100 percent cooperation" with Judge Goldstone. Please comment.

A. The Administration has made a concerted effort, indeed probably the most forward-leaning of any UN member, to provide information on alleged war crimes in the former Yugoslavia to the Office of The Prosecutor on a timely basis ever since the establishment of the Tribunal. The USG has provided substantial resources to the war crimes tribunal and is correcting procedural delays in our information support. As Justice Goldstone said in his November 16 statement, he is satisfied that the USG is "giving full cooperation" to the OTP and he was "extremely satisfied" with his mid-November meetings in Washington. It is obviously not in the interests of any prosecution to discuss publicly the bases on which its cases are being built, a guideline which we prefer to follow regarding information the USG might provide the OTP.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

17. Is special consideration being given to cases involving violence against women--rape, sexual abuse and forced prostitution? Does the investigation and prosecution body, especially the Victims and Witness Unit, include people with particular experience and sensitivity in collecting evidence in such cases? Does the Tribunal include female investigators, prosecutors and judges with such experience?

Answer:

The Tribunal is quite concerned about cases of violence against women. Rape, sexual abuse, forced prostitution and other violent acts against women are offenses within Tribunal jurisdiction, and the Tribunal has rules and procedures in place to protect the health and safety of victims and witnesses, including those in cases of violence against women. The Tribunal's staff includes someone responsible for coordinating investigations of abuses against women. The Tribunal also includes female investigators, prosecutors and two female judges.

The first prosecution, the Tadic case, includes charges of rape. The Prosecutor has sought, and the Tribunal has granted, orders protecting victims and witnesses in this case, including rape victims.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

Question:

18. The Clinton Administration has endorsed a civil lawsuit filed in New York by two women charging Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic with responsibility for participation in war crimes, torture, and genocide and for responsibility for the women's suffering at the hands of Bosnian Serb soldiers. Please comment on the implications of this for the work of the Tribunal.

Answer:

These are separate matters, although similar allegations are being made in both fora. The action in New York is a civil action brought in a U.S. court against Karadzic by Bosnian citizens and organizations seeking damages and injunctive relief for a variety of atrocities. The United States submitted as Statement of Interest addressing certain legal issues and urging that the case be remanded for further appropriate proceedings in the district court.

The War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague was created pursuant to a Security Council resolution for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting criminal violations of international law in connection with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal has issued criminal indictments against a number of persons, including Karadzic, for alleged commission of offenses including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Our policy reflects the Administration's strong support for justice to those victimized in Bosnia. Nevertheless, we see no reason why the civil lawsuit would have any necessary implication for the Tribunal case.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

1. What role has UNHCR played in the protection of refugees and displaced persons from local government and military officials throughout former Yugoslavia? How successful has the agency been?

Answer:

In addition to providing for the humanitarian assistance needs of refugee and displaced populations in the former Yugoslavia since 1991, UNHCR has sought to protect vulnerable populations - especially minority populations - and to ensure that their fundamental human rights are respected. UNHCR Protection Officers have been operating in the region since the inception of the UN-led assistance effort, and have been engaged in protection monitoring of refugees and displaced persons throughout the region. UNHCR officers have also intervened, where necessary and when possible, with local authorities to raise concerns about the condition and treatment of refugee, displaced or other minority groups.

In light of the large-scale repatriation of refugees and return of internally displaced persons which is expected to begin in early 1996, UNHCR is augmenting its protection staff in the region. UNHCR plans to augment existing staff by adding 25 Repatriation Officers and 10 Information/Training Officers, along with 35 additional local staff. These officers will be charged with obtaining and disseminating information concerning conditions in areas where repatriation/return are taking place, in addition to fulfilling UNHCR's basic mandate of ensuring that repatriation is voluntary and takes place in conditions of safety and dignity.

With some exceptions, UNHCR's protection activities have been successful in protecting the fundamental human rights of refugees and displaced persons in the region, mainly through close monitoring of conditions and interventions with local authorities. There are, however, limits to what UNHCR can accomplish, especially in areas of overt hostilities where access is denied.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

2. Has UNHCR used humanitarian assistance to protect the civilian population from human rights violations by local government and military forces? How successful has this been?

Answer:

UNHCR protection activities have involved the use of Protection Officers for protection monitoring of refugees and displaced persons in the region and interventions with local authorities to raise concerns about the condition and treatment of refugee, displaced or other minority groups. UNHCR's policy of seeking to provide all beneficiary groups with equal access to humanitarian assistance has contributed to the respect for human rights of minorities and other vulnerable groups.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

## REFUGEES

Question:

3. In your opinion, have UNHCR efforts assisted the ethnic cleansing of the area by facilitating the transfer of populations by peaceful means?

Answer:

The overarching goal of UNHCR's humanitarian assistance effort has been to provide for the basic needs of vulnerable populations by bringing humanitarian relief aid directly to the needy. UNHCR has sought to discourage population movements where possible by ensuring the availability of aid in all regions of the former Yugoslavia -- assuming that access is granted and where security conditions permit operations to be carried out.

UNHCR policy toward population movements is that, if feasible and as an exceptional measure, UNHCR will facilitate the evacuation or movement of "persons in life-threatening danger." Since the beginning of its resettlement operation in October 1992, a total of 34,307 refugees have been resettled in third countries under UNHCR auspices. UNHCR (together with ICRC and other organizations) also facilitates the reunion of families, particularly of separated spouses and minor children. The ultimate goal of UNHCR's repatriation plan is to make possible the voluntary return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

By and large, UNHCR has reacted to population movements, as opposed to having "assisted" ethnic cleansing or other, spontaneous movements of people.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

## REFUGEES

Question:

4. How much humanitarian assistance goes to the displaced in each area of the former Yugoslavia? How does it break down by ethnic group within each area? What is the reason for the difference in the amount of aid to different groups?

Answer:

The general policy of UNHCR and other international organizations is that humanitarian assistance should be provided solely according to need. Therefore, the ongoing assistance programs of these organizations have generally reflected the actual humanitarian needs of the various regions of the former Yugoslavia. For example, based upon the number of beneficiaries in each of the areas of the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR assistance in 1995 was as follows: Bosnia-Herzegovina - 49 percent; Croatia - 30 percent; "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Serbia-Montenegro) - 17 percent; Slovenia - 2 percent; and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - 2 percent.

In general, international organizations have sought to provide humanitarian assistance based on actual needs to all regions and all ethnic groups within those regions. In some cases, problems of access or security have obstructed the operations of humanitarian assistance organizations in certain areas, resulting in the delivery of relatively less humanitarian assistance per capita.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

5. What provisions are being made for the refugees and displaced in the peace process? Who or which institution will be in charge of this function?

Answer:

The Dayton Accord contains an annex (Annex 7) which deals with the issue of refugees and displaced persons. The agreement specifically guarantees the right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin in safety and without risk of persecution or discrimination, and to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities or to be compensated therefor. The Dayton Accord further leaves the choice of destination to each individual or family, and commits the parties to refraining from interfering with those choices.

In the Dayton Accord, the parties specifically note the leading role of UNHCR in coordinating the ongoing humanitarian relief effort and the planned repatriation of refugees and return of internally displaced. In the agreement, the parties agree to cooperate with and grant access to UNHCR and other organizations, such as the ICRC, in order to facilitate their humanitarian assistance activities. The parties further call upon UNHCR to develop and implement a plan of repatriation of refugees and return of displaced persons.

For those refugees and displaced persons who cannot or choose not to return to their homes, the Dayton Accord guarantees the right to just compensation. The Accord establishes a Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees which will be charged with deciding claims for the restitution of real property to its lawful owner or, alternatively, compensation for such real property. The commission will consist of nine representatives chosen by the parties and by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

6. Do you anticipate that a peace agreement will lead to more civilian displacement? Have you suggested ways that any further displacement can be avoided?

Answer:

Given the guarantees of freedom of movement contained in the Dayton Accord, it is possible that some spontaneous and voluntary population movements will occur in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Future population displacements might be discouraged by the prompt establishment of civilian authority throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with effective protection programs on the part of UNHCR and the OSCE. Additionally, we have urged the adoption of confidence-building measures aimed at minority populations, such as the Serb minority in the Sarajevo area.

UNHCR would be responsible for assisting local authorities in the relocation of people who choose to move, once the implementation stage of the settlement begins.

REFUGEESQuestion:

7. How much do you estimate that it will cost to rebuild former Yugoslavia? What amount or percent is the United States prepared to pay? What particular needs will the U.S. aid program address? Are European Union (EU) states prepared to take the lead in international reconstruction and aid efforts?

Answer:

A World Bank needs assessment completed in September 1995 indicated that over three years Bosnia reconstruction would cost \$6 billion. Of this, approximately half would be met by deep debt reduction and by the International Financial Institutions. The remaining \$3 billion would require contributions by donors on a bilateral basis.

The Administration has taken the position that 20 percent of the \$3 billion is an equitable share for the USG (the U.S. normally takes a 25 percent share of international commitments, but assumes less in this case due to our high contribution to IFOR). This amount is exclusive of our commitment to humanitarian assistance.

Among the needs the U.S. program will address are:

- o Reconstruction finance. Quick disbursing hard currency support for key imports. Importation of critical inputs for local small-scale reconstruction projects.
- o Municipal rehabilitation. Support for small business, municipal infrastructure, housing, social services, the U.N. Trust Fund and large infrastructure studies.
- o Economic transformation. Includes privatization, bank reform, enterprise development, capital markets and legal/regulatory reform.
- o Building national and Federation institutions. Providing assistance to support the basic structures of the new entities;
- o Democratic reforms. Dispute resolution/arbitration, police training, human rights monitoring, public administration, elections/political process, independent media.
- o Financial advisers. Placement of short and long term financial advisers in the Ministry of Finance and others to advise on tax system, customs union and budget planning.

## REFUGEES

## Question 7, Page 2

European Union states have declared their willingness to take the lead in coordinating the donors and the on-the-ground civilian assistance efforts in Sarajevo. The EU's Carl Bildt will be the High Representative, who will coordinate civilian assistance efforts for Bosnia.

The EU and the World Bank are organizing and co-sponsoring a preliminary donors conference for December 20-21 in Brussels. The purpose of the conference will be to: identify immediate and first quarter financing needs in Bosnia; to estimate priority reconstruction needs; and to identify existing donor efforts and future plans.

Question:

8. Have the number of refugees needing resettlement and being resettled in the United States changed since these announcements?

Answer

No. Our admissions programs in Zagreb and Belgrade, where the majority of our Bosnian processing takes place, report no significant increase in the number of applications.

In fact, our refugee coordinator in Zagreb recently reported an increase in the number of Bosnians withdrawing their applications with the stated intention of returning to Bosnia rather than resettling in the U.S. We attribute this phenomenon in part to the refugees' renewed hope that the peace process will be successful.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

9. In your opinion, is the United States doing its fair share of resettling refugees?

Answer

Yes. Since the program began in 1992, the U.S. has admitted over 20,000 Bosnian refugees. We are the largest provider of permanent resettlement opportunities to Bosnian refugees in the world.

In FY-96, we are planning to admit up to 15,000 Bosnian refugees as part of the regular U.S. refugee admissions program. In addition, the Administration may, after appropriate consultations with the Congress, utilize the 3,000 numbers in the Unallocated Reserve as well as reallocate unused numbers from other regional ceilings.

On July 31, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issued an appeal to the international community to immediately make available some 5,000 resettlement slots in 1995 and to plan for a contingency of some 45,000 in 1996 and beyond. The U.S. promptly responded with a pledge to take up to 50% of both groups -- or 2,500 this calendar year and up to 25,000 in 1996 should the need arise.

Should the post-Dayton situation require that we admit new groups of refugees beyond anticipated needs, the Administration will consult with the Congress.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

10. Are there refugees in the former Yugoslavia with a genuine fear of persecution and need for third-country resettlement who are not being resettled?

Answer

UNHCR provides leadership to the international community in determining resettlement needs. The U.S. has responded promptly and generously to all UNHCR appeals for resettlement opportunities for Bosnians.

In addition, Bosnian Muslims with certain relatives in the U.S. may apply directly for interview with an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Non-Bosnian Muslims are also interviewed if referred by UNHCR. Since April 1993, the UNHCR offices in Belgrade and Zagreb have referred over 8,500 individuals to our program.

We are prepared to consider modifications to the eligibility criteria for interview if needed.

Question:

11. Does the United States have an admissions program for Serb refugees? Does any other resettlement country welcome Serb refugees?

We are prepared to consider for interview refugees from Serbia or the Krajina region in Croatia if their cases are referred by UNHCR.

Refugees from Serbia or the Krajina region in Croatia are not eligible to apply directly to the U.S. refugee admissions program.

Bosnian Muslims with certain relatives in the U.S. may apply directly for interview with an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

12. How serious is the asylum problem for refugees from former Yugoslavia in western Europe? Should current Yugoslav refugees in western Europe return immediately following a peace agreement?

Answer:

There are currently nearly 800,000 refugees scattered throughout western and central Europe in so-called "temporary protection status." The need to provide for the basic humanitarian needs of these people has undoubtedly placed a strain on the economies of the host countries.

Current UNHCR planning foresees a phased, orderly repatriation program beginning in the spring of 1996. The plan envisages a series of movements, beginning with vulnerable displaced populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, followed by refugees currently in neighboring countries (Croatia, Serbia) and ultimately concluding with the return of refugees presently located in "temporary protection status" throughout western and central Europe. Some mixing of the phases is likely. Such a phased repatriation regime would allow UNHCR and other organizations to manage more effectively the flow of people back to their homes throughout the former Yugoslav region.

The sequencing of these repatriation movements is based on humanitarian and logistical needs, in that the first group -- vulnerable displaced populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- is currently living under less than satisfactory conditions in collective centers and other facilities. Moving these people first alleviates their condition, while making Bosnian collective centers available for use as transit facilities. Of the remaining groups, those in western and central Europe are generally living under better circumstances than those in neighboring countries.

The United States supports the UNHCR plan, which will be carefully coordinated with interested governments.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

REFUGEES

Question:

13. What role has UNHCR played in gaining or maintaining asylum for these persons? How successful has the agency been?

Answer:

UNHCR has attempted to facilitate and coordinate applications for temporary protection and resettlement with all host countries. UNHCR's efforts have generally been successful. Indeed, many of the 800,000 refugees currently in temporary protection status were assisted by UNHCR, as were the 34,000 refugees who have been permanently resettled in third countries.

Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question 1.

What happens if, during the period of IFOR's deployment, Kosovo destabilizes, and a conflict erupts there? What are your plans for this contingency?

Answer:

The "Christmas Warning" made by President Bush to Belgrade in 1992, as reconfirmed by President Clinton in 1993, that the United States will respond to Serb-incited violence in Kosovo, still stands. The nature of this response will necessarily depend on the circumstances.

IFOR is neither intended nor authorized to deploy outside of Bosnia, except in direct support of its mission in Bosnia. Accordingly, any other use of IFOR forces would require NATO authorization.



Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question 2.

The Bosnian Serbs have, under the peace agreement, been accorded the opportunity to establish their own autonomous republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why should not the Albanian majority of Kosovo be accorded the same opportunity to do so within Serbia?

Answer:

Before addressing Kosovo, it is useful to clarify the post-Dayton arrangements for Bosnia. Under the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian Serbs are permitted to participate politically on the same basis as the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. Thus, the Republika Srpska will have equal standing with the Bosnian Federation, once the Dayton Accords are implemented. While enjoying substantial political and governmental authority, both the Federation and the Republika Srpska will be more accurately likened to federal states than autonomous republics.

With regard to Kosovo, we have long demanded that Kosovo's autonomy, revoked by Belgrade over five years ago, be restored in some fashion and that human rights be respected. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the leading political party in Kosovo, has publicly rejected autonomy and is campaigning for independence. We do not share the LDK's vision of an independent Kosovo, but we endorse fully its commitment to non-violent opposition to Belgrade's repression. We believe that the LDK and the Serb authorities should begin a political dialogue in order to start the vital process of restoring dignity and liberty to Kosovo. We will continue to work for such a dialogue.

Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question 3.

Did any U.S. officials speak to Milosevic while he was in Dayton about the situation in Kosovo? If so, what was said? Did he give any assurance about how he would deal with Kosovo in the future? What about readmitting the international human rights monitors which he has prevented from visiting Kosovo since 1993?

Answer:

Although Kosovo was not formally on the agenda during the Proximity Talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, it was discussed with Milosevic. We stressed to Milosevic that the U.S. continues to be very concerned over the situation in Kosovo, and that we would be watching events closely. Milosevic restated his opposition to Kosovar separatism and continued to insist the situation there is an internal Serbian matter.

With regard to the return of OSCE long-duration missions to Kosovo and other areas of Serbia, Milosevic continued to link their return to Belgrade's membership in OSCE. However, pending meaningful progress on Kosovo and other issues, it is premature to consider "FRY" participation in the OSCE. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, head of the leading Kosovar Albanian political party, supports this position.

Question 4.

Is there any linkage between the continuation of the suspension of sanctions against Serbia and an improvement of the situation in Kosovo?

Answer:

No. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1022 suspended economic sanctions against Belgrade indefinitely, pending implementation of the Dayton Accords.

While Kosovo was not specifically addressed in the Bosnia peace agreement, Belgrade did commit to full respect for basic human rights. Moreover, we have made improvement in the situation in Kosovo a condition of Belgrade's full integration into the international community, including Belgrade's participation in international financial institutions.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Peace Accord

Question:

1. Under Annex II, Art. I(2) (sic), the Bosnian Serb Army must surrender control of the Sarajevo suburbs of Grbavica, Vogosa and Ilidza. Over 150,000 Serbs (sic) live in these towns and many are armed. Who precisely will remove the armed persons from these towns? Will Americans be asked to search and remove armed Serbs from these places?

Answer:

The parties have agreed under the Dayton Agreement to the transfer of certain areas from one entity to the other. In Sarajevo, the withdrawal from and transfer of selected positions along the Agreed Cease-fire Line and withdrawal from the Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation have been completed. The Agreement also contains specific provisions applicable to Sarajevo. The Agreement expressly bans unauthorized weapons or explosives possession in the two kilometer-wide Agreed Cease-Fire Zone of Separation in Sarajevo, but not throughout Bosnia. Forces under French command will be carrying out IFOR's mission in Sarajevo. The Agreement does not envision the forcible depopulation of any areas, whether Serb-dominated or not. However, IFOR is authorized to monitor the disbandment of armed groups and other military aspects of the peace agreement, including using necessary force to ensure compliance. Local Federation police, monitored by the International Police Training Force (IPTF), will have primary responsibility for providing a secure environment for all persons.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

PEACE ACCORD

Question:

2. The sections of the peace plan which deal with human rights are detailed and well thought out. I commend you for the thoroughness with which you addressed the important issue of providing justice to the countless victims of grotesque human rights abuses in Bosnia. However, I am not clear on how these provisions will be carried out. What happens if local Bosnian Serbs who may be implicated in charges that may be brought before the Human Rights Ombudsman or Chamber refuse to cooperate? Who can force cooperation? Will that be a possible mission for IFOR?

Answer:

Under the Dayton Agreement the parties are obligated to implement fully the decisions of the Human Rights Commission. The parties themselves proposed the Commission, and we expect them to comply with it. In addition, there will be international human rights monitors on the ground under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other agencies, as well as an International Police Task Force working with existing civil police authorities. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will also have a contingent of protection officers in Bosnia. These bodies will monitor human rights conditions and report abuses. All parties have agreed to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal which will remove violators of human rights and provide impartial justice. All of these bodies will contribute to an overall respect for human rights standards.

To encourage compliance, human rights standards will be taken into account when allocating reconstruction assistance. In addition, failure to comply with the Dayton Agreement could lead to the reimposition of sanctions. IFOR will have no role in enforcing compliance with individual decisions of the Human Rights Ombudsman or Chamber.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Benjamin Gilman  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

(Cross-reference: Smith question 3A)

Question:

3A. How did you reach those limits and how do they affect the military capabilities of the Bosnian Muslims? Should the parties fail to adhere to the limits, will IFOR compel them to do so? If not IFOR, then who?

Answer:

Stable and balanced military force levels both within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in neighboring states are essential if the Dayton Agreement is to become the basis for a lasting peace. With this in mind, the parties agreed to a series of arms control measures as part of the peace accord (Annex 1-B).

The arms control regime envisioned in the peace agreement should ensure that no party to the peace agreement grows too strong relative to the others. A conference on arms control as well as confidence and security-building measures took place in Bonn on December 18 to begin the process of negotiating numerical limits on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. If the parties fail to agree within 180 days of the signature of the agreement in Paris, individual limits on each of these categories of weapons will automatically come into force, per Annex 1-B, Article IV, Paragraph 3 of the peace agreement. These limits are based on the approximate ratio of populations of the parties and will apply to the five categories of weapons listed above on a 5:2:2 basis to the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," the Republic of Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian allocation will be further subdivided in a 2:1 ratio between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity.

Assuming the parties do not agree to an alternative arrangement and the Annex 1-B limits ultimately come into force, Bosnian Muslim military capabilities will not be adversely affected. Indeed, there is room under the Dayton caps for Federation military forces -- made up of both Bosnian Muslim and

- 2 -

Bosnian Croat elements -- to increase weaponry levels in four of the five categories listed in Annex 1-B. Only in the area of artillery may some reductions prove necessary, since Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat artillery holdings are already above their likely combined cap.

IFOR has no responsibility for implementing the arms control portion of the peace agreement. Under the terms of Annex 1-B, the OSCE will assist the parties in their arms control negotiations and will assist in the implementation and verification of any resulting agreements. These negotiations are ongoing in Vienna.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Benjamin Gilman  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

PEACE ACCORD

Question:

3b. What is the relationship between the training and arming the Bosnians and this part of the Accord?

Answer:

To ensure a lasting peace in the Balkans, it is essential to achieve stability and balance among the various forces in the region. It is our preference that military stabilization be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, rather than by the introduction of large quantities of new arms into the region. The Dayton Agreement includes a number of arms control and military confidence-building measures the parties are now committed to undertaking.

As these measures alone will likely be insufficient to achieve military stabilization, the United States is committed to ensuring that the Federation armed forces obtain the self-defense equipment and training necessary by the time IFOR departs. Because of the need to maintain the impartiality of IFOR, neither IFOR nor the United States forces in IFOR will participate in this effort. The United States will, instead, coordinate the contributions of third countries.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

PEACE ACCORD

Question:

4. We understand that the parties were unable to agree on the boundary line in one especially sensitive area that is to be patrolled by U.S. troops -- the area around Brcko. Instead of agreeing to a boundary, the parties agreed to submit the boundary issue to binding international arbitration. How will U.S. forces patrol the border and otherwise enforce the agreement in this area before the arbitrators issue their decision about a year from now? Isn't there a significant potential for confrontation as a result of the agreement to disagree over this important issue?

Answer:

The Brcko area in the Posavina Corridor is an area of great importance and therefore will be monitored very closely by IFOR prior to the completion of the international arbitration agreed to as part of the Dayton agreement. IFOR will have the authority to patrol and deploy wherever necessary. In the event of violations, the U.S. will be prepared to employ every asset at its disposal to identify the responsible party and act immediately and decisively to neutralize the threat.



Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Benjamin Gilman  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

PEACE ACCORD

Question:

5. Under the Agreement (Annex 1-A, Art. (1)), a force to assist the implementation of the agreement is to be deployed to Bosnia "for a period of approximately one year." Last night, Canadian Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, the former commander of UNPROFOR stated that setting such a time limit is "impossible." He estimated that our forces would have to remain in Bosnia for at least several years. There are few, if any, military experts outside of the Pentagon who think the Bosnia mission can be completed in 12 months. I will note that 53% of Americans in a CNN poll agreed that our deployment will lead to a long-term commitment. We are worried that your timetable is set by the Presidential election calendar and not diplomatic/military considerations. What would you do if the mission cannot be finished by next November?

Answer:

IFOR's mission will be of a finite duration; it is not an open-ended commitment. The timeframe of approximately one year is based on the military judgment of what is necessary to complete IFOR's military tasks and to provide an opportunity for the parties to begin to reap the benefits of peace.

Our military expects that the specific tasks, such as supervising the withdrawal of forces, can take place in a period of 4-6 months. Thereafter, IFOR will provide a safe and secure environment for the civilian side of the agreement, such as elections and the return of refugees, to go forward. The period of IFOR's deployment will also provide an opportunity for arms control and military confidence-building measures to be implemented. As a result, the situation should be dramatically different a year from now when it comes time for IFOR to depart.

IFOR's presence is meant to give the parties an opportunity to build on the peace they signed in Paris. It is not a guarantee; the parties must seize the opportunity provided them.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

PEACE ACCORD

Question:

6. Under the agreement (Annex 1-A, Art. IV(2)(c)(2)), the IFOR will patrol a four-kilometer wide demilitarized zone between the warring factions. When you read the details, you will note that in Sarajevo, this zone will shrink to less than a kilometer. That means Americans will be placed between warring factions less than five city blocks apart. It seems that our boys will be vulnerable at close quarters with the warring factions, without the long fields of fire that give the advantage to our weaponry. Can you comment?

Answer:

Force protection has been and remains of paramount importance in IFOR planning. The French contingent of IFOR, long-experienced in Sarajevo, has primary responsibility for the Sarajevo sector, so the situation you describe will not immediately affect U.S. troops. However, the special military problems of Sarajevo have been worked very hard by both our diplomatic negotiators and NATO planners and I would refer you to the Pentagon for more detailed explanation of this operational planning.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Gilman  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Question:

7. Under the agreement, the U.N. will recruit and train a new police force. The U.N. sponsored such projects in other countries such as El Salvador. Our experience has been that this process has taken much longer than planned and certainly longer than one year. Over the next year, who will restore order if the civilian authority breaks down? If the U.S. leaves and order breaks down before the new police force is established, who will step in to restore order?

Answer:

The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia is implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement. Addressing threats to civilian rule of law and public order is the responsibility of civilian authorities. To assist the Parties in establishing a safe and secure environment for all persons, we are working closely with the UN to establish the International Police Task Force (IPTF) as a UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) operation. The mission of the IPTF is to monitor police activities, provide on-the-job-training, and assist in reconstituting law enforcement units and functions throughout the country. Therefore, the local police, under the tutelage of the IPTF, will restore order if civilian authority breaks down. Regarding military involvement in restoring public order, IFOR has the authority to respond to any threat to peace, including circumstances resulting in a breakdown of public order which go beyond the response capacity of IPTF. We are proceeding to implement military and civilian aspects of the peace agreement with the expectation that the Parties will fully participate in all aspects of the effort to create a lasting peace.

Chairman Gilman

Peace Accord

Question:

8. Under the Agreement (Annex 7, Art I (1)), the freedom of movement in the city of Mostar has been agreed to many times but never honored. The Croats also held elections for their own congress in Bosnia. Given the problems in Mostar and the precedent set by the Croatian election in Bosnia, why are we optimistic that the Federation has any future?

Answer:

According to our latest information from Mostar, the provisions of the November 10 agreement on the Federation, which includes freedom of movement between the Bosnian Croat and Muslim parts of Mostar have been implemented since December 1. These provide for "an unlimited number of crossings for women, children and men not of military age or military obligation, as well as simpler procedures for the crossings without prior registration" and "unlimited and unobstructed access to the seat of the EU Administration On Mostar and of the Ombudsman for all citizens of Mostar." The EU Administrator of Mostar reports that these provisions are being observed with hundreds of civilians crossing daily from one part of Mostar to the other and with few incidents.

We are realistic, rather than optimistic, about the Federation. Ensuring its success will take determined efforts by the United States, other countries, and the two Bosnian parties on the ground. Turning the Federation into a fully functioning political unit will require the continued political will to transfer authority to the Federation and to dismantle other existing structures (in particular, the Croat para-state of "Herzeg Bosna").

Along with other interested governments, the United States will continue to press for rapid implementation of the institutions of the Federation.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Smith  
Subcommittee on International Organizations  
and Human Rights  
November 30, 1995

Question:

Focusing on the section of the peace plan which deals with human rights, I would appreciate your clarifying how the provisions will be implemented. Should local Bosnian Serbs who may be implicated in charges that may be brought before the Human Rights Ombudsman or Chamber refuse to cooperate, who can force cooperation? Will the IFOR be assigned that responsibility?

Answer:

The parties to the human rights annex to the Framework Agreement (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska) created the Human Rights Chamber to adjudicate alleged human rights abuses involving any of the parties. The Chamber will not hear cases directed against private individuals or entities not acting on behalf of the parties.

The Human Rights Chamber has normal judicial powers, including the right to investigate, subpoena and issue warrants. It also has broad powers to issue compensation awards against the parties. The Chamber may also enjoin or fine the parties. It has the power to order specific performance by the parties. While the Chamber possesses these powers, neither the Chamber nor the Ombudsman have enforcement mechanisms. However, the parties to the Framework Agreement are committed to honor the rulings of the Chamber and to cooperate with the Ombudsman.

Should rulings not be enforced by the parties, or should they fail to cooperate with the Ombudsman, the international community, and especially the High Representative, will bring political pressure to bear on the delinquent authorities. The Chamber will keep a record of compliance that will be taken into account in allocating economic assistance. IFOR has no responsibility in this regard.

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Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Smith  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Q: Given Milosevic's importance to the current peace strategy, what impact would an indictment against him by the War Crimes Tribunal have on the peace process? Would U.S. interests be enhanced or damaged if Milosevic were to be indicted? Would political considerations influence the investigations against Milosevic?

A: We remain committed to seeing that those responsible for war crimes are brought to justice. The International Tribunal, which we pressed to establish and are providing with personnel, information, and other services, has already issued more than fifty indictments and has initiated criminal proceedings in two cases. The Dayton Accords commit the parties to cooperate fully with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

Throughout the negotiations, we have stressed the importance and independence of the war crimes process. We do not believe, however, that it is useful or proper to discuss hypothetical matters related to the Tribunal's work.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Christopher Smith  
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

(Cross-reference: Gilman question 3A)

Question:

3. In Annex 1-B (Agreement on Regional Stability), the agreement outlines fairly specific arms control measures each of the parties must undertake. Should the parties fail to reach agreement within 180 days, the Accord specifies that certain limits -- specifically, a 5:2:2 ration between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims -- will apply to the number of tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. How did the negotiators reach those limits and how do such limits affect the military capabilities of the Bosnian Muslims? Should the parties fail to adhere to the limits, will IFOR compel them to do so? If not IFOR, then who will enforce that element of the agreement?

Answer:

Stable and balanced military force levels both within Bosnia and Herzegovina and in neighboring states are essential if the Dayton Agreement is to become the basis for a lasting peace. With this in mind, the parties agreed to a series of arms control measures as part of the peace accord (Annex 1-B).

The arms control regime envisioned in the peace agreement should ensure that no party to the peace agreement grows too strong relative to the others. A conference on arms control as well as confidence and security-building measures took place in Bonn on December 18 to begin the process of negotiating numerical limits on tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters. If the parties fail to agree within 180 days of the signature of the agreement in Paris, individual limits on each of these categories of weapons will automatically come into force, per Annex 1-B, Article IV, Paragraph 3 of the peace agreement. These limits are based on the approximate ratio of populations of the parties and will apply to the five categories of weapons listed above on a 5:2:2 basis to the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Croatia, and Bosnia. The Bosnian allocation will be further subdivided in a 2:1 ratio between the Federation and the Bosnian Serb entity.



- 2 -

Assuming the parties do not agree to an alternative arrangement and the Annex 1-B limits ultimately come into force, Bosnian Muslim military capabilities will not be adversely affected. Indeed, there is room under the Dayton caps for Federation military forces -- made up of both Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat elements -- to increase weaponry levels in four of the five categories listed in Annex 1-B. Only in the area of artillery may some reductions prove necessary, since Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat artillery holdings are already above their likely combined cap.

IFOR has no responsibility for implementing the arms control portion of the peace agreement. Under the terms of Annex 1-B, the OSCE will assist the parties in their arms control negotiations and will assist in the implementation and verification of any resulting agreements. These negotiations are ongoing in Vienna.

Question for the Record  
Submitted to  
Secretary of State Warren Christopher  
by Chairman Christopher H. Smith  
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Human Rights  
Committee on International Relations  
November 30, 1995

Question:

4. In the President's address to the nation on November 27, he stressed that IFOR would be a NATO operation involving troops from approximately 25 countries, including hundreds, if not thousands, of soldiers from non-NATO states. As I recall, NATO is considered a "Regional Arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Will the United Nations, either directly or indirectly, authorize the deployment of the IFOR force, including a proposed contingent of 20,000 Americans, for operations in the former Yugoslavia? Will the IFOR Commander report to, or in any other manner be subordinated to, the United Nations or any UN representative? Will the proposed operation in the former Yugoslavia be subject to the reporting requirements stipulated in Article 54 of the UN Charter? Will NATO report to any other organization on its operations in the former Yugoslavia? Will the UN Security Council have any power of control over the proposed NATO operation?

Answer:

IFOR is deployed by NATO under a "grant of authority" from the United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 1031 was adopted on December 15, 1995, by a vote of 15-0-0. UNSCR 1031 noted that the IFOR was to be deployed at the invitation of the parties and explicitly authorized IFOR's establishment "under unified command and control in order to fulfill the role specified in Annex 1-A (Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement) and Annex 2 (Inter-Entity Boundary) of the Peace Agreement." The Resolution also extended broad enforcement powers to the IFOR, and recognized the right of the IFOR "to take all necessary measures" to defend itself. IFOR's actual deployment was only ordered by a subsequent, separate decision of NATO's North Atlantic Council.

The UN, however, will carry out certain functions essential for successful implementation of civilian aspects of the peace agreement. With this in mind, the NAC also agreed that the NATO Secretary General should make appropriate arrangements for informing the UN of IFOR activities, in accordance with UNSCR 1031. This is only to ensure the necessary coordination of activities on the ground in Bosnia; there is no "dual key" structure. NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General George Joulwan, U.S.A., responds to the President of the United States and to NATO, not to anyone else. Longstanding UN and NATO practice indicates that there is no existing obligation for NATO to report pursuant to Article 54. Nevertheless, the Security Council is fully apprised of IFOR's activities pursuant to the reporting specified in UN Security Council Resolution 1031.



198

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Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
by Representative Eliot L. Engel  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question

Now that the Dayton talks are over, what is the timetable for pressing for a resolution of the Kosovo dilemma? Are we urging Milosevic to negotiate with Rugova? What other steps are we taking to deal with the question of Kosovo?

Answer:

We expect to spend a great deal of time in 1996 concerned with the problem of Kosovo. It remains one of the fundamental unsolved issues in the former Yugoslavia. We hope to use the momentum from Dayton in addressing these unresolved issues.

Although Kosovo was not formally on the agenda during the Proximity Talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, it did come up in discussions with Milosevic. I and other others stressed to Milosevic that the U.S. continues to be concerned over the situation in Kosovo, and that we would be watching events closely. Milosevic restated his opposition to Kosovar separatism and continued to insist the situation there is an internal Serbian matter.

We believe that the LDK and the Serb authorities should begin a political dialogue in order to start the vital process of restoring dignity and liberty to Kosovo. We will continue to work for such a dialogue.

Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
by Representative Eliot L. Engel  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question

Specifically, what sanctions constitute the "outer wall"? Specifically, what clear, identifiable conditions must Belgrade meet before the U.S. would ease the "outer wall" of sanctions?

Answer:

The so-called "outer wall" sanctions are political measures designed to encourage the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" to take positive steps with respect to the Kosovar Albanians, its neighbors, and the War Crimes Tribunal. To accomplish this, the United States works to see that the "FRY" continues to be excluded from membership in all international organizations, including international financial institutions. In addition, we continue to refuse to recognize formally the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".

Before these sanctions will be eased, progress in the following areas must be made: (a) increased respect for political and human rights in Kosovo, (b) Belgrade's good faith cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal, and (c) an arrangement among the successor states to the SFRY regarding the treatment of SFRY assets and liabilities.

Question for the Record Submitted to Warren Christopher  
by Representative Eliot L. Engel  
House International Relations Committee  
November 30, 1995

Kosovo

Question

Please specify what security conditions are preventing establishment of the U.S.I.A. office in Pristina?

Answer:

Section 223 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1992 and 1993 calls on the USIA to open a cultural center in Kosovo "when the Secretary of State determines that the physical security of the center and the personal safety of its employees may be reasonably assured." I have previously expressed the view that while having such a permanent presence in Kosovo could discourage Serb repression of Kosovar Albanians, security conditions have prevented the opening of such a center.

However, in light of the significant change in the political climate in the Balkans in the wake of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, I asked the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security to reassess the security situation in Kosovo. On January 15, a report was issued that would support the opening of such a center. As required by applicable treaty and practice, the State Department approached the "FRY" authorities to request permission to establish a USIA presence in Kosovo. In the event of a positive response, the Department and USIA will work closely to make this center a reality.

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